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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent articles have argued that existing environmental laws work to the
disadvantage of minorities or the poor and have used shorthand expressions
such as "environmental racism," "environmental justice" or "environmental
equity" to refer to a wide range of distributional issues.' It is fair to say that an
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1983; J.D., Yale Law School, 1987. I wish to thank Joe Tomain, John Applegate, Gordon
Christenson, and Paul Schwartz for their comments on earlier drafts. Jennifer Tecson
provided able research assistance. I also wish to thank law librarian Jim Hart for his
assistance in obtaining various government documents and other hard-to-find sources. All
errors or omissions are my responsibility.
I See, e.g., Vicki Been, Locally Undeirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynarmics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994) [hereinafter
Been, Market Dynarics]; Vicki Been, Wats Fairness Got To Do with It? Envirornental
Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993)
[hereinafter Been, Fairness]; Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice" The
Dist'butional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1993).
Commentators have defined environmental equity, environmental justice, and
environmental racism in slightly different ways:
Environmental racism is the intentional or unintentional practice of racially
discriminatory siting. Environmental equity involves evenly balancing the siting of
potentially environmentally hazardous facilities among communities of all backgrounds.
Environmental justice, on the other hand, has emerged as a movement to relieve all
communities of the burden of emissions by curtailing waste generation and preventing
all pollution.
Charles J. McDermott, Balancing the Scales of Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB.
LJ. 689, 689 (1994). Rae Zimmerman says:
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"environmental justice movement" now exists, including both activists and
scholars. This movement frequently argues that people of color and the poor
are exposed to greater environmental risks than are whites and wealthier
Americans at least in part because of racism and classism in the siting of
environmental risks, the promulgation of environmental laws and regulations,
the enforcement of environmental laws, and the attention given to the cleanup
of polluted areas.2 In response to charges of class and racial bias, Carol
Browner, Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), has identified the elimination of environmental racism as one of her top
priorities.3 President Clinton, in an Earth Day speech, called environmental
justice an important domestic priority, 4 and on February 11, 1994, he issued
Executive Order 12,898,5 which requires all federal agencies to investigate to
Equity typically refers to the distribution of amenities and disadvantages across
individuals and groups. Justice, however, focuses more on procedures to ensure fair
distribution. Fairness refers to where one group or individual disproportionately bears
the burdens of an action.
Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classification in Environmental Equity: How We Manage Is How
We Measure, 21 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 633, 633 n.1 (1994). Many scholars prefer the terms
"environmental justice" or "equity" to the more negative and divisive shorthand of
"environmental racism." Lazarus, supra, at 790. This Article uses the expression
"environmental justice" because it refers to a range of issues broader than racism.
2 See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1384 (discussing the environmental
justice movement).
3 Stephen C. Jones, EPA Targets 'Environmental Racism', NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993,
at 28, 34 (citing Carol M. Browner, Address at the District of Columbia Bar Association
Luncheon, National Press Club, (June 25, 1993)). Under the Clinton Administration and the
leadership of Carol Browner, the EPA has taken a more activist approach to environmental
equity issues than the EPA did under the Bush Administration and EPA Administrator
William K. Reilly. In 1992, after the National Law Journal released a study finding
significant racial disparities in the agency's enforcement and remedy selection policies, EPA
officials stated that more sophisticated studies were needed. Marianne Lavelle, EPA
Responds to Concerns of Minorities on Cleanups, NAT'L L.J., May 9, 1994, at A12. By
contrast, in 1994, Elliott P. Laws, the EPA's assistant administrator in charge of waste
programs, argued that citizen groups concerned with environmental justice issues have been
waiting for years for action and therefore that the Clinton Administration would not wait
until more research is done. Id.
4 Steven Keeva, A Breath ofJustice, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 88, 88.
5 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). Earlier, President Clinton had
issued Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), which requires agencies to "design its
regulations in the most cost-effective manner to achieve the regulatory objective. In doing
so, each agency shall consider incentives for innovation, consistency, predictability, the
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what extent their policies may create environmental inequities in minority or
low-income populations.
There is conflicting evidence about whether it is the initial siting decision
or subsequent events attributable to market dynamics that cause disparities
between the risks borne by whites and minorities, or by rich and poor.6 It is
important to understand the causes of such disparities because different
remedies may be appropriate. Siting discrimination suits can address only
disparities caused by the initial siting decision, but ongoing compensation or
broad redistributive policies can at least partially redress the impact of market
dynamics.
Siting discrimination suits under the Equal Protection Clause have
generally failed because of that Clause's discriminatory intent requirement.7
Many commentators propose a "disparate impact approach," which would
allow a finding of discrimination without the need to prove discriminatory
intent, contending that the intent requirement fails to address indirect racial
discrimination resulting from past practices or unconscious attitudes.8
This Article disagrees with environmental justice advocates who would
find discrimination whenever there are disparate impacts. The intent
requirement legitimately distinguishes between intentional conduct perpetrated
by bad actors and unintentional conduct that may have disparate impacts but is
motivated by neutral decisionmaking criteria that serve legitimate business
interests. The disparate impact approach raises troubling issues in defining
what is statistically significant discrimination, what is the relevant geographical
area affected by a facility, and which persons should be classified as belonging
to a racial minority group. 9
Courts applying the Equal Protection Clause should focus on whether
minorities are adequately represented in the siting decisionmaking process
rather than on the substantive merits of the siting decision. 10 A siting
costs of enforcement and compliance (to the government, regulated entities, and the public),
flexibility, distributive impacts, and equity." Id. at 639. Although the objectives of
Executive Order 12,866 are laudatory, it provides no guidance on how agencies should
choose among these goals if they conflict.
6 See generally Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1398-1407 (discussing
market dynamics theory and presenting conflicting empirical evidence); see also infra notes
55-58 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting studies).
7 See generally Lazarus, supra note 1, at 828-33 (citing sources and discussing four
losing equal protection cases); infra notes 293-301 and accompanying text.
8 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 825-26; see also Sheila Foster, Race(lal) Matters: The
Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 733-34; infra notes 307-13 and
accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 363-74 and accompanying text.
10 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
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representation and compensation process should insure fair representation for
minorities and make equal protection challenges irrelevant.
A "compensation approach" that fairly represents those at greatest risk,
including minorities, is sufficient to address disparate impacts and does so
without stigmatizing developers and government officials motivated by neutral
decisionmaking criteria that serve legitimate business purposes. Compensation
can at least partially address disparities that arise subsequent to the initial siting
decision as a result of market dynamics. Disparate impact suits are ill-suited to
addressing whether the benefits of a facility outweigh its costs. Moreover,
eliminating all environmental disparities may be too costly in some eases.I 1
Unlike job discrimination, the siting of a polluting or disposal facility
brings both costs and benefits to any community. Disparate impact challenges
may actually harm a minority group if they block the siting of a project that
brings to a community employment and tax benefits that outweigh the risks.12
Minorities are likely to lose more than whites if legislative measures designed
to reduce environmental inequities reduce the incentive for businesses to
relocate into poor and minority areas. 13 The dangers of poverty and
unemployment are often much greater than the risks associated with waste
disposal facilities and industrial plants. 14 Indeed, in a number of siting disputes
in which environmental justice groups challenged the siting of a particular
facility, other well-established minority groups such as the local chapter of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
REVIEW, 87, 181 & passim (1980) (proposing theory of representation-reinforcing review
and arguing that central purpose of Equal Protection Clause is protecting minority political
participation, not preventing substantive injustices). Ely's theory has generated enormous
controversy. See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political
Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence
of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Mark V. Tushnet,
Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L.. 1037 (1980); Symposium, Judicial Review Versus Democracy, 42
O-Io ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Ron Replogle, Note, The Scope of Representation-Reinforcing
Judicial Review, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1592 (1992). Regardless of the validity of Ely's
theory of judicial review, his theory offers an appropriate analogy for a statutory proposal
that emphasizes the adequate representation of minorities rather than equality of results.
ll See generally Kent E. Portney, Environmental Justice and Sustainability: Is There a
Critical Nexus in the Case of Waste Disposal or Treatment Facility Siting?, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L. 827, 832-39 (1994); see also A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: The
Potential Misfit Between Equity and Efficiency, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 871 (1992) (discussing
need to balance environmental equity and efficiency).
12 See infra notes 13-15, 406-07 and accompanying text.
13 CHRISTOPHER BOERNER & THOMAS LAMBERT, ENvIRoNmiwAL JUSTICE? 6 (1994).
14 Id.
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supported construction of the facility. 15
Developers can redress a facility's externalities by compensating affected
groups. Existing compensation practices, however, do not sufficiently address
distributional and representational issues. A number of states have some form
of compensation system, but no system is designed to make sure that those at
greatest risk receive roughly proportionate representation and compensation. 16
This Article proposes a new risk-based approach to representing and
compensating not only minorities but any person affected by a siting decision.
This proposal would create a formal mechanism for achieving the desire of
many environmental justice advocates to empower those local residents most
affected by a siting decision. 17 The EPA or state siting agencies, however,
would provide a technocratic framework for assessing the scope of risks,
despite the limitations of risk and cost-benefit analysis;' 8 would set limits on
the maximum amount of risk in any community; and would specify the
minimum compensation required from a developer. Immediate neighbors,
political residents in the siting community, and regional residents would have a
varying degree of input into the siting and compensation process depending
upon the risk they bear from a facility.
After the EPA or siting board established minimum safety standards and
determined the minimum compensation, a siting negotiation and compensation
committee, elected by a risk-weighted voting system, would negotiate with a
developer concerning both the amount and the distribution of compensation.
Compensation would go to those who are at greatest risk rather than to local
politicians and unrelated municipal service needs such as schools. The
compensation process could take into account harms caused by both the initial
15 Id. at 13-14 (discussing proposed site in Brooksville, Mississippi and controversial
Emelle Landfill in Sumter County, Alabama).
16 See infra notes 159, 188-205 and accompanying text.
17 See generally Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned:
Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PuB.
PoL'Y 69, 71-79 (1991) (discussing and praising minority grassroots environmental
movement); Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 EcoLoGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Robert W. Collin,
Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA.
ENVTL. LJ. 495 (1992) (advocating environmental planning at local level where
detrimental impact of waste siting decisions is greatest).
18 There are serious limitations in assessing the risks of carcinogens and especially
noncarcinogens. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Wat Comes After Technology: Using an
"Exceptions Process" to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13
STAN. ENVrL. LJ. 263, 281-84 (1994); James H. Colopy, Comment, The Road Less
Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Ttle VI of the Ovil Rights Act of 1964,
13 STAN. ENVTL. L.. 125, 137-39 (1994); infra notes 386-401 and accompanying text.
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siting process and subsequent ongoing or ex post risks. The compensation
process would also determine the relative allocation of monies for remedial,
preventive, and incentive purposes.
Part H of this Article discusses the empirical evidence regarding whether
minorities are disproportionately affected by pollution and examines whether
disparities are caused by the initial siting decision or by subsequent events
attributable to market dynamics. Part I1(A) reviews current siting practices and
proposed environmental justice legislation. Part 1(B) discusses the limitations
of current compensation practices. Part I(C) explores the question of to what
extent the public should participate in environmental decisionmaking. Part IV
discusses recent equal protection challenges to allegedly discriminatory siting
decisions and scrutinizes proposals by other commentators to allow for
broadened disparate impact claims. Part V argues that equal protection suits
should be allowed only when there is evidence of intentional discrimination.
Disparate impact suits should be allowed only when there is statistically
significant evidence of such impacts, the costs of discrimination outweigh the
benefits of a proposed project to an affected group, and there is no adequate
compensation process. Part VI presents a "risk-based" committee system that
would give greater representation to those most at risk from locally undesirable
land uses and would be the fairest system for compensating those who are at
risk from locally undesirable land uses.
H1. THE PROBLEM OF "ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE"
There is conflicting empirical evidence about the extent of environmental
inequities, but there are some disparities at some sites. 19 A more difficult
question is whether disparities are primarily caused by discriminatory initial
siting decisions or by subsequent events attributable to market dynamics, which
lead poor people to move toward undesirable facilities when property values
fall. 20 It is important to understand the causes of disparities because the
remedies for correcting them will differ accordingly.
A. Evidence of Environmental Inequities
In theory, it is probably to be expected that some segments of society will
receive fewer environmental benefits and bear greater environmental burdens,
19 See generally Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1398-1406 (reviewing
environmental justice literature and criticizing several studies purporting to find
environmental inequities); infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
2 0 See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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and a considerable literature has developed about this observation. 21 The
existence of at least some environmental racial disparities in a society in which
there are significant differences among minorities and whites in income levels,
education, residential patterns, and access to political power is not surprising.
Even if the government's enforcement and cleanup policies are the same in
minority and white neighborhoods and in rich and poor neighborhoods,
generally poor enforcement efforts by the EPA or delayed and inept cleanups
may still disproportionately harm minority or poor neighborhoods if there are
more such sites in these communities. 22 Furthermore, pollution prevention
schemes that reduce the overall amount of pollution may simultaneously
increase pollution for certain populations. 23
Because minorities and poor people disproportionately live closer to
polluting industries than do nonminorities, 24 minorities or the poor should
obtain disproportionately larger benefits from any across-the-board reduction in
pollution or increase in occupational safety.25 It is not clear, however, that
minorities or poor people, especially those living in urban areas, have in fact
received proportionately larger increases, 26 and there is some evidence that
greater benefits have gone to people living in nonurban areas. 27
21 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 792-94. Environmental protection laws tend to
redistribute risks because the use of pollution control devices to reduce certain risks-for
instance, air pollution scrubbers or municipal wastewater treatment facilities to reduce air or
water pollution-frequently creates other types of pollution, such as sludge, that impose
risks on a segment of the population different from the segment that would have been
exposed to the initial pollution. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-
Opening ofthe Environmental Mind?, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 463-69 & passim; Lazarus, supra
note 1, at 794-95.
22 See generally Colopy, supra note 18, at 139-40.
23 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 794-95.
2 4 See infra notes 28-29, 32-36, 41-44 and accompanying text.
25 See E. Donald Elliott, A Cabin on the Mountain: Reflections on the Distributional
Consequences of Environmental Protection Programs, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 7
(1991) ("In my judgment, minorities and the poor probably benefit disproportionately from
environmental protection measures."); Lazarus, supra note 1, at 798; William K. Reilly,
Enviromnental Equity: EPA's Position, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 18, 22 ("It is
undeniable that minorities usually benefit from-are, indeed, the chief beneficiaries of-
more general efforts to protect the environment.").
26 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 798-99; infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
There is some evidence that uniform technology-based regulation of air pollution has
resulted in higher-income persons receiving larger absolute benefits in pollution reduction
compared to lower-income persons. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 798-99 (citing studies).
Higher-income individuals may even receive greater benefits from programs aimed at
improving urban air quality. See id.
27 As a result, there has been significant progress since 1970 in improving air quality
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
National uniform regulation in some circumstances does not effectively
address localized concentrations of pollution, called "hot-spots," 28 which often
disproportionately impact minorities or poor people because they are more
likely to breathe polluted urban air or eat contaminated fish. 29 Although there
are significant differences between technology-based and market-based
regulatory approaches, 30 neither type of regulation is especially adept at
addressing localized hot-spots. 31
as measured by the national ambient air quality standards for criteria pollutants such as
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulates. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 814 n.109
(arguing that greater progress has been made in improving general ambient air quality
criteria than in reducing toxic air emissions and citing COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QuALrrY, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1986)). But relatively less progress has been
made in reducing emissions of hazardous air pollutants, which often are of greater concern
to neighbors, disproportionately minorities, of the toxic polluting source. See id. at 814. In
another article, this author questioned how effectively the two-stage approach to regulating
hazardous air pollutants in the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments will work at reducing
overall emissions of hazardous air pollutants and in particular "hot-spots" that may
disproportionately affect minorities and the poor. See generally Mank, supra note 18.
Because a larger proportion of racial minorities reside in metropolitan areas, higher
percentages of African-Americans and Hispanics, compared to white Americans, live in air
nonattainment areas for particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide, and
lead. See 1 ENVTL. EQUrrY WORKGROUP, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND EVALUATION,
U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUrTY: REDuCNG RISK FOR ALL COMMUNrMES, WORKGROUP
REPORT TO THE ADMNSTRATOR 13-14 (June 1992) [hereinafter EPA ENVMONMENTAL
EQUITY RMORT].
28 See Mank, supra note 18, at 290-91 (discussing hot-spots). See generally California
Air Toxics "Hot Spots" Information and Assessment Act of 1987, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 44300-44384 (West Supp. 1995) (legislation providing for the collection of
information and assessment of health risks regarding emissions of hazardous air pollutants
that may cause hot-spots). Some pollutants, such as volatile organic compounds, do not
have significant site-specific impacts, but other pollutants create localized pollution
problems around the emitting source. Carbon monoxide, for example, can create hot-spots
in and near tunnels and around major intersections where motor vehicle traffic is heaviest.
See Mank, supra note 18, at 290 n.121.
29 Minority groups' relative lack of political power at the national level may explain
why air pollution control efforts typically focus on general ambient air quality concerns for
an entire metropolitan region rather than on toxic hot-spots in any one particular area. See
Lazarus, supra note 1, at 814; see also Mank, supra note 18, at 290-91 (discussing hot-
spots).
30There has been an extensive academic debate about the relative merits of
technology-based and economic incentive-based regulation. See generally Mank, supra note
18, at 297-99.
31 Because the first major wave of environmental regulation in the 1970s relied
primarily upon technology-based approaches, there is more evidence that such systems of
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The real issue, however, is an empirical one: Are minorities or poor
persons disproportionately disadvantaged by environmental laws? Several
major studies have found that hazardous waste sites, solid waste dumps,
polluting factories, and other locally undesirable land uses are located in areas
that contain, on average, a higher percentage of racial minorities and are poorer
than nonhost communities. In 1983, the United States General Accounting
Office (GAO) examined the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of the
communities surrounding four offsite hazardous waste landfills located in the
eight southeastern states that make up the EPA's Region IV and found that
"[b]lacks make up the majority of the population in three of the four
communities where the landfills are located." 32 In 1987, the United Church of
Christ Commission for Racial Justice published what was then the most
comprehensive study, involving the location of all 415 commercial hazardous
waste facilities in the contiguous United States that could be identified through
the EPA's Hazardous Waste Data Management System, and concluded that
"[a]lthough socioeconomic status appeared to play an important role in the
location of commercial hazardous waste facilities, race still proved to be more
significant." 33 In 1994, an updated study by the United Church of Christ found
regulation have in many cases failed to achieve equitable reductions in the amount of
pollution. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 798-99, 814-15 (discussing various regulatory
programs that may have had neutral or even regressive distributional impacts); infra notes
41-44 and accompanying text. Marketable permit systems, however, are not necessarily
more effective than technology-based forms of regulation in reducing hot-spots. See TOM H.
TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN ExERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 71
(1985) ("Neither the command-and-control nor the emissions permit policy considers source
location in assigning control responsibility."). Market permit systems can even exacerbate
pollution concentrations more so than uniform regulations because the distribution of
pollution under a market system of transferable pollution rights will tend to replicate
existing income and property distributions, which themselves may be the product of racial
inequities. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 849; Manley W. Roberts, Comment, A Remedyfor
the Victims of Pollution Permit Markets, 92 YALE L.J. 1022, 1027-28 & n.40 (1983).
Incentive-based systems of regulation are no better than uniform standards in taking into
account the actual amount of harm caused at a particular site, because there is a complex
relationship between emission levels and "[tihe polluting effect of a given emission, [which]
depends upon weather, season, air and water flow, and a host of other factors." STEPHEN
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 276 (1982). Site-specific regulatory approaches,
including variances or exceptions from otherwise nationally uniform legislation, can address
hot-spots and can deal with local inequities generally. See generally Mank, supra note 18, at
313-26 &passim.
32 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND
THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 1
(1983).
3 3 UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, ToXIc WASTES AND RACE
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that the location of hazardous waste facilities reflects a national pattern of racial
inequality that has grown worse during the past decade.3 4 Professor Robert
Bullard, a sociologist, found that although African-Americans made up only
twenty-eight percent of the Houston population in 1980, six of Houston's eight
incinerators and mini-incinerators and fifteen of seventeen landfills were located
in predominantly African-American neighborhoods. 35 Other studies have
questioned whether there are disparities between minorities and whites in the
siting of solid and hazardous waste facilities or whether such disparities are
caused by events subsequent to the initial siting process. 36
There is evidence that the EPA and state agencies do not enforce
environmental laws equally in white and minority areas. In 1992, the National
Law Journal published a special issue on environmental racism that examined
all Resource Recovery and Conservation Act civil penalty cases in the federal
courts from 1985 through 1991 and concluded that race rather than income
caused disparities in toxic waste penalties. 37 The same National Law Journal
IN THE UNrrED STATES xiii (1987).
34 See generally BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA FrroN, ToXIc WASTES AND RACE
REvrtED (1994).
35 See Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste and the Black Houston Community, 53 Soc.
INQUIRY 273, 279-83 (1983); Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1395 n.49.
3 6 See infra part ll.B.
37Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21,
1992, at S2, S2. The study found that penalties at sites having the greatest white population
were about 500% higher than penalties at sites with the greatest minority population,
averaging $335,566 for the white areas, compared to $55,318 for minority areas. On the
other hand, there was no evidence of significant disparities between rich and poor areas for
hazardous waste civil penalties. The average penalty in areas with the lowest median
incomes was $113,491, which was three percent more than the $109,606 average penalty in
areas with the highest median incomes. The study also examined all civil cases concluded
from 1985 through 1991 under federal air, water, and waste laws and found disparities
based upon both race and income. Penalties in white communities were 46 % higher than in
minority communities, $153,067 compared to $105,028, and penalties were 54% higher in
high-income areas than in low-income areas, $146,993 compared to $95,664. Id. at S2, S4,
S6. But see William K. Reilly, EPA's Reilly Replies to 'Unequal Protection', NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 25, 1993, at 16. Reilly, then Administrator of the EPA, criticized the study on the
ground that the
analysis was limited to a small, unrepresentative sample of the agency's enforcement
actions-civil judicial suits for penalties-without regard to the many enforcement
actions brought as administrative actions or criminal prosecutions.
More important, the measure of enforcement effectiveness is not just how much
money someone is penalized, but whether and how effectively the underlying
environmental problem is corrected.
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study found that, under the Superfund cleanup program, it took twenty percent
longer in minority areas to have the EPA place a site on the national priority
action list, 5.6 years from the date of discovery to the date of listing compared
to 4.7 years in white areas, and ten percent longer in poor areas than in rich
areas, 5.3 years compared to 4.8 years.38 Congress has launched investigations
into the EPA's enforcement and cleanup practices.39 The United States
Commission on Civil Rights is also currently investigating the EPA's
enforcement and toxic waste cleanup decisions.40
There is also evidence that the poor and racial minorities are more likely to
live near sources of air pollution and to drink polluted water. 41 Proponents of
the environmental justice movement often argue that there has been greater
progress in improving air and water quality in nonurban areas.42 Although
Id. at 18.
38 Marianne Lavelle, 7he Minorities Equation, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2. At
the "minority sites," the EPA chose "containment," the capping or walling off of a
hazardous waste dump site, seven percent more frequently than it did permanent
"treatment," the cleanup method preferred under § 121 of the Superfund statute. Seventy-
five sites were "contained"; 70 were "treated." Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 37, at S2, S6.
At "white sites," the EPA ordered treatment 22% more often than it did containment, 88
treated sites compared to 72 contained sites. Id. Although § 121(b) of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) favors permanent
treatment solutions, § 121(a) gives the EPA considerable discretion in weighing costs and
other factors when determining cleanup levels. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a), (b) (1988).
39 See Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Racism Targeted, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 1993,
at 3; Marianne Lavelle, Discrimination Probe Planned: House Committee to Investigate
Environmental Racism, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 28, 1992, at 1.
40 See Marianne Lavelle, EPA Enforcement to be Probed, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993,
at 3, 34.
41 See generally Lazarus, supra note 1, at 796-806. There is evidence that African-
Americans and Hispanics are more likely than the poor population in general to live in
urban areas that are not in compliance with federal Clean Air Act requirements for
particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide, and lead. 1 EPA
ENvIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT, supra note 27, at 13-14 (stressing that measurements of
environmental contaminants represent the "potential" for exposure and not "actual"
exposure); Lazarus, supra note 1, at 805; D.R. Wernette & L.A. Nieves, Breathing
Polluted Air: Minorities Are Disproportionately Exposed, EPA J. Mar./Apr. 1992, at 16,
17. Over 67% of African-American inner-city children suffer from excessive blood lead
levels. See Jane Perkins, Recognizing and Attacking Environmental Racism, 26
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 389, 394 (1992) (citing 1990 study by the Environmental Defense
Fund); Colopy, supra note 18, at 132.
42 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 815. For example, significant financial resources have
been devoted to nonurban issues such as the prevention of significant deteriorations in air
quality, the reduction of "acid rain," and the protection of visibility in national parks and
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programs designed to reduce pollution in areas often possess great merit,
proponents of the environmental justice movement have contended that
pollution control programs aimed at poor and minority urban areas, such as
programs to reduce lead pollution, may yield greater returns in terms of overall
public health per dollar invested. 43 On the other hand, it is important to
recognize that our society has spent considerable resources to reduce urban
pollution. "[B]etween 1970 and 1990 the United States expended more than $1
trillion on environmental protection, the vast majority spent controlling
pollution in cities from industry, municipal facilities, and cars." 44
The work activities of minorities also expose them to disproportionate
environmental risks. 45 There is substantial evidence that minorities occupy
significantly more environmentally hazardous jobs and, as a result, suffer a
disproportionately higher number of environmentally related injuries. 46 For
instance, epidemiologists found that ninety percent of steelworkers most
heavily exposed to certain organic pollutants were nonwhite and that these
persons suffered from respiratory cancer at a rate eight times greater than
expected. 47 As many as 1,000 farmworkers, eighty to ninety percent of whom
are minorities, primarily African-Americans or Hispanics, die, and over
300,000 experience pesticide-related illnesses each year from direct pesticide
exposure. 48
wilderness areas. Id. In addition, Congress has directed substantial resources to improve
water quality in nonurban areas. Id. Professor Lazarus acknowledges that the Clean Water
Act's constructions grants program, which authorizes federal grants for municipal
wastewater treatment, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-99 (1988), may be an exception to the pattern of
relative neglect of urban areas that he sees in the Act, but he points out that the effectiveness
of the grants program has long been controversial. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 815.
43 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 815-16.
44 See Michel Gelobter, The Meaning of Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 841, 841 (1994) (citing COUNCIL ONENVTL. QUALITY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OFTHE
PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TwENTiETH ANNUAL REPORT 430 (1990) (Table
7)).
4 5 See generally George Friedman-Jim~nez, Achieving Environmental Justice: The
Role of Occupational Health, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 605 (1994).
46 See id. at 608-10; Lazarus, supra note 1, at 796-98 n.37.
47 1 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUrrY REPORT, supra note 27, at 17 (citing OFFICE OF
HEALTH AND ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, U.S. EPA, CARCINOGEN ASSESSMENT OF COKE OVEN
EMIssioNs (1984)). A study of long-term, fill-time, topside coke oven workers found that
they had a ten-fold increase in lung cancer and that 88% were nonwhites. Friedman-
Jim6nez, supra note 45, at 610 (citing Carol K. Redmond et al., Long-Term Mortality Study
of Steelworkers, 14 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 621, 621 (1972)).
48 See 1 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT, supra note 27, at 16-17; Ivette
Perfecto & Baldemar Velsquez, Fann Workers: Among the Least Protected, EPA J.,
Mar./Apr. 1992, at 13, 13-14; Colopy, supra note 18, at 132 (citing Paul M. Ong &
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The EPA is just beginning to address important fish consumption issues
that may cause toxic hot-spots to be especially dangerous to racial minorities. 49
Uniform water quality standards have failed to address the fact that some
populations, such as subsistence fishers and some racial groups, consume more
fish than the average population.50 It is critical that water quality standards take
into account the range of fish consumption among various subpopulations
rather than just average fish consumption patterns because polychlorinated
biphenyls, dioxins, furans, and many other chemicals can bioaccumulate in fish
tissues to high concentrations, even when water concentrations of these
chemicals are below detection limits.51 The EPA Environmental Equity Report
concluded that further study of the potential for contaminant exposure through
fish ingestion was needed, 52 and EPA Administrator Carol Browner has
specifically pledged to examine the fish consumption patterns of Native
Americans. 53 There is some evidence that certain subpopulation groups are
more sensitive to certain pollutants than is the general population.54
Evelyn Blumenberg, An Unnatural Trade-Off. Latinos and Environmental Justice, in
LATINOS IN A CHANGNG U.S. ECONOMY 207, 215 (Rebecca Morales & Frank Bonilla eds.,
1993)).
49 At least some minority groups, including African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and
Native Americans, eat disproportionate amounts of fish, which may contain dangerous
bioaccumulations of such chemicals as polychlorinated biphenyls, dioxins, and furans, and
minorities also tend to prepare fish for eating in a manner in which more contaminants will
be consumed, by including skin and trimming less fat. See 1 EPA ENvIRONMENTAL EQUrrY
REPORT, supra note 27, at 15-16; Lazarus, supra note 1, at 806 n.75.
50 1 EPA ENVIRONMENAL EQuIrY REPORT, supra note 27, at 15. In addition to the
quantitative rate of fish consumption, fish preparation and species of fish eaten also can
affect exposure to contaminants and may vary by socioeconomic factors. Id. at 16. As part
of the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act, Congress recognized that uniform
technology-based pollution control standards did not adequately address the problem of
toxic hot-spots and enacted legislation requiring states to adopt "individual control
strategies." 33 U.S.C. § 1314()(1)(C) (1988); Oliver A. Houck, 7he Regulation of Toxic
Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, [21 News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,528, 10,547-48 (Sept. 1991).
51 1 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUrrY REPORT, supra note 27, at 15.
52 Id.
53 See Mank, supra note 18, at 336 n.341 (citing Pollution Targeted: Protection of
Poor, Minorities Ordered, CN. ENQUiRER, Feb. 12, 1993, at A3).
5 4 There are uncertainties about whether risks applicable to the average white male in
the United States apply to members of minorities who may eat different foods or prepare the
same food in different ways, may have a high incidence of substance abuse, and may be
frequently exposed to toxins in the workplace. 1 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT,
supra note 27, at 3, 22; Lazarus, supra note 1, at 806; Manic, supra note 18, at 282, 336-
37; Colopy, supra note 18, at 137-39. According to the EPA, there is reason to believe that
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B. Market Dynamics and Evidence Contradicting the Discrimination
Hypothesis
1. Market Dynamics
Professor Vicki Been observes that most studies supporting the
environmental inequity hypothesis compare the current socioeconomic
characteristics of communities that host locally undesirable land uses to those of
areas that do not host such undesirables. 55 She argues that these studies do not
account for the possibility that the sites were chosen fairly in the sense that
there was no disproportionate effect upon the poor or people of color at the
time the sites were chosen, and that subsequent events attributable to market
dynamics produced the current disproportionate siting by leading poor people
to move toward a noxious site when property values fell. 56 Professor Been re-
examined a subgroup of the sites that were the subject of Professor Bullard's
1983 study and found that the facilities in Houston were sited somewhat
disproportionately in poor or minority communities, but that after the sitings,
the levels of poverty and the percentages of African-Americans increased, and
the property values in the neighborhoods declined. 57 On the other hand,
Professor Been's extension of the General Accounting Office study of four
hazardous waste landfills in the southeastern United States found a correlation
between neighborhood demographics and initial siting decisions, but no
evidence that market dynamics are leading the poor or people of color to
"several population groups identified as being sensitive to the health effects of air pollution
seem to be disproportionately composed of low-income or racial minority individuals
compared to the general population." 1 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQurry REPORT, supra note
27, at 22; see also Lazarus, supra note 1, at 806.
55 See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1384-85; see also Lazarus, supra note
1, at 802 n.56 (stating that the United Church of Christ study relied on present demographic
data); James T. Hamilton, Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact on Collective
Action on Hazardous Waste Sites, 24 RAND J. ECON. 101, 110 (1993) (examining initial
siting versus subsequent developments).
56 See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1385-92.
5 7 Professor Been eliminated data about unpermitted municipal landfills and
incinerators that had ceased to operate by the 1970s and thus avoided "double-counting"
problems in Professor Bullard's study. Id. at 1400-01. But see Robert D. Bullard, A New
"O'cken-or-Egg" Debate: Which Came First-The Neighborhood, or the Toxic Dump?, 19
THE WORKBOOK, Summer 1994, at 60-61 (challenging Been's exclusion of sites included in
his earlier study). Professor Been used census tracts as the unit of analysis whereas
Professor Bullard relied on his own "ethnographic" study and "field observations" to define
the "neighborhoods" surrounding the sites even if the census tract data indicated that an
area was predominantly white. Been, Market Dynadmcs, supra note 1, at 1401 n.72.
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"come to the nuisance." 58
Part VI of this Article proposes a new approach to compensation that
addresses the concerns of both residents present during the initial siting
decision and those who later move to the area as a result of market dynamics
and other factors.
2. Evidence Suggesting No Significant Racial Disparities
Some commentators have challenged claims that plants specializing in the
treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste are more apt to be found in
minority neighborhoods. In 1994, University of Massachusetts researchers
released a study that examined 550 hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities across the country and concluded that the census tracts in
which these facilities were located generally did not have a greater number of
minority residents. 59 Some studies since the National Law Journal report60
have found no evidence of prosecutorial discrimination in the enforcement of
environmental laws or even higher fines in poor and minority neighborhoods. 61
58 Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1398-1400, 1405.
59 See generally Douglas Anderton et al., Hazardous Waste Facilities: "Environmental
Equity" &sues in Metropolitan Areas, 18 EVALUATION REV. 123 (1994). While the United
Church of Christ study looked at affected areas by zip codes, the University of
Massachusetts study broke up the neighborhoods by census tracts. Id. at 127-29, 131.
Charles Lee, coordinator of the United Church of Christ study, and Robert Bullard have
each questioned the significance of the University of Massachusetts study, in part because
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., the world's largest waste disposal company, provided
funding. See Bullard, supra note 57, at 61 (criticizing University of Massachusetts study
because of industry funding and failure to include nonmetropolitan sites such as Emelle,
Alabama and Kettleman City, California facilities); Two Reports Dispute Claims That Siting
of Corn nercial Facilities Discriminatory, [24 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA)
2100, 2101 (Apr. 15, 1994) (reporting Charles Lee's criticism of University of
Massachusetts study).60 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., John A. Hird, Environmental Policy and Equity: The Case of Superfund,
12 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGcMT. 323, 337 (1993) (finding no relationship between pace at
which sites are cleaned up and host county's socioeconomic characteristics); Colopy, supra
note 18, at 131-32 n.17. Colopy cites an unpublished May 26, 1993 study by the
Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources of 80
hazardous waste sites in Georgia from 1984 through March 1993, which examined the race
of residents living within one-half mile of these sites and found that fines were higher in
both minority and poor neighborhoods. The average fine was $33,844 in white areas and
$45,626 in minority areas, and fines collected in areas with an annual household income of
less than $20,000 were twice as large as the fines collected in areas with incomes over
$30,000.
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C. Some Disparities Probably Exist
It is difficult to assess precisely the extent to which environmental
inequities exist. The government's records contain conflicting information even
on the location of hazardous waste sites. 62 One cannot necessarily equate the
siting of toxic sites with actual exposure to toxic releases. 63 Moreover, society
has only a limited scientific understanding of the relationship between exposure
to toxic chemicals and the development of disease. 6a Although some studies
have found no evidence of disparities in the siting of hazardous facilities, it is
difficult to discount the more numerous studies finding such evidence.65
In 1992, an EPA working group issued its "Environmental Equity"
report,66 which surveyed and evaluated pre-existing data regarding the extent to
which minorities may bear a disproportionate share of environmental risks67
and concluded that "available information suggests that racial minorities may
have a greater potential for exposure to some pollutants because they tend to
live in urban areas, are more likely to live near a waste site, or exhibit a greater
tendency to rely on subsistence fishing for dietary protein." 68
Despite the conflicting evidence, there is enough evidence of environmental
inequities to support policies designed to reduce such disparities. It is important
to understand, however, that polluting or disposal facilities bring benefits as
well as risks and that siting disparities should not be reduced at the expense of
jobs or the opportunity to earn compensation from developers in a fair and
well-informed compensation process.
III. SITING, COMPENSATION, AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
States are generally free to locate solid and hazardous waste sites where
they wish without much federal supervision. 69 Environmental justice
62 See Lavelle, supra note 3, at 12. An April 28, 1994 report by the EPA stated that a
preliminary analysis of 300 Superfund sites showed a "slightly" higher-than-average
minority population in the communities around those sites. Id.
63 See infra notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
64 See infra notes 393-401 and accompanying text.
65 See supra notes 32-38, 41, 45-54 and accompanying text.
66 1-2 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUrrY REPORT, supra note 27.
67 The report did not provide any new research on this issue. See 2 EPA
ENViRONMENTAL EQUIrrY REPORT, supra note 27, at 107 (comments of Professor Robert D.
Bullard).
68 2 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUrrY REPORT, supra note 27, at 15.
69 The Resources Conservation and Recovery Act gives states primary siting
responsibility and authorizes them to initiate their own hazardous waste programs. See 42
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commentators have argued that state siting processes often neglect minority
interests. 70 Several proposed bills in Congress would limit the siting discretion
of states and impose siting restrictions designed to protect minorities. 71
One possible approach to reduce siting disparities would involve having the
federal government police a state's political process to insure that minorities are
adequately represented in the political process under the Voting Rights Act, 72
but current efforts along those lines have not eliminated controversy about
disproportionate siting of undesirable land uses in minority areas. This Article
proposes a more focused approach to improve the representation of high-risk
and minority groups in the siting process.
Many developers of solid or hazardous waste facilities pay compensation to
local communities, and several states require such compensation. 73 There are
several different ways to pay compensation. 74 Greater attention needs to be
paid to how compensation is distributed among neighbors of a facility. Siting
and compensation legislation raises broader issues about the relative role
experts in administrative agencies and the general public should play in such
matters.
A. Current Siting Law and Proposed Environmental Justice Reforms
In part because of pollution prevention and source reduction efforts, earlier
projections of a shortage of hazardous waste facilities have given way to the
U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988); Edward P. Boyle, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of
Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and die Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection
Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 937, 971-73 (1993).
7 0 See generally Boyle, supra note 70, at 971-79; Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying
Environmental Racism, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 394, 403-08 (1991); Audrey Wright, Comment,
Unequal Protection Under the Environmental Laws: Reviewing the Evidence on
Environmental Racism and the Inequities of Environmental Legislation, 39 WAYNE L. REv.
1725, 1731-38 (1993) (noting that states seek to limit ability of local communities to block
siting of hazardous waste facilities and that minority communities often lack resources to
stage successful protest against developers).
71 See infra notes 115, 119-54 and accompanying text.
7 2 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988); LANi GUINR, THE TYRANNY OF THE
MAvoRrry: FUNDAMENTAL FAnwrss IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994) (discussing
different approaches to achieve genuine minority participation and representation in
democracy); Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1643 (1993) (arguing current judicial doctrines are
inadequate to control partisan misuse of the reapportionment process).
73 See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
74 See infra notes 170-87 and accompanying text.
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problem of excess capacity for at least the near future.75 Even in an era of
excess hazardous waste capacity, however, some new facilities are needed to
meet demand or replace old, substandard, leaking disposal units, 76 and there is
still a serious problem in siting high- or low-level radioactive waste disposal
sites.77
"[E]ven new, 'state-of-the-art' [hazardous waste] facilities pose real
environmental hazards," 78 and the public is often unwilling to bear the risks of
new facilities despite their benefits. A powerful Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY)
movement has developed. 79 Increasingly, local communities have used their
zoning and environmental ordinances to exclude locally undesirable land use
projects, and state governments sometimes oppose controversial national or
regional projects. 80 In some cases, local communities are likely to oppose the
siting of locally undesirable land uses that have net positive benefits because
"[s]iting of noxious facilities tends to concentrate costs within an area
proximate to the site while providing diffuse benefits over a wide area.-81
75 See generally Jeff Bailey, Slunp at Hazardous-Waste Dups Raises Concerns,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1994, at B3 (noting that declining demand for hazardous waste
disposal space between 1992 and 1994 has led to overcapacity but that there will continue to
be a market for such landfills); Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of
Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived
Cfisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047, 1050-55 & passim (1994) (arguing that the "shortage of
disposal facilities is actually far less severe and more localized than usually portrayed" but
proposing an approach to facilitate siting of needed facilities); National Capacity for Waste
Management Sufficient Through 2013, Draft Report Says, [25 Current Developments] Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1473, 1473-74 (Nov. 25, 1994) (discussing EPA draft report indicating excess
hazardous waste capacity through the year 2013).
76 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1050-55.
77 See generally Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay
Attention?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 800-10 (1994); Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1074-
83.
78 Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1054.
79 See generally Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of
Distributive Justice, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 437 (1988); Bradford C. Mank, The
Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Ceaning Up Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic
Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster?, 19 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 239, 272-85
(discussing NIvfBY problem and possible solutions); Peter Margulies, Building
Communities of Virtue: Political Theory, Land Use Policy, and the "Not In My Backyard"
Syndrome, 43 SYRAcuSE L. REv. 945 (1992).
80 See generally Been, supra note 77, at 800-08 (discussing Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act and actual results); Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1162 (noting that state
governments often block siting of hazardous or radioactive waste facilities even when local
residents are willing to accept them); Mank, supra note 79, at 272-85.
81 DAvID MORELL & CHRISTOPHER MAGORIAN, SrING HAzARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES:
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NIMBY opposition is much more likely to block disposal facilities that employ
relatively few people than to stop the siting of polluting factories that pose
equal or greater dangers but employ more people82
On the other hand, urban governments, whether led by whites or
minorities, must compete to keep business from relocating to suburban areas
and therefore have little power to reject any business that promises more tax
revenues or jobs, even if it is environmentally risky. 83 The economic
constraints on urban politics, including the ability to impose land use exactions
or require compensation for the siting of undesirable land uses, are structural
and derive from the multiplicity of local governments and the mobility of
people and businesses.84 Urban sites, however, tend to be more expensive than
rural sites, especially because many urban sites are already contaminated from
prior use and must be remediated before they can be reused, but there have
been recent efforts to facilitate inner-city site cleanup as a way to create jobs in
urban areas. 85 In addition, impoverished rural areas, including many with
significant minority populations, may be attractive, low-cost sites for hazardous
LOCAL OPPOSION AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION 167 (1982) (advocating use of
compensation to local communities to overcome inequities); see also Been, supra note 77,
at 789-90; Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1153. In other cases, local communities may have an
incentive to allow environmentally risky development in fragile "critical areas," such as
coastal zones, shorelands, and wetlands. Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1153 n.677. "These are
areas where the benefits of development, in terms of new jobs or an expanded tax base, will
be enjoyed by local residents, while the environmental losses will be felt statewide."
Richard Briffault, Our Locasm: Part I-7he Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 65 (1990).
82 On-site storage of nuclear or hazardous waste by nuclear power plants and chemical
companies usually generates little controversy because of familiarity, absence of
transportation risk, and the fact that the firms often create significant employment
opportunities; by contrast, off-site facilities tend not to create many jobs and therefore are
less able to mobilize local support. See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1146-48; see also Been,
Fairness, supra note 1, at 1044 (discussing difficulties in balancing employment gains to
residents against damages to residents).
83 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism. Part Il-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 409-12 (1990).
84 See generally Vicki Been, "Exit" As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 506-28
(1991) (discussing competition as a constraint on government); Briffault, supra note 83, at
399-403 (discussing Tiebout hypothesis that the large number of local governments and the
relative ease of individual movement from one locality to another fosters efficiency);
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416-18
(1956) (same).
85 See generally James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Racism, Site Ceanup and Inner
City Jobs: Indiana's Urban In-Fill Incentives, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 43 (1994).
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waste facilities, may desperately need jobs at any cost, and therefore may be at
risk for exploitation. 86
States have set up hazardous waste management programs to either
overcome or bypass local opposition. 87 States have taken three major
procedural approaches in siting facilities: super review, site designation, and
local control. 88 In addition, several states have adopted compensated siting as
part of their hazardous waste siting programs. 89 None of the current
approaches, however, insures adequate representation for high-risk or minority
residents.
1. Super Review
Under super review, the most common approach to siting hazardous
facilities, the developer of a hazardous waste facility selects a possible site and
applies for a permit with the authorizing agency, typically a state EPA or
Department of Natural Resources. 90 If the state EPA decides to issue a permit
after evaluating potential environmental impacts, the state appoints a special
administrative board whose explicit role is to allow the public to participate in
the site selection process. 91 These special siting boards usually have some
expert or technical members and some local representatives, but the
composition of the boards and methods for selecting local representatives vary
from state to state.92 Often the implicit purpose of siting boards is to quell
public opposition, minimize the issue of political expediency, and emphasize
the safety of the proposal. 93
86 See generally Conner Bailey & Charles E. Faupel, Environmentalism and Ovil
Rights in Suner County, Alabama (providing data suggesting that poor African-Americans
in rural Alabama had no real choice in accepting Emelle Landfill in exchange for
compensation), in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAzARDs: A TIME FOR
DisCOURSE 140-43 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992); Robert B. Wiygul et al.,
Environmental Justice in Rural Communities, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 405, 441-48 (1993)
(discussing location of hazardous waste sites in rural Alsen, Louisiana).
87 Godsil, supra note 70, at 403.
88 Collin, supra note 17, at 511; Godsil, supra note 70, at 403.
89 See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
90 Collin, supra note 17, at 511; Boyle, supra note 69, at 973; Godsil, supra note 70,
at 403.
91 Collin, supra note 17, at 511; Godsil, supra note 70, at 403.
92 See Godsil, supra note 70, at 404. See generally Rodolfo Mata, Hazardous Waste
Facilities and Environmental Equity: A Proposed Siting Model, 13 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 375,
447-67 (1994) (proposing two separate committees, a "technical review board" containing
members from technical fields and a "local review board" of local residents).
93 Collin, supra note 17, at 511; Godsil, supra note 70, at 403.
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All of the states using a super review approach have preemption clauses
that permit the siting of a facility despite community resistance. 94 Attempts to
use federal or state preemptive laws to eliminate the ability of local
communities to oppose undesired facilities, however, often lead to more intense
local opposition and the use of political and other extralegal means to delay a
project until it becomes economically futile to build.95
The super review approach may fail to prevent disparate siting because
developers have an incentive to select sites in areas with low land values, which
are often inhabited by the poor, especially poor minorities. 96 Developers may
avoid wealthy or politically powerful communities that can "use their informal
connections in state government to prevent the operation of a preemption
statute, or resort to civil disobedience." 97
2. Site Designation
Under the site designation approach to siting hazardous facilities, the state,
not the private developer, creates an inventory of possible sites. 98 Techniques
for developing the inventory vary from state to state.99 Because site designation
eliminates the developer's natural tendency to choose the least expensive site
and provides a statewide data gathering mechanism that can inform future
environmental decisionmaking to make sure no area is overburdened, site
designation may lead, at least in theory, to a more equitable distribution of sites
than does super review. 10° On the other hand, states or counties may choose
geographically unsuitable sites if they wish to avoid siting unpopular facilities
such as a low-level radioactive waste depository, 10 or politicians from
politically powerful communities may lobby to remove their communities from
the list.l°0 In addition, the community may litigate against the facility or
94 Collin, supra note 17, at 511; Godsil, supra note 70, at 404.
95 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1052 (noting that opponents of facilities have
defeated elected officials and even engaged in civil disobedience involving vandalism and
other illegal acts); Mank, supra note 79, at 274 (noting that local officials can influence state
legislature and that citizens may engage in civil disobedience).
9 6 See Boyle, supra note 69, at 973; Godsil, supra note 70, at 405; see also Mank,
supra note 79, at 274.
97 Godsil, supra note 70, at 405; Boyle, supra note 69, at 973; see also Mank, supra
note 79, at 274.
98 Collin, supra note 17, at 512; Godsil, supra note 70, at 405-06.
99 Collin, supra note 17, at 512; Godsil, supra note 70, at 405-06.
100 Collin, supra note 17, at 512; Godsil, supra note 70, at 406.
101 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1033.
102 See Godsil, supra note 70, at 406.
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otherwise try to delay the siting, and the prospect of such delays may lead an
agency to choose the least politically or economically powerful community,
which often means a poor or minority community.10 3
3. Local Control
Only two states, California and Florida, continue to apply a de jure local
control model in which local land use regulations are not preempted by a state
hazardous waste management plan and a local community may impose strict
land use regulations to block any hazardous waste site.104 Politically or
economically powerful communities, however, have exercised de facto local
control in many cases to block or delay facilities until a developer abandoned a
proposed site.10 5
Community control over siting has often disproportionately benefited
wealthy suburbs and resulted in more undesirable facilities being located in
poor or minority neighborhoods. 10 6 Dissatisfaction over the disparate abilities
of communities to block the siting of locally undesirable land uses has
contributed to the rise of the environmental justice movement. 107 Wealthy or
politically well-organized communities may have an advantage in blocking
projects through expensive litigation or lobbying techniques, and as a result
such sites may be placed in less wealthy or politically powerful
neighborhoods.108 While there are some potential advantages to local control
for both whites and minorities, local decisionmaking is often less representative
or effective than is national policymaking. 10 9
103 See Boyle, supra note 69, at 973-74; Godsil, supra note 70, at 406.
104 Godsil, supra note 70, at 406-07.
105 See supra notes 97, 102-03 and accompanying text; infra notes 106-08 and
accompanying text.
10 Environmental justice proponents often argue that middle-class neighborhoods have
long blocked the siting of unwanted facilities and as a result more such facilities have been
sited in poor and minority neighborhoods. See Cole, supra note 17, at 646-47 (arguing that
NIMBY results in PIBBY, "Place in Blacks' Back Yard"); Foster, supra note 8, at 747
(same).107 See Austin & Schill, supra note 17, at 71-74; Been, supra note 77, at 789.
108 See Austin & Schill, supra note 17, at 71-74; Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at
1047-52 (discussing difficulties in free-market society (or, indeed, any society) to force
equal allocation of society's burdens); Mank, supra note 18, at 343.
109 Local political control does not necessarily result in grassroots public participation.
See Briffalt, supra note 83, at 412-15, 453. In theory, shifting authority to local or smaller
units of government should enhance opportunities for public participation; however, the
empirical evidence for that assumption is inconclusive. See id. at 393-99 (discussing
relationship between local governance and public participation). People in a highly mobile
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Yet most advocates of environmental justice are in favor of greater
community control over the siting of locally undesirable land uses.110 Many
environmental justice advocates have suggested that the movement seeks to
block the siting of virtually all polluting or risky facilities.' They believe that
current pollution control approaches are insufficiently protective, and they
would like to eliminate risk to the greatest extent possible. n 2 Eliminating all
pollution is a politically appealing slogan, but society should reduce pollution
only to the extent it is reasonably cost-effective to do so." 3 While
environmental justice advocates may hope that greater community control will
empower minority and poor neighborhoods, the results may simply be to give
the rich more leverage over siting.
4. Proposed Environmental Justice Siting Legislation
Several recent proposals in Congress address alleged siting inequities. On
the whole, they would make it more difficult to site new facilities in certain
high-pollution or minority areas. These proposals represent a fourth approach
to addressing siting issues. The congressional proposals generally seek to limit
the number of sites in a particular area, but often do so through overly
expensive moratorium strategies. These proposals fail to address the
fundamental issue of increasing minority representation.
In 1992, Representative Henry Waxman held the first congressional
society work, shop, go to school, or have other important affiliations outside their
residential jurisdiction and may not identify exclusively with that jurisdiction. Id. at 413-14.
Many people do not identify with their residential municipality as a "community" of shared
interests. Id. at 414. While the ideal of local community involvement and control is
theoretically attractive, local control can result in isolation of poor areas from wealthy
suburbs rather than empowerment of the poor. Id. at 453.
110 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 852.
111 See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 7-8 (quoting several prominent
environmental justice advocates whose goal is total elimination of all waste); Cole, supra
note 17, at 644--4 (arguing for pollution prevention by blocking the siting of new facilities);
Foster, supra note 8, at 748-49 (suggesting NIMBY should be expanded to "Not in
Anybody's Backyard").
112 See Cole, supra note 17, at 642-45 (criticizing traditional focus of environmental
law on control of pollutants to "safe" level and arguing for preventive approach); Foster,
supra note 8, at 741-44 (challenging EPA's use of risk assessment to address only hazards
that present a demonstrable link between exposure and measurable health effects).
113 See BOERNER & LANBERT, supra note 13, at 9. See generally STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE Vicious CiRcLE: TowARD EFFEcrrE RISK REGULATION (1993); infra notes
402-05 and accompanying text.
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hearing on environmental equity issues. 114 A number of congressional bills
targeting environmental justice issues are now pending.' 15 In the past,
minorities were very underrepresented in Congress, especially in committees
and subcommittees with jurisdiction over environmental issues. 116 In 1992,
however, there was a significant increase in the number of minority
representatives elected to the House of Representatives,' 17 and minority
representatives have recently become more active on environmental issues as
environmental justice concerns have become more prominent. 118 In the 1994
elections, however, the Republican Party gained control of the House and
Senate. Minority representatives, who are overwhelmingly Democrats, may
lose whatever power they had recently gained.
Proposed procedural legislation that would require the EPA to consider
distributional impacts' 1 9 and to gather more information about possible racial
and class disparities 120 would be advantageous, but there is no evidence the
114 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 790 n.12 (citing Disproportionate Impact of Lead
Poisoning on Minority Communities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the House Com. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)).
115 See Catalina Camia, Poor, Minorities Want Voice in Environmental Choices, 51
CONG. Q. 2257, 2257-60 (1993) (discussing proposed environmental justice legislation in
Congress); Keeva, supra note 4, at 88 ("Currently [February 1994], at least nine bills
before Congress-including the Environmental Justice Act and a bill to elevate the
Environmental Protection Agency to Cabinet level-contain environmental justice-related
provisions.").
116 See generally Lazarus, supra note 1, at 820-21; supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
117 In 1991, there were 31 minority representatives in the House, with 26 being
members of the congressional black caucus. See 1 1991 CONGREssIONAL STAFF DIRECrORY
(Ann L. Brownson ed., 1991). In 1992, however, the number of African-Americans in
Congress increased to 39 with the addition of 16 new members. Jeffrey L. Katz, Groving
Black Caucus May Have New Voice, 51 CONG. Q. 5 (1993). Voters elected nine new
Hispanic representatives for a record total of 19, including representatives from Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See Ines Pinto Alicea, Hispanics Gain Members, 51 CONG. Q.
7 (1993).
118 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 821 nn. 142-43 (discussing specific minority
representatives).
119 Senator Glenn and Representatives Synar and Clinger have proposed legislation to
require the preparation of a community information statement assessing the demographic
characteristics near proposed hazardous waste facilities. See S. 533, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 1 (1993); H.R. 495, 103d Cong., lst Sess. § 1 (1993).
120 For instance, the Environmental Health Equity Information Act of 1993 would
have required the EPA and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry to collect
additional data on the race, age, gender, ethnic origin, income level, and educational level
of persons living in communities adjacent to toxic substance contamination. See H.R. 1925,
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impact statement approach would affect the distribution of new facilities. 121
There is the danger, however, that proposed substantive legislation will be
overly restrictive, inefficient, and apply to areas that are not truly poor or
significantly different in racial or ethnic composition from the rest of America.
In 1992, Representative John Lewis, a Georgia Democrat, and Senator,
now Vice President, Al Gore introduced similar legislation entitled the
"Environmental Justice Act of 1992,"122 which would have required the
identification of "environmental high impact areas" in the 100 counties or
"other appropriate geographic unit[s]" with the highest total weight of toxic
chemicals in the air, water, and soil during the past five years. The bills would
have imposed, with certain exceptions, a moratorium on the siting or
permitting of any new toxic chemical facility in an area identified as "high
impact" under specified circumstances. 123
Moratorium proposals are flawed because they avoid the fundamental
question of whether a proposed facility will provide greater benefits than
harms. It would make more sense for the EPA or a state to evaluate the siting
of new projects on a case-by-case basis using cost-benefit analysis and scientific
risk assessment procedures.124
The use in the Gore and Lewis bills of 100 environmental high-impact
areas to trigger more agency scrutiny and to place the areas high on the EPA's
priority list for pollution reduction is an example of appropriate congressional
priority setting that recognizes that the EPA cannot solve every inequity
problem immediately. 125 Focusing on counties with the heaviest pollution
burdens is a reasonable place to start. The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments 126
divide ozone nonattainment areas into categories from marginal to extreme
nonattainment and impose different requirements and deadlines depending upon
the severity of the ozone pollution problem in a given area.127 On the other
hand, the Clean Air Act allows the siting of new sources if their increase in
pollution is offset by an equal or greater reduction in the amount of pollution
103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993).
121 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1071-74.
122 H.R. 5326, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 2806, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
123 See S. 2806, supra note 122, § 9; H.R. 5326, supra note 122, § 402.
124 See generally Mank, supra note 18, at 266, 313-15, 326-45 (proposing
individualized "exceptions process" for granting permits to sources of hazardous air
pollutants).
125 See infra notes 390-92 and accompanying text (discussing priority-setting
approaches to regulation).
126 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7511d (Supp. V 1993).
127 There are also special provisions for moderate and serious carbon monoxide areas,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7512-7512a (Supp. V 1993), and moderate and serious PM-10 (particulate
matter) areas, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7513-7513a (Supp. V 1993).
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
from existing sources. 128 The Gore and Lewis bills would have been more
efficient if they had allowed exceptions for offsetting or other market-based
approaches.
Another problem with the moratorium approach is that arbitrary
geographical divisions such as county lines or the "other appropriate
geographic unit[s]" in the Gore and Lewis bills may not take into account the
population density in an area or the effects of spillover into other counties or
states. 129 A more refined approach might regulate the 100 worst hot-spots
within a smaller geographical area such as a two-mile radius, 130 a census
tract, 131 or zip code area, or look at the actual risk posed by a proposed site.13 2
The Gore and Lewis proposals do nothing for the area that is 101st on the list
and indeed might create an incentive to locate in that area, which may have a
much higher population than some areas on the top 100 list. 133
The moratorium approach in the Gore and Lewis bills could prove to be
either overly stringent or lenient because the proposed exceptions are vague.134
The moratorium on construction would continue until the Administrator of the
EPA concluded that the area has achieved "health-based levels" sufficient "to
avoid adverse impacts on human health," a vague standard that could be
128 See 42 U.S.C. § 751 la(e)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring offset of at least 1.5 to 1 in
"extreme" ozone nonattainment areas).
129 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1070-71 (criticizing use of arbitrary areas in
"dispersion" statutes); Colin Crawford, Strategies for Environmental Justice: Rethinking
CERCLA Medical Monitoring Lawsuits, 74 B.U. L. REV. 267, 294 (1994) (criticizing use of
arbitrary geographical areas); infra notes 363, 483-84, 533-34 and accompanying text.
130 Even a two-mile radius can be arbitrary. See Wiygul et al., supra note 86, at 437.
131 See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
132 See infra notes 485-89 and accompanying text.
133 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1070-71.
134 The version of the Lewis bill introduced in the 103rd Congress in 1993 would have
allowed exceptions to the moratorium only if: "(1) the need for the activity is shown to the
Secretary [of Health and Human Services]; (2) the owner or operator of the facility
demonstrates that the facility will develop a plan and maintain a comprehensive pollution
prevention program; and (3) the facility demonstrates that it will minimize uncontrolled
releases into the environment." H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., ist Sess. § 403 (1993); see
Crawford, supra note 129, at 294 (arguing that exceptions under Environmental Justice Act
may "give companies considerable leeway that may permit future siting of facilities in poor
communities of color" and that hazardous waste managers will vigorously pursue
exceptions). The legislation introduced in 1992 did not contain exception (2) for
comprehensive pollution prevention. See S. 2806, supra note 122, § 10; H.R. 5326, supra
note 122, § 403. Exceptions or emissions trading may pose their own dangers through the
creation of hot-spots and should be carefully regulated. See supra notes 27-29, 31 and
accompanying text.
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impossible to achieve given the nonthreshold nature of many carcinogens. 135
In 1993, Senator Baucus and Representative Lewis reintroduced legislation
entitled the "Environmental Justice Act." 136 The Baucus proposal was more
flexible than the moratorium approach in the Gore and Lewis bills. Under the
Baucus proposal, a new or modified facility would have been able to obtain a
permit if there were "a net reduction in the release of any toxic chemical
determined to cause such significant adverse impacts on human health in that
area."137 The Baucus bill would have been more efficient than the Gore and
Lewis bills because it would have allowed a source to offset increases in the
emissions of a pollutant with reductions from another source.138 One potential
objection is that offsetting would not address potential hot-spots within a small
area in the county, but neither the Gore nor the Lewis proposals addressed that
issue.
Representative Collins sponsored the Environmental Equal Rights Act of
1993,139 which would have amended Subtitle G of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act 4o to allow petitions to be submitted to prevent certain waste facilities from
being constructed in environmentally disadvantaged communities-defined as
(1) those areas within two miles of the site that already have at least one active
or inactive hazardous waste facility and have a higher percentage of minorities
135 See H.R. 2105, supra note 134, §§ 401(5), 403. Congress should avoid the use of
unattainable health-based standards like "adverse impacts on human health" and instead
aspire to reduce pollution until there is no statistically significant risk to a human
subpopulation group. See infra notes 363-74 and accompanying text. At the individual plant
level, the Gore and Lewis proposals recognize the need to trigger the moratorium only at a
significant threshold of risk. The moratorium would apply only to sources emitting "toxic
chemicals in quantities found to cause significant adverse impacts on human health." H.R.
2105, supra note 134, § 403. Realistically, an area would have a better chance of escaping
such a moratorium if it is dropped from the top 100 list when the list is revised every five
years than achieving the no "adverse impacts on human health" standard. See id. § 102
(requiring revision and republication of list of environmental high-impact areas every five
years).
136 S. 1161, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2105, supra note 134; see Legislation
Would Require Enission Freezes in 100 Most-Polluted Areas of U.S., Baucus Says, [24
Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 392 (July 2, 1993).
137 S. 1161, supra note 136, § 6.
138 The Bush Administration adopted on a limited basis an even more favorable
approach to business, involving emissions-averaging of different hazardous air pollutants.
But there are serious methodological problems with comparing the toxicity of different types
of toxic chemicals such as carcinogens and noncarcinogens. See Mank, supra note 18, at
284-88.
139 H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., lst Sess. (1993).
140 Pub. L. No. 94-580, §§ 7001-7009, 90 Stat. 2795, 2824-28 (1976) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6971n-6979b (1988)).
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than the state or national average, or (2) areas that have twenty percent or more
persons below the poverty line or a per capita income of eighty percent or less
of the national average. 141 The bill would have required an administrative law
judge to hold a public hearing and grant a petition seeking the prohibition of a
facility unless the judge found that there were no less risky alternative sites in
the state and that the proposed facility would not release contaminants or
increase the cumulative impact of contaminants on any residents of the
environmentally disadvantaged community. 142
The Collins proposal should be rejected because it does not require
consideration of the relative costs and benefits of a proposed facility. Indeed, a
single challenger could block a project that is overwhelmingly popular. 143 A
judge or agency should be able to block the siting of a proposed project only if
it poses a discernible risk to a statistically significant subpopulation and if the
costs, as measured by conservative but realistic risk assessment procedures,
outweigh the benefits to that subpopulation. 144
The Collins proposal was both more and less inclusive than the 1992
Environmental Justice Act proposals because it would have potentially covered
a much larger area of the country rather than concentrated resources on a
relatively small number of high-impact areas, but would have applied to only a
two-mile radius rather than to an entire county. 145 The Collins bill did not
protect communities without any facilities or against the expansion of existing
ones. 146 Furthermore, the bill did not require an examination of relative risk
before designating a community as an environmentally disadvantaged area and
did not require that the percentage of the minority or poor population be
significantly higher than the national average. 147 Nor was there any
141 See H.R. 1924, supra note 139, § 3.
14 2 See id. § 3(a). Crawford argues that the lack of criteria for determining whether
alternative locations may be acceptable would allow firms to obtain siting waivers based on
the argument that the site has unique geographical characteristics. See Crawford, supra note
129, at 295. Similarly, Crawford worries that there are no standards for whether a proposed
facility releases contaminants or will increase the cumulative impact of contaminants on a
community. Id. While Crawford worries that the lack of standards will make it too easy to
site new facilities, their absence will probably make it more difficult to site new facilities.
143 See BOERNER& LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 11.
144 See infra notes 363-74, 402-07 and accompanying text.
145 A two-mile radius is a better test for determining which residents are at high risk
than is a county-wide criterion, but even a two-mile radius is a rather arbitrary measure
compared to an actual site-specific risk assessment. See Wiygul et al., supra note 86, at 437
(criticizing use of arbitrary two-mile radius).
146 See id.
147 See generally Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1084 (criticizing Collins proposal
for ignoring relative burden imposed by proposed site and for limiting remedy to poor and
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requirement that the challenger be personally at risk.148 Finally, only citizens
residing in the state where the new facility would be sited would have been able
to object, 149 which might have further encouraged the "state line syndrome,"
in which waste disposal facilities are proposed for political subdivisions
bordering another state. 150
Collins also was a co-sponsor of the Pollution Prevention and Incineration
Alternatives Act of 1993, which would have prohibited the siting of new solid
waste incinerators until 1997.151 Beginning in 1997, applicants would have had
to meet numerous requirements, including a "demonstrat[ion] that the location
of the facility will not have a disproportionate impact on minority or low-
income communities. " 15 2 A ban on all incinerators until some arbitrary date is
unwise because such a moratorium is inefficient unless there are exceptions for
new sources to replace existing sources.153 The proposed Act does not define
critical terms such as "disproportionate impact" and "minority or low-income
communities." These terms can have widely divergent meanings.154
A more flexible approach to siting regulation is needed than has emerged
from Congress. Because hazardous waste facilities can provide greater benefits
than costs, it makes more sense to require proportionate compensation for a
facility's externalities than to ban all new facilities. The proposed legislation
does not grapple very well with the complex problem of balancing public
participation with expert decisionmaking.
B. The Compensation Approach
Commentators have proposed various ways in which a developer might
provide compensation as a means to win public approval of new facilities by
making the benefits of the facility outweigh the costs. 155 Because locally
minority neighborhoods when evidence does not support racial or class-based prejudice).
148 See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 11.
149 H.R. 1924, supra note 139, § 3(a).
150 See Wiygul et al., supra note 86, at 437-38.
151 H.R. 2488, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1993).
152 Id.
153 See supra notes 130, 139-40 and accompanying text.
154 See infra notes 363-65, 371-74 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties in
defining race, ethnicity, and geographical boundaries); infra notes 386-401, 482-93 and
accompanying text (discussing complexities associated with defining risk to community).
155 See Been, supra note 77, at 789-91 (discussing justifications for compensation
proposals); Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1196-99 (proposing reverse auction in which
developer bids to pay community to accept new hazardous waste facility); Herbert Inhaber,
Of LULUs, NIMBYs, NIMTOOs, 107 PuB. INTEREsT 52, 60-63 (1992) (proposing a
"reverse Dutch auction," in which government or industry would raise compensation until a
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undesirable land uses typically concentrate costs in one community while
providing benefits to a much larger area, proponents argue that compensation is
an equitable solution where it would be impractical to equitably distribute risks
physically or spatially, and that compensation can make siting decisions more
efficient by forcing the facility's developer to internalize the cost of the
facility. 156 While compensation at first blush may appear to be the equivalent
of a bribe and to pose dangers to political minorities, compensation is
consistent with the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause if minorities are
adequately represented in the negotiation process.15 7
It is now common for solid waste firms to pay compensation to site
landfills and incinerators, although it is not clear whether such programs have
solved the shortage of disposal space in some areas of the country.' 5 8 Several
states have begun to require that developers of hazardous waste facilities pay
compensation to host communities in an effort to eliminate local opposition. 15 9
Compensation programs have had a mixed record of success, 160 but they may
still be the best approach to induce communities to accept otherwise undesirable
land uses. 161 Studies show that risks that a community assumes voluntarily are
more likely to be accepted than those imposed upon a community. 162
By "voluntary," proponents of compensation generally mean that a
municipality's political leadership or a majority of its voters have accepted a
proposed project. Some environmental justice advocates believe that no
hazardous waste project is safe and that acceptance by a poor or minority
community is involuntary when induced by incentives. 163 Under the proposal
in Part VI of this Article, compensation in exchange for siting an undesirable
community volunteered to accept an otherwise environmentally unacceptable facility);
Mank, supra note 79, at 241, 274-77, 282-85 (discussing use of compensation to site
facilities and proposing risk substitution approach, in which developer remediates
contaminated site in exchange for building new, safer facility).
156 See Been, supra note 77, at 791.
157 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra notes 428, 497 and accompanying
text.
158 See Been, supra note 77, at 822-23.
159 See id. at 794-95 nn.45-47 (citing state compensation statutes); Godsil, supra note
73, at 407-08; infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing whether compensation
actually reduces public opposition).
160 The use of compensation to induce communities to volunteer to site low-level
radioactive waste disposal facilities has generally been unsuccessful. See Been, supra note
77, at 800-08.
161 See id. at 824.
162 Been, supra note 77, at 791-92 n.24 (citing sources).
163 See Cole, supra note 17, at 642-45 (arguing that pollution prevention, rather than
safety, should be the goal); Bailey & Faupel, supra note 86, at 140-43.
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project may be accepted if minorities and high-risk residents are adequately
represented in the siting negotiation process.
The effectiveness of compensated siting programs varies because whether a
developer is successful in siting a facility often depends on particular local
circumstances.1 64  There has been controversy about how effective
compensation is at changing the minds of those who are initially opposed to a
facility. Some public opinion surveys suggest that compensation may make
potential neighbors more willing to accept hazardous waste facilities. Professor
Been believes that "at least those compensation methods that guarantee local
monitoring and control may sway a significant number of people to accept a
facility. The studies also suggest that while compensation measures may not be
sufficient to secure acceptance, they nevertheless may be necessary to gain
sufficient support for the facility." 165 Michael Gerrard, however, believes that
surveys suggesting that compensation can overcome public safety fears "do not
seem to be translated into actual behavior."1 66
In an earlier article, the author suggested that beyond simply providing
compensation, developers need to convince the local public about the overall
safety of a project so that the community does not perceive the compensation as
a bribe. 167 Gerrard argues that "compensation works when, and only when, the
community does not believe the proposed facility poses an undue hazard." 168
Creating representation procedures that allow those at greatest risk to negotiate
the terms of compensation may be crucial in convincing a community to accept
a project. 169 The proposal in Part VI of this Article addresses the need for both
compensation and special safety measures designed to reduce public fears.
Residents at greatest risk must have the most input into the siting or cleanup
decisionmaking. To protect the public safety and prevent exploitation of
vulnerable groups, the EPA or a state siting agency should set minimum health
standards and levels of compensation.
1. Remedial, Preventive, and Incentive Compensation
Compensation may serve as a remedy to make a community whole for
damages it will suffer as a result of a facility, as a preventive measure to reduce
the harm the facility will cause, or as a reward to the community for accepting
164 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1209-10.
165 Been, supra note 77, at 800.
166 -errard, supra note 75, at 1155 n.692.
167 See Mank, supra note 79, at 675.
168 Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1155.
169 See infra notes 458-75 and accompanying text.
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the facility by providing benefits in excess of a make-whole remedy. 170 A
developer might compensate neighbors by agreeing to pay, either monetarily or
in-kind, for any decrease in the market value of their homes caused by the
facility. 171 Preventive measures might include buffer zones between a facility
and its residential neighbors, 172 monitoring equipment or leakage barriers
beyond that required by law, or additional emergency equipment. 173 Rewards,
which are sometimes referred to as incentives, might include the payment of
taxes or a percentage of the facility's gross or net profits to the host
municipality. 174
2. Ex Ante, Ongoing, and Ex Post Compensation
Compensation may be ex ante, before the facility is constructed; ongoing;
or ex post, after the facility causes harm. 175 Ex ante grants might be technical
assistance grants from the developer or the government to allow a host
community or citizens group to hire its own experts to evaluate the proposed
facility. 176 The author and others have discussed a special form of ex ante
compensation, risk substitution, in which a developer would clean up all or
some of a community's existing toxic waste sites in exchange for approval of
the new facility. 177 Ex ante compensation can redress injuries suffered by those
170 See MORELL & M ORIAIN, supra note 81, at 164-75; Been, supra note 77, at 792;
Mank, supra note 79, at 276-77.
171 See Been, supra note 77, at 792; Bernard Holznagel, Negotiation and Medion."
The Newest Approach to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 13 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv.
329, 356 (1986) (arguing that a developer might compensate for loss of recreational land by
providing other land); Mank, supra note 79, at 276. Guaranteeing property values,
however, can be very expensive, and developers are likely to place limits on their liability.
See Mank, supra note 79, at 276.
172 See Bradford C. Manic, Preventing Bhopal: "Dead Zones" and Toxic Death Risk
Index Taxes, 53 Omo ST. L.J 761, 763-64, 781-91, 802-04 (1992) (proposing use of
buffer zones to minimize consequences of catastrophic releases of extremely hazardous
chemicals).
173 See Been, supra note 77, at 792-93; Mank, supra note 79, at 276.
17 4 See Been, supra note 77, at 792-93; Mank, supra note 79, at 276-77.
175 See Been, supra note 77, at 792-93.
176 See id. at 793; Mank, supra note 18, at 340-43 (proposing expanded technical
assistance grants to citizen groups).
17 7 See KENT E. PORTNEY, SrrING HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT FACILrrIs: THE
NIMBY SYNDROME 137-59 (1991) (proposing existing risky facilities such as chemical
plants, ammunition factories, and nuclear power plants be purchased, shut down, and
replaced by new hazardous waste sites posing equal risk); Mank, supra note 79, at 282-85.
But see Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1163-64 (arguing that for psychological reasons people
[Vol. 56:329
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
present at the time of the initial siting decision but cannot address injuries that
will be suffered subsequent to the siting. 178
Ongoing compensation often takes the form of special taxes or fees the
facility regularly pays to the community, or services the facility regularly
provides the community. 179 Ongoing measures may include mitigation of a
facility's negative impacts and benefits to the local economy, such as jobs for
local residents, purchases from local businesses, or contributions to charity.' 80
Ongoing benefits may take the form of continuing opportunities for community
participation in the management of the facility, such as site monitoring,
deciding whether to close a facility, emergency response questions, or
representation on the facility's governing board.' 18 Ongoing compensation can
at least partially redress injuries suffered by persons who move to a community
after the initial siting process. 182
Ex post compensation may include commitments to pay for, or insure
against, future damages through property value guarantees,'183 indemnification
agreements, or funds to compensate victims in the case of an accident.18 4
Firms, however, may have an incentive to under-insure or to under-capitalize
against future accidents, especially if bankruptcy laws limit their liability, and
there is some empirical evidence that hazardous waste firms do so.185 Current
insurance and financial responsibility requirements tend to be inadequate to
are unlikely to accept the trade of an old risk for a new one, and that if people are
concerned about an existing risk, they may demand that it be abated regardless of any plans
for new facilities); Stephen T. Washington & Robert H. Harris, Necessary Evils, 8 IssuEs
Sci. & TEcH. 86, 87 (1991) (reviewing PORTNEY, supra, and arguing that risk substitution
may devote resources to cleanups that are not the most socially desirable). My earlier article
emphasized the difficulties of inducing people to accept new risks in exchange for any form
of compensation, cantioned that a number of different compensation approaches should be
tried, and bluntly stated that risk substitution would fail in many cases. See Mank, supra
note 79, at 272-85. There are no panaceas for siting locally undesirable land uses. Because
not all proposed facilities ought to be sited, the fact that psychological factors may lead
some attempts at risk substitution to fail does not mean that my proposal cannot be
successful on other occasions.
178 See infra notes 179-87, 500-19 and accompanying text.
179 See Been, supra note 77, at 793; Mank, supra note 79, at 276-77.
180 See Been, supra note 77, at 792-93; Mank, supra note 79, at 276-77.
181 See Been, supra note 77, at 794.
182 See infra note 516 and accompanying text.
183 See Mank, supra note 79, at 276 (noting that developers are often reluctant to
provide full property value insurance).
184 See Been, supra note 77, at 794.
185 See Mank, supra note 172, at 791-95.
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force firms to fully internalize the risks posed by hazardous substances.' 86
Nevertheless, appropriate ex post compensation can redress injuries that occur
long after the initial siting decision. 187
3. Procedures for Determining Compensation
There are at least five major ways in which a state may determine
compensation: (1) legislative formulas, (2) administrative determinations, (3)
negotiations, (4) reverse auctions, and (5) lotteries.188 First, a legislature can
establish a formula such as Indiana's tax of $11.50 per ton on commercial
hazardous waste facilities, twenty-five percent of which goes to the host
county. 189 There is a serious question, however, whether legislative formulas
based upon a fixed percentage of receipts are flexible enough to adapt to
varying circurnstances 190 or to compensate those individuals most at risk from
a facility. 191
Second, a statute could authorize a statewide siting board to make a case-
by-case administrative determination of the amount of compensation. 192 It is
186 See id. at 796-97; Steven W. Black, Comment, The Fact and Fiction of Financial
Responsibilityfor Hazardous Waste Management, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 581, 581, 584 (1990).
187 See infra notes 517-19 and accompanying text.
188 See MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL., FACILrrY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSMON 84-86
(1983) (discussing legislative formulas, administrative determinations, and negotiations);
Been, supra note 77, at 794-95 (discussing all five); Holznagel, supra note 171, at 373-74
(discussing legislative formulas and negotiations); Mank, supra note 79, at 243-84
(discussing legislative formulas, administrative determinations, and negotiations).
189 See IND. CODF ANN. §§ 6-6-6.6-2, -3 (West 1989); see also CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 22A-128 (limit of 2.5% of quarterly gross receipts over $2,500,000) (West 1985);
KY. RnV. STAT. ANN. § 68.178(3) (Michie/fBobbs-Merrill 1994) (county may levy up to
5% of gross receipts of hazardous waste facility); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1319-
R(4) (West Supp. 1994) (host municipality may levy up to 2% of a commercial hazardous
waste facility's annual billings).
190 See O'HARE IT AL., supra note 188, at 84-85; Mank, supra note 79, at 277.
191 See infra notes 480-520 and accompanying text.
192 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.6-11 (West 1990) (administrative body may
assess fee to hazardous waste facility if it determines that facility creates a need to educate
and train local officials and employees regarding emergency response measures); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-80 (West Supp. 1994) (host municipality may levy up to 5% of
receipts of hazardous waste facility, but amount may be increased or decreased by
administrative agency); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-152.1 (1991) (host county may levy tax
on hazardous waste facility to compensate for additional costs it incurs as a result of facility,
but facility may appeal to administrative body and to courts); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-
211.1 (1994) (host city may levy tax on hazardous waste facility to compensate for
additional costs it incurs as a result of facility, but facility may appeal to administrative body
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difficult, however, for the government to set values in the absence of a free
market, and administrative determinations may involve high transaction
coSts.193
Third, the facility developer and community can negotiate a mutually
satisfactory package.19 4 A key question is how to elect representatives to serve
on a negotiation committee. Part llI(C)(2) of this Article discusses current
approaches to electing representatives, and Part VI proposes a more equitable
representation process.
A fourth approach to determining compensation is to auction the facility to
the community willing to accept the least compensation. 195 Herbert Inhaber has
proposed a reverse auction system in which a siting authority announces the
facility it wishes to site, the environmental and safety criteria it will use to
determine appropriate sites, and its initial bid for the site.196 Any community
that believes it has an appropriate site and wishes to accept the siting
authority's bid may offer the site for consideration. If no community steps
forward, the siting authority continues to raise its bid until the facility would no
longer be cost-effective or until a community steps forward, whichever comes
first. If a community accepts a bid, some percentage of the compensation is
transferred to a trust fund for the community, where it is held until the
proffered site is approved on environmental and safety grounds. If the siting
authority disapproves a site, the trust fund returns the monies to the developer
and the auction continues. 197
Reverse auctions are inadequate because they do not address how
compensation should be distributed among individuals, whether the
compensation should be used for remedial or preventive purposes, or whether
the compensation should be ex ante, ongoing, or ex post. To prevent poor
communities that may lack the technical expertise to evaluate a facility from
and to courts); see Been, supra note 77, at 794; Mank, supra note 79, at 277.
193 See O'HARE ET AL., supra note 188, at 85; Mank, supra note 79, at 277.
194 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22A-128 (West 1985); MICH. Cow. LAws
ANN. § 299.520(6) (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.191(5) (West Supp.
1995); R.L GEN. LAWS § 23-19.7-8 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1442 (Miechie 1993);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(8) (West 1989); see O'HARE ET AL., supra note 188, at 85-86;
Been, supra note 77, at 794-95; Holznagel, supra note 171, at 374; Mank, supra note 79,
at 277.
195 See, e.g., Been, supra note 77, at 795; Herbert Inhaber, A Market-Based Solution
to the Problem of Nuclear and Toxic Waste Disposal, 41 J. AIR & WASTE MGT. ASS'N
808, 812-15 (1991); Howard Kunreuther et al., A Compensation Mechanism for Siting
Noxious Facilities: Theory and Experimental Design, 14 J. ENVrL. ECON. & MGMT. 371,
375 (1987).
196 Inhaber, supra note 155, at 60-62; Inhaber, supra note 195, at 811-13.
197 Inhaber, supra note 155, at 60-62; Inhaber, supra note 195, at 811-13.
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being exploited, the EPA or a state agency should require a minimum level of
compensation, 198 and the developer or government should provide technical
assistance grants to communities to enhance their ability to evaluate the risks
and benefits of a proposed facility.' 99
Fifth, economist Arthur M. Sullivan has proposed a lottery scheme in
which the siting government asks all citizens in a region to submit to the results
of a lottery to pick the site for the facility, with the understanding that those
who live in the areas spared the facility will be taxed to compensate those who
live in the host community.200 The compensation is the amount the government
must promise its voters to secure unanimous consent for the lottery. Sullivan
offers a two-city economic model to show that the compensation necessary to
secure unanimous consent to the lottery will be lower than the compensation
required to site facilities through negotiation. 20'
One must be skeptical of any proposal that requires unanimous consent
because of the potential for holdout problems and strategic bargaining,
especially where there are a limited number of suitable sites.2°2 Sullivan's
proposal would require a degree of regional cooperation that seldom has been
achieved. Proposals requiring such cooperation have faced daunting political
odds in light of the highly decentralized nature of American politics.203
Sullivan's lottery scheme also fails to address the distribution of the
compensation. 204
The proposal in Part VI of this Article calls for determining compensation
by negotiation, because it is the best method for taking into consideration
unique, site-specific circumstances; allowing public participation; and
addressing distributional issues. Reverse auctions and lotteries may in theory be
more efficient than negotiations, but no state has adopted either scheme.20 5
Negotiations between a developer and a community-based negotiation
committee can provide nonmonetary communitarian benefits in the form of
democratic participation and republican community that a purely economic
198 See infra notes 409-10, 450-57 and accompanying text.
199 See infra notes 468, 474 and accompanying text.
200 See Arthur M. Sullivan, Siting Noxious Facilities, 31 J. URB. ECON. 360, 360-61
(1992).
201 See id. at 363-66.
202 See infra notes 459-62 and accompanying text.
203 See infra part VI.B.5.
204 Sullivan does state that in principle it is possible to provide greater compensation to
residents who suffer greater property damage from a facility, but he does not offer any
procedure for achieving this result. See Sullivan, supra note 200, at 373.
205 See Been, supra note 77, at 794-95 (citing states that have adopted legislative,
administrative, and negotiation-based compensation strategies, but none that has adopted a
reverse auction or lottery scheme).
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approach does not provide. Both the reverse auction and lottery systems
include some limited democratic decisionmaking, but neither addresses
distributional considerations. Legislative and administrative solutions are too
crude and inflexible to take into account local conditions and do not generally
allow for significant community-based representation, although an
administrative board could allow for some local representatives. None of the
five approaches guarantees that those most at risk will receive proportionate
compensation, but the negotiation approach has the greatest potential for
addressing this problem.
4. Equitable Issues in Detenniing Compensation
Compensation proposals raise at least four moral questions: (1) Do
compensation programs inappropriately make marketable commodities out of
health and safety risks? (2) Are compensated siting proposals fair and voluntary
to a poor community that cannot afford to say no? (3) Do compensated siting
programs allow a community to trade away the rights of future generations,
who are not represented at the bargaining table? (4) Are such schemes
voluntary when local governments and citizens lack sufficient information and
expertise to assess risky projects?206
Environmental justice advocates have suggested that compensation
programs may harm the poor or minorities because they are especially
vulnerable to economic exploitation by developers offering jobs or
compensation to a disadvantaged community. 207 Yet, in Los Angeles
community fears about dioxin from a proposed hazardous waste facility led to
its defeat despite the developer's offer of $10,000,000 in compensation and the
support of a key African-American city councilman. 20 8 But in other cases,
minority groups have accepted projects bringing jobs or compensation despite
206 See id. at 824-25.
207 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 808 (arguing that minority communities are
vulnerable to "environmental blackmail," when developers of locally undesirable land uses
offer short-term economic relief in exchange for accepting long-term risk); Boyle, supra
note 69, at 973-75 (arguing that communities may not fully understand health risks of
project until it has been built and may fear losing jobs if residents voice safety concerns).
One solution would be to allocate vouchers to poor or minority communities to allow them
to bargain more effectively within the pollution rights market, but communities with fewer
resources might still lack meaningful choice. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 849. For a
discussion of compensated siting proposals, see supra notes 170-205 and accompanying
text.
2 08 See Anthony R. Chase, Assessing and Addressing Problems Posed by
Environmental Racism, 45 RuTGERs L. REv. 335, 346 (1993).
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the opposition of an environmental justice coalition, presumably because the
community decided that the benefits outweighed the risks. 209
There is no simple way to measure the fairness of a siting process. Perhaps
the best way to measure fairness is by the level of representation of minority
groups in the process of selecting a community's siting negotiation
committee.210 One factor that may influence a community's perception of
fairness is whether the community has volunteered to accept a facility or rather
a developer has selected the community. Whether a siting process is voluntary
depends upon the adequacy with which minorities and high-risk residents are
represented in the siting negotiation process and their access to information
about the relevant risks.
Many commentators have proposed that mediators assist in the negotiation
of compensation. 211 According to one scholar's count, "Nineteen states have
procedures for negotiation or mediation between facility developers and
proposed host communities."2 12 Some commentators, however, have argued
that mediation, and especially mandatory arbitration, are inappropriate ways to
resolve siting disputes because they do not address the potential problems of
unequal bargaining power and informational asymmetries between a
community and developer.2 13
In 1980, Massachusetts adopted a Hazardous Waste Siting Act,2 14 which
209 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text; infra notes 413-28 and
accompanying text.
210 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra notes 428, 497 and accompanying
text.
211 See generally Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1156 n.694 (citing sources); Holznagel,
supra note 171, at 364-66; Mank, supra note 79, at 274-82 (discussing advantages and
disadvantages of mediated compensation); John C. Sassaman, Jr., Comment, Siting Without
Fighting: The Role of Mediation in Enhancing Public Participation in Siting Radioactive
Waste Facilities, 2 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TEcH. 207, 223-24 (1992) (arguing mediation can
enhance public participation). But see DOUGLAS J. Amy, THE PoLrrics OF ENViRONMENTAL
MEDIATION 149-53, 189-90, 216-19 (1987) (arguing that mediated siting schemes can be
coercive and inadequately representative, and can result in unsafe sites).
212 Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1156.
213 See generally AMY, supra note 211, at 149-53, 189-90, 216-19 (criticizing
environmental mediation and arbitration); Mank, supra note 79, at 277-82 (discussing
criticisms of mediation, arbitration, and negotiated compensation).
214 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, §§ 1-19 (West 1981); see Been, supra note 77,
at 811-19 (discussing Massachusetts statute and attempts to site hazardous waste facilities
under the statute); Mank, supra note 79, at 274-78 (same); Michael Wheeler, Negotiating
NIMBY's: Learning from the Failure of the Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 YALE J. ON REG.
241, 255-80 (1994) (same).
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has served as a model for other states.215 The Massachusetts statute allows a
developer to select a community, limits the ability of a municipality to pass
local ordinances designed to block the proposed facility, requires the developer
and community to negotiate concerning a broad range of compensation issues,
and allows a state siting council to require the parties to submit to binding
arbitration if negotiations reach an impasse.216 Some commentators have
criticized the Massachusetts negotiated compensation model on the grounds that
it is coercive, does not adequately represent local citizens, and fails to address
safety concerns. 217 Massachusetts has had, at best, a mixed record of success in
using compensation in overcoming community opposition.2 18 Wisconsin,
which provides for voluntary mediation and then for binding arbitration by a
waste facility siting board, 219 has probably enjoyed the greatest success of any
state with a compensated siting program, although the measure of success
depends upon whether one counts only actual sited facilities or siting
agreements. 220
For both equitable and practical reasons, mandatory arbitration should be
avoided unless there is a pressing national or regional demand for a certain type
of facility and no other alternative sites exist. Preemptive statutes often increase
215 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-114 to 34r (West 1985) (providing
communities with choice between fixed assessment and negotiated compensation with
ceiling on the amount of total compensation, and providing arbitration if negotiations fail);
R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-19.7-1 to -15 (1989) (providing negotiation and arbitration); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 144.43-.445 (West 1989) (providing voluntary mediation and binding
arbitration by waste facility siting board if negotiations fail).
216 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, §§ 1-19 (West 1981); Been, supra note 77,
at 811-19; Mank, supra note 79, at 274-78; Wheeler, supra note 214, at 255-80.
217 See, e.g., AMY, supra note 211, at 149-53, 189-90, 216-19; Brion, supra note
79, at 447-52.
218 See generally Been, supra note 77, at 811-19; Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1157
(arguing that Massachusetts experiment has failed because all six serious attempts at siting
hazardous waste facilities between 1980 and 1992 failed); Mank, supra note 79, at 274-78;
Wheeler, supra note 214, at 278-80.
219 See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 144.445 (West 1989); Been, supra note 77, at 819-22;
Arthur J. Harrington, The Right to a Decent Burial: Hazardous Waste and Its Regulation in
Wisconsin, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 223, 262-66 (1983); Mary Beth Arnett, Comment, Down in
the Dumps and Wasted: The Need Detenmination in the Wisconsin Landfill Siting Process,
1987 Wis. L. REV. 543, 547-49.
220 Compare Been, supra note 77, at 821 ("By the end of 1993, siting agreements had
been entered into for five hazardous waste sites and forty-one solid waste sites [in
Wisconsin].") with Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1157 ("In Wisconsin, thirty-four solid waste
facilities, but not a single new hazardous waste disposal facility, have been sited using
negotiation.").
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community opposition to a facility, 221 and there is the danger that politically
weak communities, which tend to contain a disproportionate share of poor
people or minorities, will be targeted by siting boards even when those boards
have the authority to site a facility in a politically powerful area. 222 Mediation
is less coercive and therefore better than mandatory arbitration. Mediation,
however, generally does not redress inequities in bargaining power caused by
the usually superior financial and informational resources available to industry
compared to citizens or local governments. 223 The representation and
compensation scheme proposed in Part VI of this Article includes ways to
improve the mediation process so that citizens and local governments can
effectively bargain with developers.
C. Public Paricipation
A fundamental question in siting decisions is the relative role career
employees in a state or federal agency should play in comparison to the general
public. The answer should depend, at least in part, upon the extent to which an
administrative agency can claim technocratic expertise in generating and
evaluating reliable scientific information that is inaccessible to most members
of the general public and the extent to which the public can understand risk
assessments and cost-benefit analysis. Some proponents of the environmental
justice movement have suggested or clearly stated an intention to replace
technocratic decisionmaking, by expert agencies, with community
empowerment.22 4 Technocratic decisionmaking, however, should guide and
enhance public participation in siting negotiation and compensation decisions
because technocratic tools are needed to identify high-risk residents and to give
them proportionately greater votes in electing a siting negotiation committee.
Developers would like to know whether experts or the public are more
willing on average to approve a siting proposal. Increased public participation
in the siting process can either increase or decrease opposition to siting new
facilities depending upon the particular facts and whether the facility is
perceived as threatening. 225 Increased public access to information tends to
increase the public's perception of risk and seldom decreases that perception. 226
221 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 103, 108 and accompanying text.
223 See AMY, supra note 211, at 149-53, 189-90, 216-19; Mank, supra note 79, at
280; infra notes 467-68 and accompanying text.2 24 See generally Austin & Schill, supra note 17, at 75-76; Cole, supra note 17, at
662-63.
225 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1158.
226 Id. at 1159.
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Local residents, however, have been more willing than state governments to
accept hazardous or radioactive waste facilities. 227
If administrative agencies could make siting decisions without regard to
public opinion, their staff probably would, on average, be more willing to
grant permits to facilities based upon cost-benefit and risk assessment analysis
than would the general public.228 From the standpoint of democratic theory and
moral legitimacy, however, only a system that combines administrative
expertise and participation is likely to be successful.
Environmental justice commentators generally favor increased public
participation in the siting process. 229 On the other hand, from a public choice
perspective,23 0 "organized, well-informed, resource-rich, politically connected
neighborhood groups benefit from sitings of facilities in unorganized,
uninformed, resource-lacking, politically powerless areas." 23 1 Because wealthy
people have greater access to lawyers, lobbyists, and the media, a key question
is whether any siting process that incorporates public opinion can temper the
tendency to site facilities where people are relatively politically powerless.
1. Public Participation Theory
There are conflicting views about the value of public participation in
environmental decisionmaking. Study after study shows that the public's
evaluation of environmental and safety risks differs radically from any
consensus of experts in the field.232 Conflicts between expert and public views
of policy questions occur in other fields such as the provision of medical
services. 23 3 Cognitive error theory has demonstrated that individuals often
22 7 Id. at 1161-62.
228 See infra note 476 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
230 "Public choice models often treat the legislative process as a microeconomic
system in which interest groups manipulate the political process to obtain 'rents' in the form
of tax relief, subsidies or favorable regulation to increase their wealth in excess of what the
group could achieve in the marketplace without legislation." Mank, supra note 18, at 304-
05; see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Judspndence ofPublic Choice, 65 TEX.
L. REv. 873, 878 (1987). Public choice theory suggests that politically influential
municipalities might manipulate the political process to lessen the likelihood that locally
undesirable land uses will be located in their communities.
231 Boyle, supra note 69, at 978 n.222.
232BREYER, supra note 113, at 33; see also CARNEGIE COMM'N, RISK AND THE
ENviRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECIsION MAKING 92-93 (1993) (discussing
causes of divergence between "expert" and "public" beliefs about risk).
233 Oregon uses a ranking of Medicaid services to reflect comparative benefits and
denies payment for services below a certain ranking. See David Stipp, Prevention May Be
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reach inconsistent conclusions about risky options solely as a function of the
way these options are framed. 23 4 The question is whether society should base
its policies on expert evaluations or public perceptions of risk.
Most commentators, including the author, have argued in favor of
increased public participation in environmental decisionmaking primarily
because such participation is consistent with democratic values and because
administrative decisionmaking has its own limitations. 23 5 Expert risk
assessment can be excessively narrow in scope and may not adequately
consider values that the public considers important, such as voluntariness of
risk.236 Proponents of environmental justice generally believe that the limited
Costlier Than a Cure, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1994, at B1, B4. But public hearings on
Oregon's ranking system for Medicaid services led to decreasing weight on cost-
effectiveness between 1990 and 1993. After public hearings, the Oregon Health Services
Commission revised the rankings of about 400 of the 696 items on the final priority list
because the Commission found that a list based upon cost-effectiveness alone did not follow
the general public intuition of how to rank priorities. Id. at 134.
23 4 See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 606 (1992). Professor Hornstein,
however, believes that society should not rely upon expert decisionmaking, despite the
implications of cognitive error theory, because expert decisionmaking has its own
limitations, and more fundamentally because "a fully synoptic system of comparative risk
analysis would lack legitimacy because its decisions would be despised as undemocratic."
ld. at 611.
23 5 See generally Ellison Folk, Public Participation in the Superfund Cleanup Process,
18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 173, 213-20 (1991); Bruce C. French, More Effective Citizen
Paricipation in Environmental Decision-Making, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 389, 391-415
(1993); Mank, supra note 18, at 338-43.
236 Many commentators favoring a public approach to risk have argued that
environmental decisionmaking and regulation are ultimately based upon political factors
rather than upon technical or analytical processes such as cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g.,
Daniel A. Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public Interest, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1021, 1043 (1989) ("[C]ost-benefit analysis is misused to provide technocratic solutions to
fundamentally political questions...."); Mank, supra note 18, at 280-81, 306-09
(contrasting public and technocratic approaches to risk regulation); Joseph P. Tomain,
Distributional Consequences of Environmental Regulation: Economics, Politics, and
Environmental Policymaking, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 110 (1991) (arguing that
cost-benefit analysis is deficient because it obscures sociopolitical norms). A number of
commentators have argued that formal cost-benefit analysis overemphasizes the costs, which
are more easily quantifiable, and underemphasizes health concerns, which are difficult to
quantify. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 233, 248 (1990). See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So
Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 731-
36, 741. The bias toward emphasizing costs may be exacerbated by informational biases
because industry generally has the best information about the costs and feasibility of
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involvement of minorities in environmental decisionmaking has led agencies to
ignore or underestimate risks that especially affect minorities. 237 Environmental
justice proponents often contend that members of minority groups must be
placed in key environmental policy roles so that they can set the environmental
priorities for their communities. 23 8
On the other side, there is a technocratic school of thought that generally
prefers that Congress and the public take a limited role in setting broad policy
goals and delegate most decisions to the discretion of expert administrative
agencies.239 Judge, now Justice, Stephen Breyer, in his 1993 book Breaking
the Vicious Circle, argues that the public often overreacts to risks, that
Congress responds to such public pressures, and that because Congress lacks
expertise it is incapable of addressing risk comprehensively. 240 Breyer
acknowledges that the public may legitimately take into account such factors as
voluntariness of risk or whether the risk is likely to be accompanied by pain or
dread,241 but he argues that in many cases public perceptions about risk differ
pollution controls. See Dwyer, supra, at 248. Critics of the expert approach and of formal
cost-benefit analysis suggest that the analytical methods of the technical approach may make
it risk-preferring, in contrast to the public's risk aversion. See Clayton P. Gillette & James
E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1060-61 (1990).
237 Proponents of environmental justice have suggested that limited public involvement
in cleanup decisions may explain why the National Law Journal study, supra note 37, found
that cleanups took longer in minority and low-income communities. See Deeohn Ferris,
Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Ceanup: Expanding Public Participation in the
Federal Superfund Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 671, 675 (1994).
23 8 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 850-52; Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and
Democratic Justice, 21 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 431, 453-54 (1994).
23 9 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DiRTY
AIR (OR How THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-Our FOR HIGH
SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT) 5 (1981) (arguing that
Congress should provide only the "most general kinds of policy guidance" to free the
agency to engage in rationalist decisionmaking processes); John S. Applegate, Worst Things
First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J.
ON REG. 277, 296-98 (1992) (discussing rationalist models of regulation that emphasize
agency discretion and limit congressional role to broad goal setting); Mank, supra note 18,
at 307 n.203 (citing sources); CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 232, at 118-19 (arguing that
when divergence between public and expert risk assessments cannot be overcome through
education, experts, rather than public, should reconsider).
240 See BREYER, supra note 113, at 33-42; see also Mank, supra note 18, at 307-08
(discussing Breyer's argument).
241 BREYER, supra note 113, at 33-35. Proponents of a public approach to risk
assessment generally believe that it is important to look at numerous factors in assessing risk
and most importantly to rely heavily upon public perceptions of risk, such as voluntariness
or dread of worst case potential accidents. See generally James F. Freeman & Rachel D.
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from expert opinions simply because the public misunderstands the actual risks
involved. 242 Breyer is skeptical that better "risk communications" will improve
public understanding of risk,243 distrusts the ability of Congress to write an
effective agency agenda for addressing risk,244 and believes that the
combination of uncertainties about risk and political pressures often lead to
regulatory overkill by agencies. 245 In Breyer's view, greater knowledge and
public awareness do not necessarily lead to better regulation. 246 Breyer's
solution is to create an elite reviewing body of civil servants within the
executive branch to coordinate risk regulation. 247 This bureaucratic elite would
have interagency jurisdiction, political insulation, prestige, and authority
unprecedented in American history.248
In another article, the author argued that although Breyer's assessment of
how well the public and Congress have handled risk assessment issues in the
past has considerable merit, his solution, as well as that of many other
technocrats, underplays the need for public legitimacy 249 and participation.250
Godsil, The Question of Risk.- Incorporating Connunity Perceptions into Enviromnental Risk
Assesfments, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547, 575 (1994) ("For the federal government to
effect meaningful change in the siting process and waste management generally, it must do
more to incorporate citizens' risk perceptions into its risk calculations and its regulations.");
Gillette & Krier, supra note 236, at 1071-73; Hornstein, supra note 234, at 584-615. By
contrast, technocratic experts tend to rely upon quantifiable, formal cost-benefit analysis and
"body counts" of expected excess fhtalities caused by different risks. See generally Gillette
& Krier, supra note 236, at 1071-85 (arguing that experts tend to focus simply upon the
expected annual fatalities, or "body count," caused by a chemical, whereas the lay person is
also concerned with additional factors); Hornstein, supra note 234, at 585-87, 604-06
(contrasting expert and public perceptions of risk).
242 See BREYER, supra note 113, at 33-39.
243 Id. at 38-39. But see CARNEGlE COMM'N, supra note 232, at 92-93 (arguing that
the public will substantially change its views on many but not all risk issues if exposed to
full and balanced discussion that acknowledges uncertainty and presents framework of
choices).244 See BREYER, supra note 113, at 39-42.
245 See id. at 42-51.
246 See id.
247 See id. at 59-60.
248 See David A. Dana, Setting Environmental Priorities: The Promise of a
Bureaucratic Solution, 74 B.U. L. REV. 365, 372 (1994). As examples, Breyer points to the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the United States Office of
Management and Budget and the Conseil d'Etat in France, but neither has authority to
determine substantive regulatory priorities. See BREYER, supra note 113, at 68-72; Dana,
supra, at 372.
249 See Douglas R. Williams, Environmental Law and Democratic Legitimacy, 4 DUKE
ENVFL. L. & POL'Y. F. 1, 6-31 (1994) (discussing two contending views of democratic
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Congress needs to make the basic policy choices about how to regulate
pollution and what level of risk is acceptable. 25 1 Public participation is
important as a value in itself, a means of developing a broader administrative
record, and a means of lessening the risk that special interests will capture the
EPA.25 2 Breyer's proposal does not sufficiently acknowledge the uncertainties
in risk assessment, especially when comparing different types of risk.253
Although democratic policymakers must give weight to public opinion,
administrative agencies should consider the interests of future generations and
take a longer view than the latest opinion polls or market reports. 254 A
combination of technocratic decisionmaking and public participation should
insure that risks are fairly compensated for both present and future
generations.25 5
2. Public Participation Statutes and Regulations
Congress, states, and the EPA have often sought to encourage public
participation in environmental decisionmaking.25 6 Public participation in siting
legitimacy, liberal economic theory and civic republican theory).
25 0 See Mank, supra note 18, at 307-08.
2 51 Craig Gannett, Congress and the Refonn of Risk Regulation, 107 HARV. L. REv.
2095, 2100-04 (1994) (arguing that Breyer missed the new willingness of Congress to
address risk issues and that the political branches of government must play a role in risk
regulation); Mank, supra note 18, at 308.
252 The EPA has not been captured by industry interests, in part because it regulates so
many different industries and is subject to countervailing pressures by pollution-control
industries, but mainly because of strong public interest in promoting environmental goals.
See Dwyer, supra note 236, at 309-10; Mank, supra note 18, at 302-04; Bradford C.
Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 34, 34-35, 49-
54(1993).
253 See Dana, supra note 248, at 381-83 (criticizing Breyer's proposal for
underestimating value judgments inherent in risk assessment).
254 See Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future:
Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REv. 267, 271
(1993).
255 See infra notes 480-520 and accompanying text.
256 Congress has adopted a technical assistance grant program providing funds to
citizen groups so they can challenge proposed cleanup strategies for Superfund sites put
forward by either the EPA or potentially responsible parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e)
(1988); Folk, supra note 235, at 194-95; see also Mank, supra note 18, at 340-43
(proposing technical assistance grants to allow neighbors of plants emitting significant
amounts of hazardous air pollutants to seek more stringent permit conditions). On June 2,
1994, the EPA proposed a rule to increase public involvement early in the process for
permitting hazardous waste facilities. The EPA has acknowledged that it must improve
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or permit decisions runs the gamut from provisions for public hearings, the use
of citizen advisory committees, and membership on state siting boards. 257 The
EPA has begun creating Superfund Advisory Committees. 25 8 Superfund reform
legislation proposed in the last Congress, House Bill 3800, would have allowed
the EPA to consider future use in consultation with advisory community
working groups. 259 Senator Specter introduced Senate Bill 443, which would
have given developers a preference for state siting approval if they won support
from a host community advisory committee. 260
A potential problem with a siting committee or board is that, because only
a limited number of community representatives can serve, many parties
potentially affected by a siting or cleanup may be excluded.261 A single
community representative on a siting committee is unlikely to represent all of
the interests of the host community. 262 On the other hand, there are practical
limits to how many members can effectively serve on a siting committee.
House Bill 3800 would have limited each community working group to twenty
members. 263
Statutes often provide only vague criteria for selecting representatives of
siting or other environmental committees. For example, House Bill 3800 stated
that "[s]pecial efforts shall be made to ensure that the composition of CWG's
[Community Working Groups] reflects a balanced representation of all those
public participation in the Superfund cleanup process and that the agency "must achieve
earlier and more effective community involvement at each site." U.S. EPA, FINAL REPORT,
SUPERFUND ADMMISTRATIVE IPROVEMENTS 31 (1993); see also GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, EPA's CoMMuNrrY RELATIONS COULD BE MORE EFFECTIvE (1994) (arguing that
the EPA's Superfund community relations program is generally effective but that the
Agency should do more to increase public involvement). Proposed Superfund reform
legislation would have expanded the availability of such grants to include state registry sites.
Richard E. Bartelt & David E. Polter, Swnary of the Proposed Superfund Reform Act of
1994, [25 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 608, 610-11 (July 29, 1994).
257 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1158.
258 See Torres, supra note 238, at 454 n.137.
259 See H.R. 3800 (first version), 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 102, 103, 502, 503 (1994);
S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 102, 103, 502, 503 (1994). Elliott Laws, the EPA's
Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, has suggested that the
remedy selection process "could be amended to give community work groups great
deference in remedy selection: the agency would have to make a 'strong showing' to ignore
the community's recommendation." Mary Bryant, Environmental Jusdce Forum,
SONREEL NEWS, July/Aug. 1994, at 8 (reporting speech by Elliott Laws on April 29,
1994 at Environmental Justice Forum in Dallas).
260 See S. 443, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(4) (1993).
261 See Sassaman, supra note 211, at 220.
262 Id.
263 See H.R. 3800, supra note 259, § 103Ci)(4).
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interested in facility representation." 264
Despite the potential unrepresentativeness of siting committees, other
methods of incorporating public input have their own flaws. Public hearings
are often held after a siting commission has made its decision about where to
locate a facility, and frequently such hearings are viewed as a ritual to obtain a
stamp of approval rather than an effective way to solicit comments from the
public. 265 The effectiveness of public hearings can be increased through the
provision of technical assistance grants to citizens to enable them to challenge
an applicant's data, requiring states to prepare detailed fact sheets, and the use
of formal adjudicative procedures including the right to cross examination.266
But it may be less necessary to hold expensive, formal public hearings if a
representative siting committee has already had a chance to examine a siting or
remedy selection proposal in depth and has convinced the community of the
soundness of the committee's decision. Some commentators have argued that a
binding or nonbinding referendum of the entire electorate is the best
approach,267 but such an approach does not give more weight to residents who
bear greater risks.
Compensated siting programs typically rely upon elected officials or a
bargaining committee, and in some cases allow a community referendum on the
siting agreement. 268 But according to Professor Vicki Been, "none of the
programs distinguishes between the interests of those who are most affected by
the siting and those who are least affected." 269 A referendum process for
ratifying a proposed compensation agreement raises serious questions about
264 Id. The bill provided that it is "appropriate" for the President to include
representation from the following groups: (A) persons who are adjacent residents or directly
affected by releases from the facility; (B) persons who are not physically close to the facility
but who may be potentially affected by releases from the facility; (C) long-term residents
who have resided in the community for at least five years and who are members of the
medical community; (D) representatives of Indian tribes; (E) representatives of resident
citizen groups; (F) local government officials; (G) workers at the facility who will be
involved in actual cleanup operations; (H) persons at the facility during response actions; (1)
facility owners and significant potentially responsible parties; and (3) members of the local
business community. Id. The main problem with the bill is that it does not define how many
persons from each group ought to serve on the CWG, except for a poorly worded reference
to "a minimum of one representative of the recipient a grant [sic] for technical assistance, if
any, awarded under subsection (e)." Id.
265 See Sassaman, supra note 211, at 220.
266 Mank, supra note 18, at 338-43.
267 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1198 (proposing referenda at both the county and
municipal levels); Inhaber, supra note 155, at 61-62 (proposing a county-wide referendum).
268 See Been, supra note 77, at 826.
269 Id.
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who could vote and the percentage required to ratify an agreement. 270 An
administrative or judicial process rather than negotiation could determine
compensation, "[b]ut problems of accountability, expertise, conflicts of
interest, and special interest influence are likely to vex any such process." 271
Instead, representation should be based on the amount of risk that a site poses
to surrounding residents.
IV. SIING, INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION, AND DISPARATE IMPACTS
Proponents of the environmental justice movement generally believe that
environmental inequities are produced at least in part by conscious or
unconscious racist attitudes. 272 Advocates of environmental justice have
frequently suggested that the government and large corporations consciously
select sites for undesirable facilities in poor or minority neighborhoods because
such localities are less likely to have political clout.273 Those responsible for
siting decisions, however, usually disavow any efforts to select politically
disadvantaged communities and argue that a particular siting decision was
based upon cost, convenience, or sound geological reasons. 274
Most litigants have invoked the Equal Protection Clause to challenge the
siting of a facility in a predominantly minority community on the grounds that
the government decisionmaker was racially discriminatory in selecting the site,
but some recent academic commentators have argued that Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 provides a broader disparate impact approach. 275 Usually,
270 Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1045; see MARY R. ENGLISH, SrING LoW-LEVEL
RAIOAcIVE WASTE DISPOSAL FAcILrrms 74, 138-39 (1992).
271 Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1045; see Gillette & Krier, supra note 236, at
1088-99.272 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 806-07.
273 See Austin & Schill, supra note 17, at 71-74; supra notes 106-12 and
accompanying text.
274 See, e.g., Joan Z. Bernstein, The Siting of Commercial Waste Facilities: An
Evolution of Community Land Use Decisions, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 84 (1991)
("The waste industry's criteria for identifying attractive sites has [sic] evolved over the last
several decades, from considerations that were primarily financial to considerations that
reflect the priority of protecting human health and the environment."); McDermott, supra
note 1, at 697 (arguing that WMX's Emelle Landfill in predominantly African-American
Sumter County, Alabama was chosen because of its good transportation, aridity, sparse
population, and, most importantly, its location atop the Selma chalk formation). But see
Foster, supra note 8, at 729 (criticizing use of race-neutral grounds by private industry and
suggesting they may be a cover for racism).
275 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); Lazarus, supra note 1, at 835-39; Colopy, supra
note 18, at 128-29, 156-88.
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plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the siting of a facility,
but Title VI may allow for a damages remedy where an existing facility has
harmed a plaintiff.276 While it is important in some cases to prevent the siting
of a facility, minority residents and society as a whole would often be better off
if a developer receives a siting permit but negotiates with a representative
community siting committee to pay compensation for the external harms
resulting from a facility.
When plaintiffs have challenged the granting of a permit to a developer,
courts usually have found sufficient state action by a state or local siting board,
either on its own or in ratifying the actions of developers, to allow a suit to go
forward.2 " Equal protection suits alleging discriminatory siting of hazardous
waste facilities have generally failed because courts have required evidence of
discriminatory intent, which is difficult to obtain. Some commentators have
argued that courts should abandon or weaken the intent requirement. 278 Other
commentators have suggested that plaintiffs bring disparate impact suits based
upon civil rights statutes such as Title VI, 279 which bans discrimination by
federally funded programs and does not require proof of intentional
discrimination. 280 Yet others have proposed that Congress enact a new statute
276 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 836; Colopy, supra note 18, at 165-66.
277 See, e.g., Bean v. Southwestern Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex.
1979), afj'd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). The district court did not find it necessary to
reach the issue of whether the actions of the developers were so intertwined with the state as
to constitute state action.
278 See Boyle, supra note 69, at 980-81 (proposing intermediate standard of review if
plaintiff meets certain conditions).
279 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); see Lazarus, supra note 1, at 835-39 (discussing and
advocating use of Title VI in environmental cases); Colopy, supra note 18, at 128-29, 156-
88 (same).
280 Title VI is one of several theories to address environmental inequities that have not
been fully explored. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 829, 834-42 (discussing Equal Protection
Clause, Title VI, Title VIII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982); Omar Saleem, Overcoming
Environmental Disciimination: The Need for a Disparate Impact Test and Improved Notice
Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 COLTTM. J. ENvrL. L. 211, 228-29 (1994)
(same); Colopy, supra note 18, at 128-29 (Title VI). Proponents of environmental justice
have argued that the federal government should begin enforcing civil rights laws that
prohibit discrimination in programs receiving federal money. Solutions: What Can Be
Done, NAT'L L., Sept. 21, 1992, at S12. Others have proposed using substantive
environmental statutes to reduce inequities. See Crawford, supra note 129, at 273 (arguing
that civil rights lawsuits have failed to address environmental justice problems and
advocating use of CERCLA medical monitoring lawsuits); Foster, supra note 8, at 725
("Environmental law and policy, because they are preventative in nature, are free from the
constraints of strict remedial and causation requirements that characterize civil rights law.");
Lazarus, supra note 1, at 842-49; Saleem, supra, at 229-30 (discussing substantive
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allowing the use of disparate impacts to establish discrimination in siting
cases.
281
Under the Equal Protection Clause, the fundamental focus should be on
ensuring adequate representation for minority groups rather than on the
impossible task of achieving equality of substantive results.282 If minorities are
adequately represented in the political process, the legislative process is better
suited to addressing broad questions of political and economic inequality than
are courts in lawsuits alleging that state siting officials are placing a
disproportionate number of hazardous waste facilities in minority
neighborhoods. The proposal in Part VI of this Article is designed to provide
adequate representation for those at greatest risk and for minority groups. 283 If
minority groups are adequately represented in the siting process, courts
generally should ignore environmental disparities because such disparities
probably are the result of economic or historical factors beyond the control of
environmental decisionmakers. In some cases, decisionmakers consciously use
environmental quality arguments to discriminate against minorities, 284 but in
most cases environmental disparities are probably the indirect product of
differences in income, residential patterns, diet, or occupation. 285
Assuming adequate representation of minority interests in selecting a
negotiating committee and assuming that the committee has access to all
relevant information about the risks of the projects and to the technical
expertise needed to understand those risks, a compensation process is sufficient
to address disparate impacts without stigmatizing developers and government
officials who are motivated by neutral decisionmaking criteria that serve a
legitimate business purpose. Courts should issue an injunction barring the
construction of a facility approved by both a state regulatory agency and a
community only when plaintiffs can prove intentional discrimination by the
siting board or developer, or when the process for electing representatives to
the siting board is so fundamentally unfair to minorities as to exclude them
environmental statutes and tort law).
281 Godsil, supra note 70, at 421-25.
282 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
283 See infra notes 430, 502 and accompanying text.
284 It is often alleged that environmental quality measures in local zoning laws are
really aimed at excluding minorities or the poor. See Foster, supra note 8, at 737.
285 See 1 EPA ENViRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT, supra note 27, at 12 ("All of these
differences in exposures are complex and deeply rooted in many aspects of society, such as
historical residence, politics, commerce, geography, state and local land use decisions and
other socioeconomic factors that affect where people live and work."). But see Foster,
supra note 8, at 736-37 (criticizing EPA Environmental Equity Report for failing to
recognize "the social context and structural dynamics that influence the choices, mobility,
and employment of people of color").
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from the decisionmaking process. Discriminatory intent is difficult to prove and
presents a substantial barrier to plaintiffs bringing equal protection challenges
to allegedly discriminatory siting practices. It is inappropriate, however, to
stigmatize government decisionmakers who intend to act in racially neutral
ways, even if they are subtly influenced by unconscious or structural racism,
because compensation can redress economic harms to minorities. 286
A better approach than lawsuits seeking to brand government
decisionmakers as racists is to reform the process of electing representatives to
siting boards so that high-risk and minority residents are adequately represented
and have access to the risk information and technical expertise needed to
interpret the relevant factors. Many may question whether monetary
compensation is an adequate remedy when a person is exposed to increased risk
from a hazardous facility, but in a society in which some persons inevitably are
exposed to higher risks than others, money is the most convenient and effective
way to compensate high-risk persons. To prevent exploitation, the EPA and
state siting agencies should set limits on the maximum level of risk acceptable
for any community or individual. 287
It may be argued that compensation will not eliminate the tendency to place
locally undesirable land uses in minority and poor neighborhoods because
wealthy or politically powerful communities will block their siting even if
compensation is available. 288 Siting discrimination suits, however, cannot
eliminate disparities caused by postsiting events attributable to market
dynamics. 289 On the other hand, ongoing and ex post compensation can at least
partially redress the injuries of those who move near an existing facility. 290
Ultimately, siting disparities can be addressed only through a profound
redistribution of income and political power. The increasing political power of
minorities both at the local level and in Congress291 may in the long run
286 The Supreme Court has noted that invalidating a decision because of its
disproportionate impact often would be a remedy disproportionate to the decisionmakers'
presumably racially neutral act. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1976);
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738, 744-45 (1974). On the other hand, a strong
argument can be made that the costs to minorities in not considering disproportionate impact
far outweigh the risks in explicitly considering race. See Charles R. Lawrence MII, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protecton. Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV.
317, 320 n.12 (1987). Under the proposal in Part VI of this Article, the EPA would reduce
disproportionate impacts to minorities whenever it is cost-efficient to do so.287 See infra notes 441-61 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text; infra notes 437-41 and
accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 20, 55-58, 182, 187 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
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diminish the impact of current patterns of indirect or structural racism.
Disparate impact suits should be allowed only when there is substantial
statistical evidence of disparate impacts, as defined by well-established tests of
statistical significance; evidence that the harms to the affected class of persons,
based upon conservative but realistic expert risk assessments, outweigh the
benefits in jobs and taxes to members of that affected class; and there is no
adequate compensation process. 292 Developers should be able to avoid
disparate impact suits if those persons at greatest risk are adequately
represented in the siting negotiations and compensation process.
A. Antidiscrimination Law and Environmental Justice
1. Equal Protection
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.293 and Washington v. Davis,294 the Supreme Court established the
requirement that in an equal protection case a plaintiff must demonstrate
discriminatory intent before a court may invoke its remedial powers. In some
cases, a plaintiff may use statistical evidence of disparate impacts to establish an
inference of discriminatory intent,295 but a plaintiff must show that the
defendant's policies were undertaken at least in part because of and not in spite
of their adverse effects upon an identifiable group.296
Even when there have been disparities in the location of hazardous waste
facilities between minority and white areas, plaintiffs in equal protection cases
often have been unable to provide statistically significant evidence of disparate
292 See supra note 15.
293 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Arlington Heights established five factors in an equal
protection analysis: (1) "[tlhe impact of the official action-whether it 'bears more heavily
on one race than another,'" id. at 266; (2) the historical background of the decision; (3)'the
series of events prior to the decision, which could reveal the decisionmaker's purpose; (4)
any departures, substantive or procedural, from the normal decisionmaking process; and (5)
the legislative and administrative history of the decision. Id. at 266-68. The Court later
added the foreseeability of the adverse consequences as a factor. Godsil, supra note 70, at
410 (citing Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979).
294 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
295 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (holding that when a "clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the government legislation appears neutral on its face," a court may find invidious
racial discrimination using that pattern as circumstantial evidence of intent); Colopy, supra
note 18, at 146 n.88.
296 Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); see Colopy, supra note
18, at 147 n.92.
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impact because too few facilities existed in a particular geographical area to
establish statistical significance. 297 Another reason why courts have generally
failed to find evidence of intentional discrimination is that siting boards and
developers can almost always offer some race-neutral justification for a site,
including geological, economical, or transportation characteristics. 298 In Bean
v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.,299 the district court did not find
sufficient evidence to establish discriminatory intent, despite concluding that the
Texas Department of Health's approach to the siting had been "unfortunate and
insensitive." 3°° In R.IS.E. v. Kay,301 the court found evidence of disparate
impact, but held that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence of
discriminatory intent to support a finding that the Equal Protection Clause had
been violated because the latest site chosen in a black community was
environmentally more suitable for a landfill than the previously proposed site in
a white community.
Plaintiffs have been more successful in using evidence of disparate impacts
to establish an inference of discriminatory intent in cases involving the
provision of municipal services, and some commentators have argued that
courts in siting cases ought to apply a similar approach in determining whether
evidence of disparate impacts creates an inference of discriminatory intent.302
2 97 See Colopy, supra note 18, at 150.
298 See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991) (finding
no evidence of discriminatory intent in siting of landfill in a predominantly African-
American area despite the fact that three other landfills in the county were in predominantly
African-American areas), aftd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp.
880, 885-87 (M.D. Ga.), aft'd, 846 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern
Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-78 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aft'd, 782 F.2d
1038 (5th Cir. 1986); NAACP v. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982)
(finding no evidence of discrimination in siting PCB disposal facility in county with highest
percentage of minority residents in state of North Carolina); In re Genesee Power Station
Ltd. Partnership, PSD Appeal Nos. 93-1 to 93-7, 1993 WL 473846, at *2 (EPA Oct. 22,
1993) (finding no support for charge that Michigan commission acted in a discriminatory
fashion in approving the air permit in a minority area while denying permit in rural white
area); see also Colopy, supra note 18 at 145-51.
299 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aft'd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
300 Id. at 680.
301 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.
1992).
302 See, e.g., Dowdell v. Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375, 1383 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (finding
that disparities in water and stormwater drainage between black and white neighborhoods
was motivated by discriminatory intent), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); see
Lazarus, supra note 1, at 833-34 (arguing that courts have been more willing to infer
discriminatory intent when there is evidence of disparate provision of government services);
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Some scholars have suggested that courts have been more reluctant to find
discriminatory intent in siting cases than in government services cases because
increasing government services for minority groups is less controversial than
forcing another community to accept a locally undesirable land use after a court
has ruled that it may not be sited in a minority neighborhood.303 There is also a
difference between denying services to minorities and granting a permit to site
a facility in a minority area that brings both risks and benefits. 3 4 Since the
Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis °5 in 1976, lower courts have
been less willing, even in municipal services cases, to use evidence of disparate
impacts to establish discriminatory intent.306
Several proponents of environmental justice have sharply criticized cases
that refused to find intentional discrimination by siting authorities despite
substantial evidence of disparate impacts on minorities. 307 Their criticism is
part of a larger school of thought challenging the requirement of evidence that
an individual bad actor had a race-conscious impetus.30 8 A number of scholars
Colopy, supra note 18, at 149; Godsil, supra note 70, at 416-18 (discussing cases involving
disparate impact of municipal services and analogizing them to siting cases). Courts may be
more reluctant to draw an inference of discriminatory intent in siting cases than they are in
municipal services cases because there are often only a few landfills or waste facilities in a
geographical area, whereas city governments make countless decisions on how to distribute
municipal services, which make patterns of long-term discrimination more apparent.
Colopy, supra note 18, at 150. Developers often can provide apparently neutral criteria
such as land cost and residential density to justify disproportionate siting. Id. The remedy in
municipal services cases is simply to provide equal services to blacks and whites, but the
remedy in a siting case may be to shift the burden to another community, a remedy courts
may be reluctant to impose. Id.
303 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 833.
304 See Crawford, supra note 129, at 293 n. 126.
305 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
306 See jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrfi cation: Explicating a Right to
Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REv. 739, 779-82
(1993).
307 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 1, at 831-33; Saleem, supra note 280, at 225 ("In
essence, courts narrowly construe the Equal Protection Clause to the detriment of groups
that unfairly bear the brunt of environmental hazards under the guise of economic
apportionment."); Godsil, supra note 70, at 410-16.
30 8 See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See" White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 953, 958-59 (1993); Alan D.
Freeman, Legitimati'ng Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MNN. L. Rnv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978) (arguing that
antidiscrimination law is based upon a model of discrimination that is focused on individual
actors through a "perpetrator" perspective); Lawrence, supra note 286, at 318-19; Saleem,
supra note 280, at 225-28.
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have criticized the intent requirement in Arlington Heights and Washington v.
Davis because it treats equal protection violations as though they were criminal
in nature and required a culpable state of mind.3°9 Because the intent-based test
addresses only those who are consciously racist, it either ignores unconscious
racism or treats the problem as being outside the ambit of the Equal Protection
Clause.310
Some environmental justice advocates have argued that, even if it is not
possible to establish a clear connection between racial disparities and intentional
conduct on the basis of race, one may assume that there are unconscious racist
attitudes and discriminatory structures that produce environmental disparities.
Therefore, evidence of disproportionate impacts should be enough to trigger
corrective measures.31' These scholars often believe that courts have looked
too narrowly at what constitutes racism. For instance, in East Bibb Twiggs
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning
Commission,312 the district court looked only at whether the zoning agency
responsible for the permit decision had a history of discrimination. The court
refused to accept evidence of the history of state- and city-wide discrimination
and concluded that there was no evidence of improper racial animus. 313
While historical and institutional racism are serious problems, minorities
will benefit more from remedial, preventive, and incentive compensation than
from a court imposing findings of discrimination on siting boards that have
applied race-neutral criteria in good faith, especially when a facility has net
positive benefits for a community. It is inappropriate to so stigmatize a siting
board or developer when a compensation program can redress any external
costs imposed by a facility.
2. Title VI
Given the difficulties of proving discriminatory intent in equal protection
cases, a number of commentators have recommended that environmental justice
plaintiffs bring disparate impact actions under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,3 14 which provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
309 See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 69, at 961-62.
3 1 0 See id. at 963.
311 See Foster, supra note 8, at 733-35, 737-38 & nn. 76-77, 79-81 (arguing that
historical and institutional racism leads more minorities to live in polluted metropolitan
areas and to work in dangerous occupations).
312 706 F. Supp. 880, 885-87 (M.D. Ga.), aftid, 896 F.2d 1264 (1lth Cir. 1989).
3 13 Id. at 884.
314 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53.
19951
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 3 1 5 While Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke316 casts some doubt on the holding of Lau v.
1ichols317 that disparate impact is always enough to win a Title VI action, the
Supreme Court in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission318 held that
proof of discriminatory intent is not required in a Title VI action, at least where
that view had been historically endorsed by federal agency regulations
implementing the statutory mandate. The historical test of Guardians probably
applies to the EPA's Title VI regulations, which have consistently embraced a
discriminatory effects test.319 Title VI applies only to federally funded
programs, but virtually all federal environmental laws provide assistance to
state governments. 320 Until recently, it appeared that Title VI provided only
equitable relief, but the Supreme Court in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools321 unanimously held that a damages remedy is available in implied
rights of action brought under Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of
1972.322 Because the language of Title IX was expressly modeled after that of
Title VI and because the Supreme Court has frequently relied on constructions
of one in interpreting the other, it is likely that a damages remedy is now
available under Title VI, even absent a showing of discrimination. 323
A plaintiff in a Title VI case must establish a prima facie case of "definite,
measurable disparate impact" upon the affected community. 324 Once a prima
facie case is established, a defendant can counter the plaintiff's charges with
"evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action." 325 If the
defendant provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business justification, the
plaintiff must show that this justification is a pretext and that other selection
devices would serve the defendant's interests with less discriminatory
315 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); see Lazarus, supra note 1, at 834-39; Colopy, supra
note 18, at 128-29 &passim.
316 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (Powell, J., announcing judgment); Colopy, supra
note 18, at 158.
317 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974); see Lazarus, supra note 1, at 834-35.
318 463 U.S. 582, 584 & n.2 (1983); see Colopy, supra note 18, at 159.
319 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b), (c) (1994); Lazarus, supra note 1, at 836.
320 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 835.
321 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
322 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988).
323 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 836.32 4 See NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1332 (3d Cir. 1981); Colopy,
supra note 18, at 161.
325 Medica! Qr., 657 F.2d at 1333; see also Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against
1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Colopy, supra note 18, at 161-
62.
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impact. 326
There has been controversy regarding whether Title VI was intended to
cover environmental siting and permitting agencies. 327 From 1971 until early
1993, the EPA maintained that Title VI did not apply to its decisionmaking and
often avoided enforcing the statute against state or local governments that
received funding for projects such as sewers. 328 More recently, the EPA's
office of civil rights has been investigating whether Louisiana and Mississippi
are violating the rights of their African-American citizens under Title VI by
issuing permits to hazardous waste treatment facilities in minority
neighborhoods. 329 To resolve some of the uncertainties surrounding the scope
of Title VI and environmental permitting, Senator Paul Wellstone introduced a
bill, the Public Health and Equity Act of 1994, that would have clearly
established that discrimination judgments against siting and permit agencies
could be based solely upon a demonstration of disparate impact.330
There is the danger that Title VI or other types of disparate impact suits
based merely upon differences in exposure or location of facilities will
discourage government officials from permitting and facility owners from
operating in communities where suits are likely to occur even if there is a net
social benefit to poor and minority neighborhoods. 331 At least in theory,
compensation is more socially efficient than disparate impact suits because a
compensation process allows a worthwhile project to go forward and at the
same time forces the developer to internalize all of the risks and costs of a
326 See Medical Or., 657 F.2d at 1334-36; Colopy, supra note 18, at 162. A
discussion of how courts' interpretation of the business justification defense has evolved
over the years is beyond the scope of this Article.
327 See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 12; see also Saleem, supra note 280,
at 228 ("However, it is currently unsettled as to whether Title VI applies to EPA decision-
making."). A number of environmental justice proponents have advocated Title VI claims
of disparate impact against environmental permitting agencies. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at
834-39; Colopy, supra note 18, at 128-29, 156-89; supra notes 279, 314 and
accompanying text.
328 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 836-38 (discussing the EPA's decision to
deemphasize its civil rights responsibilities under Title VI); Saleem, supra note 280, at 228
(arguing that the EPA's stance that its decisionmaking was exempt from Title VI "lacks
support from any internal policy or legal precedent"); Colopy, supra note 18, at 180-88
(discussing history of the EPA's enforcement of its Title VI regulations).
329 See Marianne Lavelle, Cinton Pushes on Race and Environment, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
6, 1993, at 1, 41; John H. Cushman, Jr., U.S. to Weigh Blacks' Complaints About
Pollution, N.Y. TImEs, Nov. 19, 1993, at A16.
330 See S. 1841, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); BoERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13,
at 12 (criticizing the bill).
331 See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 12-13.
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facility.33 2 In lieu of disparate impact suits, the proposal in Part VI of this
Article includes a more equitable process for representing and compensating
the neighbors of hazardous facilities.
3. Proposals for Expanded Disparate Impact Claims
James Colopy has argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1991,333 which
amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to make it easier to prove
disparate impact, could significantly affect Title VI caselaw.334 According to
Colopy, under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, once a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the defendant has the affirmative burden of persuasion in
demonstrating that "the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity." 335 If the defendant satisfies
this requirement, the plaintiff can still present evidence that "other test or
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve
the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy
workmanship."' 336 Colopy proposes that this mechanism of disparate impact
analysis be adopted for Title VI analysis as well. 3 37
Assuming that Colopy's interpretation of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is
correct, courts should not apply expansive Title VII analysis to Title VI unless
Congress explicitly adopts such an approach. Siting decisions are different from
job discrimination claims because facilities often bring greater tax and
employment benefits than harms.338 In the siting context, racial disparities
sometimes benefit minorities. Therefore, a plaintiff should be required to prove
not only that statistically significant siting disparities exist, but also that the
harms to the affected subpopulation group exceed the benefits the facility
provides to that group, using conservative but realistic risk assessments. 339
Rachel Godsil has proposed that Congress enact a statute modeled after
332 It is difficult to measure the costs and benefits of a facility. See infra notes 407-25
and accompanying text.
333 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k) (Supp. V 1993)). A discussion of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and how courts
have interpreted its provisions is beyond the scope of this Article.
334 See Colopy, supra note 18, at 163-64.
335 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)Ci) (1991); see Colopy, supra note 18, at 163-64.
336 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)); Colopy, supra note 18, at 164.
3 37 See Colopy, supra note 18, at 164.
338 See infra notes 406-07, 414-28 and accompanying text.
339 See infra notes 406-07, 414-28 and accompanying text.
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Title VII to outlaw siting discrimination. 34° A minority community would have
to establish that it bore greater burdens than a neighboring white community
that could have been considered for a proposed site.341 If a minority
community could establish a prima facie case of disparate impacts and show
that alternative sites existed, then the burden would shift to the siting agency to
show that there was an environmental necessity for choosing the minority
location, such as unique geological conditions. 342
Godsil's proposal is troubling because it would explicitly favor minorities
at the expense of whites.343 Because of the controversial nature of favoring
minorities at the expense of whites in the absence of intentional discrimination,
one commentator has predicted that if Congress enacted the Godsil proposal, it
would not explicitly address the issue of whether a plaintiff must establish
discriminatory intent, and courts might impose such a requirement.344 Godsil's
proposal also fails to consider whether the benefits of a facility, including
compensation and jobs, outweigh the risks.
Edward Boyle has argued that restructuring equal protection law to address
siting disparities is preferable to Godsil's proposal to enact a statute because her
views are so unlikely to be adopted by Congress.345 Boyle proposes that the
circuit courts manipulate the Supreme Court's intent test to create an
intermediate scrutiny approach to equal protection cases involving siting
issues.346 If a plaintiff could show statistically significant evidence of disparate
impact, then defendants would have the burden of showing that the affected
minority group was adequately represented in the decisionmaking process. 347 If
minorities were adequately represented, a court would apply a rational basis
standard of review, but if minorities were inadequately represented, a court
would apply intermediate scrutiny.348
Boyle correctly understands that the Equal Protection Clause is
fundamentally concerned with whether minorities have been adequately
represented rather than with substantive results. 349 But his attempt to avoid the
necessity of congressional action by suggesting that circuit courts consciously
340 See Godsil, supra note 70, at 421-23.
341 See j& at 422.
342 See id. at 422-23.
343 See Crawford, supra note 129, at 296.
344 See Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race
Discrimination, 41 KAN. L. REV. 272, 294-96 (1992).
345 See Boyle, supra note 69, at 979-80 n.228.
346 See id. at 979-83, 988-89.
347 See id. at 980-83.
3 4 8 See id. at 982.
349 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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distort Supreme Court precedents is unprincipled and impractical.
Substantively, his proposal for increased judicial scrutiny is cumbersome
because it may be difficult for courts to assess the adequacy of minority
representation if the process nominally gives equal access to minorities, but
minority groups feel excluded from the majority coalition making the real
decisions.350 The proposal in Part VI of this Article calls for a statutory scheme
that would assure adequate minority representation through a weighted,
cumulative, or proportional voting system, or other measures.351 Boyle is right
to be concerned about whether minorities are adequately represented in the
decisionmaking process, but his proposal does not distinguish between those
minorities who are actually at high risk from a facility and those minorities
who might be counted as being the victim of disparate impacts because they
live in a particular geographical area but who are at less risk than many white
persons. This Article's proposal would assure that all persons who are at high
risk from a facility, regardless of race or ethnicity, are adequately represented
in the decisionmaking process.
B. A Limited Defense of the Intent Requirement
Proponents of environmental justice goals would have a stronger case for
placing equity criteria above efficiency concerns if they could establish
intentional discrimination. 35 2 Legally, and even socially, "racism" has been
construed to mean intentional or purposeful conduct on the basis of race, or at
3 50 See GUINER, supra note 72, at 4-6 & passin (arguing that minority oppression by
white majority is possible despite opportunity to vote); Issacharoff, supra note 72, at 1644-
46 (arguing that current judicial doctrines are inadequate to control partisan misuse of the
reapportionment process).
351 GUINIER, supra note 72, at 14-16 (discussing cumulative voting as a remedy for
minority oppression); Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional
Representation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1991, 1999-
2015 (1993) (proposing that representatives to United States House of Representatives be
elected on statewide basis using Hare Single Transferable Vote proportional voting system);
Edward Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Disnicts (discussing cumulative and
proportional voting systems and arguing that proportional voting is superior), in MINORrrY
VoTEDLrboN 249, 255-64 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989); John R. Low-Beer, Note, The
Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, YALE L.. 163, 187-88 (1985)
(proposing use of party-list proportional voting system with single-member districting in
state and local elections); infra notes 429, 497 and accompanying text.
352 By "intentional discrimination," I mean cases in which a plaintiff can establish an
inference of purposeful intent through statistical evidence, but not cases based solely upon
disparities, without any evidence of discriminatory intent. See supra notes 295-96 and
accompanying text.
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least some consciousness of race as a factor motivating conduct. 353 The
discriminatory intent requirement is based upon the notion that racial
discrimination is conscious, willful, and morally reprehensible. 354 Professor
Gerald Torres, both a leading critical race and environmental scholar, has
cautioned against using the term "environmental racism" too loosely because
"calling something racist when another term might suffice risks subjecting the
word to a kind of verbal inflation." 355
Defenders of the intent-based approach to discrimination argue that volition
is an essential element of race discrimination. 356 An intent requirement is a
bottom-line standard for determining whether or not a person was motivated to
harm a particular group, whereas a disparate impacts or effects test creates a
laundry list of factors that can be balanced the way a particular decisionmaker
wants. 357 Commentators have cited four major reasons for not adopting a
discriminatory impact standard: (1) the impact standard would be too costly for
the government; (2) under an impact standard, innocent people would bear the
cost of remedying the harm; (3) the impact standard would be inconsistent with
traditional equal protection doctrine, because the judicial decisionmaker would
need to explicitly consider race; and (4) it would be inappropriate for the
judiciary to remedy the impact of otherwise neutral government action at the
expense of other legitimate social interests. 358
Critics of the intent approach correctly observe that it does not address
structural, indirect, or vestigial effects of racism, 359 but there are more
effective ways to redress such issues than through discrimination suits. Broad
353 See Foster, supra note 8, at 731. See generally Lawrence, supra note 286, at 318-
20, 347-49, 366-76 (explaining establishment of the intent-purpose requirement in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and its further inculcation
in equal protection-race discrimination jurisprudence as a necessity in establishing actionable
racism). Because of this intent requirement, a showing of a racially disparate impact of a
facially neutral law or decision is insufficient without showing specific racial animus. Id. at
318-19; see also Foster, supra note 8, at 731 n.48 (discussing Lawrence).
354 See Boyle, supra note 69, at 963 n. 146 (citing sources).
355 Gerald Torres, Introduction. Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 839, 839 (1992).
356 See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination:
Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L.
REV. 633, 643-44 (1983).
357 See id. at 644-45.
358 Lawrence, supra note 286, at 320-21; see also Colopy, supra note 18, at 146
(citing Lawrence).
359 See supra notes 307-13 and accompanying text.
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income redistribution policies designed to ameliorate market dynamics, 360
compensation schemes that internalize the social costs of pollution,361 and
environmental policies designed to reduce the impact of hot-spots362 that
disproportionately affect minorities will accomplish more than liberalized
disparate impact suits.
C. Statistical Significance and Disparate Impact Claims
While it is undoubtedly frustrating for plaintiffs who allege discriminatory
siting practices to be told by a court that there are not enough facilities in a
given area to establish statistically significant evidence of disparate impacts,
there is a danger in applying any lesser standard for determining whether a
pattern of inequity exists. Some critics of studies alleging racial disparities have
questioned the quality of the evidence. For example, studies that classify an
area as minority or poor whenever the percentage of people of color or poor in
the community exceeds that of the population as a whole ignore the population
density within a neighborhood. They also classify predominantly white or
wealthy areas in which the population variance from the national distribution is
statistically insignificant as victims of disproportionate siting.363 The National
Law Journal study,364 which found significant racial and income disparities,
has been challenged on two grounds: first, all of the areas the authors defined
as minority areas included a substantial majority of white persons; and second,
the study failed to use standard tests of statistical significance. 365 In addition,
3 6 0 See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1390-92.
361 See supra notes 170-87 and accompanying text; infra notes 480-520 and
accompanying text.362 See supra notes 28-29, 31, 49-54 and accompanying text.
363 See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 4-5; Been, Market Dynanics, supra
note 1, at 1384 n.2, 1403 n.85 (criticizing assumption that siting is always disproportionate
when the percentage of a minority group in a host tract is higher than the percentage in
nonhost tracts or the city or national average).364 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
365 See Mary Bryant, Unequal Justice? Lies, Damn Lies, and Statisics Revisited,
SONREEL NEws, Sept./Oct. 1993, at 3, 3 (criticizing National Law Journal study for
referring to populations that are at least 79% white as "minority" in nature); Lazarus, supra
note 1, at 818 n.125. But see Methodology, NAT'L L.'., Sept. 21, 1992, at S4. Thomas E.
Godfrey, vice president for research at Decision Demographics, which contributed to the
study, defended it by arguing that "'[iun a country where residential segregation abounds, an
area that is 80 percent white or less might be considered highly integrated in the eyes of the
residents,'" and that for the purposes of measuring environmental inequities such areas
"'may still be arguably indicative of "minority" populations compared to an area that is
nearly 100 percent white in population composition.'" Id. The National Law Journal did not
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the National Law Journal data are not adjusted for time.366
Professor Lazarus, an advocate of reducing environmental inequities, has
observed that the statistical findings of the 1987 United Church of Christ
study3 67 reflect a ninety percent confidence level, "which is not particularly
high," and that the statistical methodology utilized in the study is controversial
because the "study utilizes a 'discriminate' rather than 'regression' analysis
technique, which is the more widely accepted basis for differentiating between
the effect of multiple dependent variables." 368 Furthermore, he notes that the
United Church of Christ study equates the siting of toxic sites with actual
exposure to toxic releases and relies on present demographic data rather than
the demographic data pertaining to the time when the initial siting decision may
have been made.369 Professor Been has severely criticized the methodology
used by Professor Bullard in his studies of alleged discriminatory siting in
Houston. 370
Beyond requiring statistically significant evidence of discrimination, there
are even more difficult problems that courts need to address in assessing claims
of environmental inequities. Scholars have employed different definitions of
race and ethnicity371 and have disagreed about defining the location of
subpopulations relative to the location of the activity, condition, or impact
report the statistical significance of any element of its study. See Bryant, supra, at 4.
366 Because cleanup requirements have become more stringent since Congress enacted
the 1986 Superfund Reform and Reauthorization Act, it is important to take into account
when a cleanup occurred, but the National Law Journal study failed to do so. See Bryant,
supra note 365, at 4. Other commentators have come to conflicting conclusions about
whether race or class matters in determining how quickly EPA cleans up a site. Compare
Bird, supra note 61, at 337 (finding no relationship between pace at which sites are cleaned
up and host county's socioeconomic characteristics) with Rae Zimmerman, Social Equity
and Enviromnental Risk, 13 RISK ANALYSIS: INT'L J. 649, 660-64 (1993) (finding that the
higher the percentage of African-Americans in community, the less likely it was that
hazardous waste sites in community had progressed to "Record of Decision" stage of
cleanup, especially when community was also relatively poor; but finding that difference
was primarily function of how long site had been listed on National Priorities List).
367 See supra note 31.
368 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 802 n.56.
369 Id.
370 Been notes that Bullard's data are confusing and perhaps incomplete, and that her
own finding of disproportionate siting may not be correct if Bullard's data are flawed. Been,
Market Dynawics, supra note 1, at 1400-01 n.69, 1403 n.85. But see Bullard, supra note
57, at 60-61 (challenging Been's exclusion of sites included in his earlier study).
371 See Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 634. Some scholars have suggested that race and
ethnicity are meaningful only when combined with other factors, such as income. See id. at
665-66 (citing sources).
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area. 372 Scholars have strongly disagreed about the appropriateness of using
various geographical boundaries such as counties, municipalities, zip codes,
service areas, census tracts, block groups, and blocks. 373 Because scholars
cannot agree on how to define subpopulations or geographical areas, one must
assess all existing empirical research with some caution. 374
Courts need to establish clear tests for defining minority and ethnic groups
and geographical areas, but it will be difficult. Courts should distinguish
between disparities resulting from the initial siting decision and those caused by
subsequent events attributable to market dynamics.
Courts should be relatively stringent in evaluating discrimination claims
because of the stigma associated with branding a defendant as a discriminator.
Many might argue that the threat of exposing minorities to disproportionate
pollution is a far greater danger than the impact of a discrimination verdict
upon a government official's career, but a legislative reform of the siting
process that insures adequate minority representation and compensation can
achieve more to prevent disparities and do so without the need for a finding of
unlawful discrimination on the part of government officials. In light of the
methodological difficulties in determining whether a particular ethnic or
minority group has been discriminated against, it is better to use a
compensation process to redress racial and income disparities unless a plaintiff
can prove intentional discrimination.
V. A COST-BENEFIT APPROACH TO COMPENSATION AND RISK
A. A Limited Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis and Risk Management
Professor Rodgers has argued that there are four basic approaches to using
cost-benefit analysis for regulation: (1) cost-oblivious, which ignores cost
because it is too hard to measure or because environmental values should be
protected at any cost; (2) cost-effective, which takes cost into account only in
implementing objectives or choosing means, not in setting goals or objectives;
372 Id.
3 73 William K. Reilly, then Administrator of the EPA, criticized the use of zip code
areas in the National Law Journal study because they vary in size and their overall
population may not reflect the immediate population surrounding a facility. See Reilly,
supra note 37, at 16. Likewise, Professor Been has argued that census tracts of
approximately 2500 to 8000 people are a more reliable means to define a community than
five-digit zip code areas, which may be smaller or larger than census tracts but typically are
larger than census blocks or block groupings. See Been, Market Dynanics, supra note 1, at
1401 n.73, 1402-03 n.84.
3 74 See Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 665-69.
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(3) cost-sensitive, which takes cost into account both in setting and
implementing policy; and (4) strict cost-benefit analysis based upon highly
quantitative methods.375 Most federal environmental statutes that regulate
health risks favor the second or third approach over strict cost-benefit
analysis.376 While numerous provisions of environmental statutes require the
EPA to consider economic factors, none explicitly requires a formal cost-
benefit analysis. 377 A series of executive orders, however, require agencies
issuing "major rules" to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to ensure that the
benefits of a proposed regulation outweigh its costs. 3 78
The great difficulty in conducting a cost-benefit analysis is in measuring
the value of nonmarket goods such as human lives or the existence of other
species.379 For instance, existing regulations establish values ranging from
$70,000 to $132,000,000 per life saved. 380 Another problem is that cost-
benefit analysis does not address distributional issues.381
The EPA or a state siting board or agency should perform a limited cost-
sensitive analysis to determine whether a proposed hazardous waste site poses
an acceptable risk to a community and whether the developer's proposed
compensation to a community is reasonable. Because there are too many
difficulties in assessing environmental risks to apply a strict cost-benefit
analysis, the EPA or a siting board should apply a cost-sensitive approach in
which it considers costs, benefits, and other factors, including distributional
375 See generally William H. Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of
Health and Environmental Decisionmaling, 4 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 191, 201-14 (1980)
(addressing regulatory cost-benefit analysis but not compensation).
376 Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 254, at 272.
3 77 Id. In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1214 (5th Cir. 1991),
however, the EPA and Fifth Circuit independently concluded that the decisionmaking
process should include a cost-benefit analysis even though the Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988), does not explicitly require it. See Asbestos, Preamble
to Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,467 (1989); Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note
254, at 272-73.
378 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 5, at 641 (President Clinton) (cost-
benefit analysis required for any "significant" rule, that is, "a rule that may [have] an
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way
the economy"); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 127 (1981) (President Reagan)
(cost-benefit analysis required for any "major" rule, that is, "any regulation that is likely to
result in [an] annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more [or a] major increase in
costs or prices").
379 See Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 254, at 273-74; Rodgers, supra note
375, at 194-96.3 80 See Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 254, at 273.
381 Rodgers, supra note 375, at 194.
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inequities. The EPA or state agency should require higher minimum
compensation for higher-risk facilities. 382
1. Risk Assessment: Imperfect but Necessary
It is difficult to estimate the health risks of a hazardous waste facility.
Given the uncertainties of risk assessment, some environmental justice
proponents have proposed that all such facilities be closed down, or at least that
no new facilities be built.38 3 But some new facilities are needed to replace old
ones or address new capacity needs. 384 Furthermore, there is some evidence
suggesting that the benefits of such facilities outweigh their risks. 385
The amount of potential risk a hazardous waste site generates has not been
established, nor has the relationship been established between such risks and
distance from a site.38 6 The extent to which pollution from a facility reaches a
given individual and reaches individual cells that are sensitive to the pollutant is
difficult and expensive to measure. 387 The EPA generally uses predictive
models, such as the Human Exposure Model, rather than direct measurements,
to calculate the exposure of a hypothetical maximally exposed individual.388
Some commentators have criticized this model for being overly conservative,
but others have defended conservative assumptions because it is better to err on
the side of safety.389
To understand the relative risk of hazardous waste facilities, it would be
helpful to compare their risks to those of other types of polluting facilities or
substances. The EPA has already undertaken a large amount of research on
interprogram priority setting, based upon the premise of the commensurability
of risks.390 The EPA is currently establishing a process to set pollution
382 See infra notes 451-55 and accompanying text.
383 See infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
3 84 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
385 See infra notes 414-28 and accompanying text.
386 See Anderton et al., supra note 59, at 124-25.
3 87 See Mank, supra note 18, at 336-37.
388 Id. at 335 n.334.
389 See id (citing sources).
390 See U.S. EPA, COMPARING RISKS AND SET'IG ENvIRONMmEAL PRIORnEs:
OvERvIEw OF THREE REGIONAL PRolEcrs (1989) [hereinafter EPA, COMPARING RISKS];
U.S. EPA, SCIENCE ADVISORY BD., REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORIrIES AND STRATEGIES
FOR ENvIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990) [hereinafter EPA, REDUCING RISK]; U.S. EPA,
UNFINISHED BusmNEss: A CoMPNARATIvE AssEssMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
(1987) [hereinafter EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESs]; see also Richard L. Andrews, Long-
Range Planning in Environmental and Health Regulatory Agencies, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515,
552-57 (1993); Applegate, supra note 239, at 349-51 (citing sources).
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reduction and resource priorities. 391 The most difficult problem is comparing
health risks in different contexts, such as pesticides, water pollution, air
pollution, and land disposal of toxic wastes, each of which presents different
routes of exposure, costs and benefits, and types of risk.39 2
There has been considerable scholarly debate about the EPA's basic
premise that different types of risk are commensurable. 393 Opponents of risk
assessment often criticize attempts by experts to rate the risk of a single
chemical based upon expected fatalities because of pervasive scientific
uncertainties, inadequate information, and the need to consider moral,
equitable, and distributional issues.394 In addition, critics of comparative risk
assessment often argue (1) that society lacks sufficient information to compare
different types of risk or health effects; (2) that the pain of dying from cancer is
not comparable to the impact of reproductive or neurological disease; and (3)
that comparative risk assessment does not consider the distribution of risk-
bearing and control costs, the concentration and dispersion of risks in space or
time, or intergenerational equity.395 Professor Hornstein believes that because
social priority setting is inescapably collective and political, proponents of
comparative risk analysis exaggerate its scientific legitimacy. 396
The EPA has used carcinogenicity as a common metric, but that single
measure cannot provide scientific answers on how to compare the impact of
391 In a December 22, 1993 memorandum, EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner
announced a new Science Policy Council and the elimination of the narrower Risk
Assessment Council. Science Panel Set to Begin Projects on Peer Review, Risk
Ch racterization, [25 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 19, 19-20 (May 6, 1994).
The Council's duties will include: "Determining priorities among issues identified by EPA
regions, programs, the Risk Assessment Forum, Science Advisory Board, other federal
agencies, and other major working groups and committees. .. ." Id. at 20.
3 92 See Applegate, supra note 239, at 350-51.
393 See id. at 349-51 (citing sources); Hornstein, supra note 234, at 584-616
(criticizing comparative risk assessment); Symposium, Risk Analysis and the U.S.
Enviromnental Protection Agency, 21 ENVrL. L. 1321 (1991); Setting Environmental
Priorities: The Debate About Risk, 17 EPA 3. (1991) (entire issue).
3 94 See generally Gillette & Krier, supra note 236, at 1071-85 (arguing for multi-
factor "public" approach to risk and against "expert" cost-benefit analysis of expected
fatalities).
395 See generally Hornstein, supra note 234, at 584-616, 631-33 & passim; Robin
Shifrin, Note, Not by Risk Alone: Reforming EPA Research Priorities, 102 YALE L.J. 547,
560-62 (1992) (arguing that comparative risk assessment tends to focus on aggregate risk
reduction and largely ignores the equitable norm that all members of society should bear a
similar average risk); see also Gillette & Krier, supra note 236, at 1071-85 (arguing for
multi-factor "public" approach to risk and against "expert" cost-benefit analysis of expected
fatalities).
396 See generally Hornstein, supra note 234, at 584-616, 631-33 &passim.
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cancer on diverse, exposed subpopulations such as children and adults, or the
tradeoff-s between using two chemicals that are more or less risky to
farmworkers or applicators as opposed to consumers. 397 Cancer research
cannot always measure the risk of a chemical within a range of two orders of
magnitude, a factor of 100.398 When hard data are lacking, the EPA may create
a grossly inflated upper bound for actual cancer risk from specific pollutants or
may create too low a bound despite conservative assumptions. 399 There are
even greater uncertainties about measuring on a single risk index the risks from
chemicals that present dangers of such noncancer "endpoints" as birth defects,
reproductive failure, acute poisonings, and neurological defects. 4 ° This author
agrees in many respects with critics of comparative risk assessment who argue
that it is methodologically impossible and misleading to compare carcinogens
and noncarcinogens on a single risk index.40 1
Although the numbers used by risk or cost-benefit analysis may provide a
misleading sense of accuracy in a field based upon assumption after
assumption, there are some meaningful differences in risk and cost that might
be used as the basis for a rough siting evaluation and compensation process. A
recent Harvard Lifesaving Study by the Harvard School of Public Health's
Center for Risk Analysis found that medical care generally saves lives at less
cost than workplace-safety or environmental measures, and that extravagantly
large sums are spent to alleviate minor cancer 'risks.40 2 The Harvard study
points out some examples of pollution control requirements that are clearly
cost-ineffective by any measure. For instance, preventing releases of
carcinogenic chloroform at pulp mills costs an estimated $99.4 billion for each
3 97 See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesiicide Regulation on the
Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Refonn, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 441;
Mank, supra note 18, at 282.
398 See Mank, supra note 18, at 281-83, 333; Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating
Acceptable Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 338
(1992).
399 See Mank, supra note 18, at 282.
40o See id at 283-84, 333.
401 See id at 283-85 (criticizing Bush Administration's efforts to use single risk index
for carcinogens and noncarcinogens).
402 Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-
Effectiveness 13 (July 7, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). According to
the study, each year of life bought by a medical intervention costs, on average, $19,000,
but a life-year saved by toxin control costs more than $2,700,000. Id. Outside researchers
say that the Harvard study, begun in 1990, is more rigorous than previous studies because
some 90% of its data were drawn from government or peer-reviewed studies in technical
journals and because of its breadth and the number of interventions analyzed. See Stipp,
supra note 233, atB1.
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life-year saved. 403
Because it is unacceptable to spend billions of dollars for each life-year
saved by regulation, the EPA must refine its risk and cost-benefit analyses and
avoid rapidly escalating costs that fail the "knee-of-the-curve" test.40 4 The EPA
or state agencies, however, should still take into account normative reasons
such as equity in making decisions-even if such decisions are not justified by
a strict cost-benefit analysis, which is likely to be imperfect in light of
pervasive scientific uncertainties and high informational costs-as long as the
cost of reducing inequities is not too far out of line with other pollution
reducing priorities. 40 5
Some risks, however, are so remote or expensive to remediate that nothing
should be spent on them because the money could be better spent elsewhere or
because there are negative "income effects" leading to poorer diet or more
unemployment, which in turn may increase the number of heart attacks or
suicides.40 6 By reducing the incentives for businesses to locate in poor and
minority areas, legislative proposals to reduce environmental inequities may
exacerbate local problems of poverty and unemployment that are far more
unhealthy than the minute risks associated with waste disposal facilities and
industrial plants. 407
2. Assessing a Developer's Compensation
It is relatively easy to measure the benefits of a proposed hazardous waste
facility. Developers are quick to provide information in terms of new jobs, tax
revenues, and additional compensation. 40 8 An agency or siting board should
verify how the developer came up with the numbers and perhaps hire a
consulting firm to perform an independent analysis. The siting board should
analyze both the overall benefits to a community and the distribution of benefits
to particular individuals.
A much more difficult task is assessing whether the compensation offered
by a developer is sufficient to internalize the externalities that the facility will
impose on surrounding residents. Because of the uncertainties in risk
assessment, the EPA or a state agency should determine only whether the
403 Tengs et al., supra note 402, at 50; Stipp, supra note 233, at B2.
404 See Manic, supra note 18, at 327, 331 n.320; Shapiro & McGarity, supra note
236, at 743 n.77.
405 See Mank, supra note 18, at 328.
406 See BREYER, supra note 113, at 16-29.
407 See BoRNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 6.
408 See McDermott, supra note 1, at 698 (discussing benefits of Emelle Landfill in
Sumter County, Alabama).
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developer's offer meets minimum standards and then allow a community to
negotiate a higher amount. 409 The EPA or state agency could either base
minimum compensation on a historical examination of what developers have
offered in the past five or ten years for a facility of similar size or risk, or rely
upon surveys of residents who live near similar facilities to determine what
they believe would be fair compensation. 410 In formulating its 1989 benzene
standards, the EPA used a historical survey to determine that a one-in-ten-
thousand risk to the maximally exposed person constituted an acceptable risk to
human health.411 Critics of the benzene rule have argued that use of historical
survey data is inappropriate for setting current standards. 412 Even if their
criticism of the benzene standard is appropriate, a historical survey could be
used to set minimum compensation standards that would serve as the starting
point for compensating neighbors of a hazardous waste site.
3. The Emelle Landfill Example
One example may help in assessing the relative costs and benefits of a
hazardous waste facility to a minority community. Chemical Waste
Management's Emelle Landfill in rural Sumter County, Alabama is one of the
largest hazardous waste facilities in the United States.413 Charles McDermott,
Director of Government Affairs for WMX Technologies, the parent of
Chemical Waste Management, 414 claims that the facility provides a minimum
of $4,200,000 in taxes to Sumter County, has a payroll of $10,000,000 and
that sixty percent of the employees live in the county. 415 The facility has
provided in-kind services such as water supply hookups, the construction of the
409 See infra notes 451-74 and accompanying text.
410 See Been, supra note 77, at 796-800 (discussing surveys of residents who actually
or potentially live near a hazardous or radioactive waste facility).
411 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions
from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethyl Benzene Styrene Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels,
Benzene Equipment Leaks, and Coke By-Products Recovery Plants, Preamble to Final
Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 38,045-46 (1989) (describing how EPA selected its method for
setting emissions standards for benzene and radionuclide categories); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1164-66 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane)
(suggesting use of historical surveys in determining acceptable risk); Mank, supra note 18,
at 270-71, 276-77 (discussing benzene rule and use of historical risk survey).
4 12 See Janet L. McQuaid, Note, Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under
the EPA's Final Benzene Rules and the Cean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 427, 437 (1991).
413 See McDermott, supra note 1, at 697.
414 Id. at 693 n.16.
415 See id. at 698.
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town hall, and a baseball field. 416 He contends that the site was chosen because
it was sparsely populated, had good access to transportation, was relatively
arid, and, most importantly, was located atop the Selma chalk formation, which
consists of several hundred square miles of dense, 700-foot-thick natural chalk,
an ideal barrier between disposal activities and the nearest aquifer feeding a
drinking source. 417
Environmental justice proponents Conner Bailey and Charles E. Faupel use
the Emelle Landfill as an example of how economic considerations encourage
the placement of environmental hazards in minority communities. 418 They
argue that the "black, rural, and poor" area of Sumter County has become
dependent upon the Emelle Landfill for economic survival and that the county's
depressed economy prevented citizens from organizing aggressive opposition to
the siting of the facility in their community. 4 19
The EPA has ranked the relative risk posed by several different kinds of
environmental problems and found that hazardous waste facilities permitted
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)420 pose relatively
low risks, even though much more of the agency's budget is spent to regulate
them than on other, more serious environmental problems.421 Similarly, the
416 See ad.
4 17 See id. at 697.
418 Bailey & Faupel, supra note 86.
419 See id. at 140-43.
420 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795.
421 An EPA study assessing the relative risk of 31 different environmental problems
found that the following issues posed a high risk to human health or the environment but
received relatively little attention or funding from the agency: indoor radon; indoor air
pollution; ozone depletion; global warming; non-point sources; discharges to estuaries,
coastal waters, and oceans; other pesticide risks; accidental releases of toxins; consumer
products; and worker exposures. See EPA, UNFINISHED BusINEss, supra note 390, at xv;
see also U.S. EPA, A RISK ANALYSIS OF TWENTY-SIX ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS:
SUMMARY REPORT (1991) (ranking the relative risk of 26 different environmental problems
ranging from ozone depletion and radon exposure to several common industrial activities
and RCRA-permitted facilities) [hereinafter EPA, TWENTY-SIX PROBLEMS]; McDermott,
supra note 1, at 692. Other problems posed relatively lower risks, but the EPA spent a great
deal of resources in redressing them: active hazardous waste RCRA sites; National Priorities
List abandoned waste sites eligible for Superfund monies; underground storage tanks; and
municipal nonhazardous waste sites. See EPA, UNF SHED BUSINESS, supra note 390, at
xv; see also EPA, TWENTY-SIX PROBLEMS, supra, at 9 (ranking RCRA-permitted facilities
among lowest tested risks); McDermott, supra note 1, at 692 (same). The implications of
the EPA's studies for developing risk-based priorities and for comparative risk assessment
are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally EPA, REDUCING RISK, supra note 390
(qualifiedly endorsing risk-based prioritization and comparative risk assessment); Applegate,
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amount of money allocated to Superfund cleanups of abandoned hazardous
waste sites corresponds more closely to public perceptions of risk than actual
risks, and less money is allocated to more serious problems such as pesticide
residues because of the public's misperception of the relative risks. 422
On the other hand, Professor Hornstein and others have observed that a
perfectly plausible equitable argument can be made that it is more important to
eliminate highly concentrated risks from hazardous, waste sites that include the
risk of destroying whole families or neighborhoods than greater but more
diffuse risks such as those posed by chlorine by-products in public drinking
water.423 A recent study found that the risks of Superfund sites to present
populations are generally relatively low but quite substantial in many
instances. 424 For instance, Superfund sites on the National Priorities List often
contain lead, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), benzene, or pesticides.425
Hazardous waste sites may pose considerable risks to future generations,
depending upon the validity of certain assumptions about future use of a site,426
an issue addressed in Part VI(B)(2). In a world of scarce financial and
informational resources, environmental policymaking should consider the
relative risks of different types of problems427 and the views of those citizens
most at risk from concentrated dangers. 428
Although it is probably impossible to fully assess the risks produced by the
Emelle facility, in light of the relatively low risks posed by hazardous waste
supra note 239, at 309-10 (qualifiedly endorsing risk-based prioritization); Hornstein, supra
note 234, at 584-629 (criticizing comparative risk assessment).4 22 See EPA, UNFINIsH-D BusINESS, supra note 390, at 77-78, 84-86, 91-99; EPA,
CoMPARING RISKS, supra note 390, at 62-65; Applegate, supra note 239, at 279; see also
Lester B. Lave, Risk Assessment and Regulatory Priorities, 14 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 307,
309-11 (1989) (discussing studies showing that regulatory expenditures do not correlate
with greater risk).
423 See Hornstein, supra note 235, at 593; Shifrin, supra note 395, at 561 (arguing that
even if Superfund sites pose relatively low overall risk, they may pose concentrated risks to
nearby residents justifying substantial expenditures on equitable grounds).
424 Professors James T. Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi analyzed the exposure pathways
considered in the human health risk assessments conducted at 78 Superfund sites with
Records of Decision signed in 1991 or 1992, and found that the risks to present populations
were relatively low but could not be classified as trivial. James T. Hamilton & W. Kip
Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assesments for Superfund, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 573, 576, 608-
09 (1994).
425Jeffrey Spear, Comment, Remedy Selection Under CERCLA and Our
Responsibilities to Future Generations, 2 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 117, 139-40 (1993).
426 See Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 424, at 608-09.
427 See Applegate, supra note 239, at 282-87.
428 See Hornstein, supra note 234, at 593; Shifrin, supra note 395, at 561.
[Vol. 56:329
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
facilities in general, it is not unreasonable for an agency and community to
conclude that the overall benefits of the landfill outweigh its risks. While Bailey
and Faupel may be right that poor blacks in rural Sumter County are more
vulnerable to the economic inducements offered by the facility, local residents
ought to be able to accept such a facility as long as the risk is reasonable as
judged by technocratic experts and those most at risk in the community think
that the benefits outweigh the costs. Environmental justice proponents are
undoubtedly genuinely concerned about the risk of facilities such as the Emelle
Landfill, but local residents may be making the right choice in accepting
relatively minor risks in exchange for concrete benefits. Existing compensation
programs, however, do not guarantee that those most at risk will have a voice
in negotiating compensation.
VI. SOLUTION: RISK-BASED COMPENSATION COMMrrrEES
A national or state risk assessment process should be used to set maximum
levels of risk within a local area to prevent exploitation of any community. The
risk assessment process could also determine the minimum amount of
compensation that a developer, owner, or operator must provide to compensate
a local community.
A risk-based siting committee would ultimately determine whether to
accept a site and would negotiate the amount and distribution of compensation
paid by the developer. The relative say that nearby residents, residents in a
municipality, and regional neighbors have on a siting negotiation committee
would depend on the relative amount of risk to which individuals are
potentially or actually exposed, as determined by the risk assessment process.
This siting proposal differs from previous siting proposals in that the risk
assessment process would determine both the membership of the local siting
committee and the minimum amount of compensation. To protect the interests
of racial minorities and those exposed to higher risks, special voting systems
could be used, such as weighted cumulative voting or proportional voting.429
A. Limits on Risk: Technocratic Maximums
If all communities are fully informed about the costs of a facility and all
enjoy equal bargaining power, a siting will be most efficient if the facility is
placed in the community that is willing to accept the facility for the lowest
price, assuming that the price covers all the costs the facility imposes. 430 To
429 See supra note 349.
430 Been, supra note 77, at 796.
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promote such efficiency, some proposals attempt to create a competitive market
between facility developers and communities. 431 While studies have disagreed
about whether there are widespread siting disparities, 432 there is enough
evidence to cast doubt on rosy assumptions about equal access to full
information and bargaining power among all communities. Given the
complexities of risk assessment, 433 it would be surprising if access to full
information was the norm among potential siting communities in the United
States. At the very least, a siting scheme must consider inefficiencies in the
market for siting hazardous waste facilities and the need for some government
regulation.
Technical experts from state or federal administrative agencies should
determine maximum levels of allowable risk and impose moratoria on the
construction of new disposal or polluting facilities in high-risk areas. 434 A cost-
benefit and risk assessment analysis could determine if any subpopulation
group is likely to receive substantially disproportionate harm from a proposed
facility. 435 Part VI(B)(3) discusses alternative approaches for defining the
appropriate geographical area and the relevant class of protected persons.
Unlike the Gore, Lewis, and Collins bills, 436 however, there should be an
opportunity to build new facilities if an equal or greater amount of risk was
eliminated by closing an existing facility. The proposed moratoria approach
would prevent any one area, whether predominantly white or minority, from
being exploited.
There should be no attempt, however, to insure that all areas have roughly
the same amount of risk, because in a market-based society it is too difficult to
mandate equality of results. Attempts to use a "fair share" approach or a
mathematical formula for allocating low-income housing have enjoyed only a
mixed record of success. 437 Even for a single type of locally undesirable land
use, mathematical determinations of "fair share" involve an enormous number
431 See id.
432 See supra part I.
433 See supra part V.A.1.
43 4 See infra notes 441-49 and accompanying text.
435 See supra note 54 and accompanying text; infra notes 449, 492 and accompanying
text.
436 See supra part II.A.4.
437 The New Jersey Supreme Court used such an approach with mixed success to
force exclusive suburbs to open their doors to low- and moderate-income housing. See
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J.), appeal dismssed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Been, Fairness, supra note
1, at 1076 (noting mixed record of success of fair share housing plans).
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of value judgments and measurements that are likely to result in litigation. 438 A
recent proposal to have states adopt a point-system siting model that takes into
account factors such as race, income, history of siting practices, and
geographical fairness is likely to fail because it is too difficult to balance such
complex and diverse technical and social factors, especially to the extent that
incommensurable notions of equity are at stake.439 In a free-market society
there is no way to prevent wealthy people from living in areas that are
unsuitable for locally undesirable land uses, and therefore national or state
attempts to impose a fair distribution of such projects on local communities are
likely to be unsuccessful. 440 Nevertheless, the process of establishing moratoria
in high-risk areas may indirectly encourage the siting of facilities in lower risk
locations as developers look for alternative sites. 44 1
The EPA and state agencies already employ a number of technical and risk
assessment criteria to evaluate the suitability of proposed locations or the risk
of proposed or existing sites. Most existing state siting schemes look at hard-
technical criteria including the physical and geological characteristics of the
site, natural hazards such as earthquakes or flooding, drinking water sources,
surrounding fragile land areas such as wetlands or shorelines, ecological
habitats, and historic areas. 442 In addition, most states examine soft-technical
criteria such as economic development and traffic congestion.443
Risk assessment procedures are used to evaluate the risk of existing or
proposed sites. For example, the National Priorities List for cleaning up
Superfund sites uses a Hazard Ranking System, a scoring system, to rate the
438 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1075-76.
439 See Mata, supra note 92, at 447-67 (proposing siting model based on point system
for assessing both technical and equitable factors). See generally Hornstein, supra note 234,
at 602.
In general, to the extent that incommensurable notions of equity are at stake, they
cannot be resolved simply by combining equity "points" that might be generated even
by a richer model of expected utility; incommensurability means that there cannot be a
single equity scale that can generate "points" which represent meaningful conclusions
about the equitable thing to do in any particular environmental decision.
Id.
440 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1050.
441 Because developers often avoid high-cost areas, to the extent the proposal increases
the cost of locating in an already high-risk area, developers would presumably select an
alternative, lower-risk and lower-cost location. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying
text.
442 See Mata, supra note 92, at 454-55.
443 See id. at 455.
19951
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
relative risk posed by a potential clean-up sites. 444 Section 112(t) of the Clean
Air Act requires a risk assessment of the carcinogenic danger of major sources
emitting hazardous air pollutants in determining whether the EPA must
promulgate residual risk standards. 445
Both the EPA and state agencies have used risk assessments to determine
what constitutes an unacceptable level of risk,446 often recognizing the
uncertainties of risk assessment by looking at a range of possible risk. 447
Generally, a level of excess cancer risk greater than one-in-ten-thousand is
unacceptable and a risk less than one-in-one-million is presumptively
acceptable. 448 The EPA needs to develop better techniques for assessing
noncarcinogenic risks and for evaluating the risks to subpopulations whose
dietary and work patterns differ from the national average.449 Despite its
limitations, however, risk assessment can serve a protective function in
preventing excessive concentrations of risk from environmental pollution.
444 See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A (1994); see also John S. Applegate, How to Save
the National Priorities List from the D.C. Circuit-and Itself, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENvrL. L. 211, 214-15 (1994); Ragna Henrichs, Superfund's NPL: The Listing Process, 63
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 717, 729-37 (1989).
445 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412() (Supp. V 1993); Mank, supra note 18, at 274-76.
446 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993) (using one-in-one-million
standard to trigger residual risk provisions for hazardous air pollutants); Mank, supra note
18, at 275-77, 309-10, 332 (discussing several statutes and regulations relating to toxic
chemicals that use one-in-one-million standard).
447 A risk range approach would start with a basic acceptable risk range of an excess
cancer risk of one-in-ten-thousand to one-in-one-million. The EPA and at least one state
currently use such ranges to guide their decisions. See Manic, supra note 18, at 332
(discussing use of risk ranges by the EPA's Office of Solid Waste and the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection's Division of Environmental Quality). "For
example, the EPA's Office of Solid Waste in selecting among cleanup alternatives for
corrective action for Solid Waste Management Units at active hazardous waste facilities
seeks to reduce lifetime cancer risks into the one-in-ten-thousand to one-in-a-million range."
Id. at 332 n.326 (discussing Corrective Action for Solid Waste Management Units
(SWMUs) at Hazardous Waste Facilities, 40 C.F.R. pts. 264, 265, 270, 271 (1994)); see
also infra notes 448, 453, 493 and accompanying text.
4 48 See id. at 332 (discussing United States EPA's standards for hazardous waste
facilities and New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's standards); Corrective
Action for Solid Waste Management Units (SMWU's) at Hazardous Waste Facilities, 55
Fed. Reg. 30,798, 30,825-27 (1990); National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency
Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8717-23, 8768 (1990).
449 See Manic, supra note 18, at 281-84, 336-37.
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B. Negotiated Compensation: Technocratic Minimums and Risk-Based
Negotiating Committees
Membership of siting negotiation committees should be determined by a
risk assessment process that gives proportionately increased representation to
those who are likely to be exposed to greater risks from a proposed facility.
The risk assessment process should establish a minimum amount of
compensation that a developer must pay to a community, perhaps based in part
upon how much developers of similar facilities have paid or surveys of
residents in communities with similar facilities. 450 Technical representatives
from the EPA, a state agency, or independent consultants paid for by
government or developer funds would assist the local citizens on the
negotiating committee in understanding the complex risk issues.
1. Minimum Compensation Benchmarks and Agency Expertise
The EPA could set minimum compensation benchmarks based upon a
scientific risk assessment process. Negotiation-based assessments of cost may
be too low because of imperfect information or poor negotiating skills.451
There are difficult problems in measuring the appropriate amount of
compensation, especially for hazardous and radioactive wastes, and in
allocating compensation among potential recipients, 452 but the agency's
minimum compensation figure would provide a starting place for negotiations.
If the EPA found that the risk could range from an excess cancer risk of one-in-
two-hundred-fifty-thousand to a risk of one-in-one-million, it would base
compensation on its lower assessment of risk, one-in-one-million, and then
allow the community committee to bargain with the developer over the
possibility that the risk is really at the high end of the agency's estimate, one-
in-two-hundred-fifty-thousand.
For example, the EPA or a state agency could give persons exposed to
greater than a one-in-one-hundred-thousand excess cancer risk the right to
demand that the developer, owner, or operator buy out those persons' homes at
the fair market value absent the facility. 453 Congress and the EPA have
4 50 See supra notes 410-12 and accompanying text.
451 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1043-44.
452 See id. at 1042-46; Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1212-13 (explaining that different
modeling assumptions can produce very different results in identifying ideal facility
locations).
453 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1198-99 (arguing that "[pleople within a close
radius of the site should not be trapped; they should be offered the preproposal value of
their property, plus relocation costs," and discussing examples of buyouts); Mank, supra
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authorized the buyout of property and relocation of residents when remediation
of a site was infeasible. 454 For the siting of new facilities, however, the EPA
normally should not authorize the siting of a high-risk facility requiring
relocation of residents unless the facility is of critical importance and there are
no other reasonable locations. Developers should not normally have an implicit
eminent domain authority to force a reallocation of property rights. 455
Developers enjoy some constitutional protection from unreasonable
demands. Under Dolan v. City of 2igard,456 governmental exactions imposed
upon a developer must be roughly proportionate to the harm the development
imposes on a neighborhood.457
2. Risk-Based Negotiating Committees
Whenever a new facility is sited, the EPA or a state agency should
establish a Community Negotiation and Compensation Committee and
determine its membership based on technocratic risk assessment procedures. In
selecting representatives, the EPA or a state agency should ignore political
jurisdictions to the extent possible to prevent the "'state line syndrome' in
which waste disposal facilities are frequently proposed for political subdivisions
bordering another state."458 This proposal focuses on three categories of
members: (1) immediate neighbors or those most at risk; (2) state and local
government officials and voters; and (3) regional residents.
A local siting negotiation committee should be free to reject a site unless a
state or federal agency determined that the proposed facility was critically
needed and could not reasonably be sited in another location. The siting
committee would negotiate both the amount and the distribution of the
compensation.
This proposal differs from previous compensation schemes in that those
groups or individuals most at risk would have the largest representation on the
note 172, at 786-91 (proposing use of buffer zones around facilities handling extremely
hazardous chemicals liable to cause catastrophic accidents). Gerrard does not define "close
neighbors" or "close radius."
454 See Marianne Lavelle, Help Sought from 'Green' Justice Panel, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
31, 1994, at A16 (explaining that in 1991 Congress authorized a bill ordering the EPA to
buy out 79 homes and a church in the Carver Terrace subdivision in Texarkana, Texas).
455 See Mank, supra note 172, at 803-04 (discussing buyouts of contaminated areas
and fairness issues raised by in effect giving polluters eminent domain rights).
456 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987).
457 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
458 Wiygul et al., supra note 86, at 437-38.
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negotiation and compensation committee. For example, if a neighborhood
within the host municipality was exposed to an excess cancer risk of less than
one-in-one-million, it would have relatively little representation in the siting or
remedy selection process. If nonimmediate neighbors of the facility, those who
live outside the host municipality, were exposed to an excess cancer risk of
between one-in-ten-thousand and one-in-one-hundred-thousand, they would
have greater representation than residents of the host municipality.
The agency could also set upper limits on compensation to prevent socially
inefficient compensation that gives neighbors no incentive to be the least cost
avoider. 459 Such an approach, however, is probably politically infeasible,
especially in light of scientific uncertainties. Negotiation-based assessments of
cost may be too high as a result of strategic bargaining, because people in the
neighborhood have excessive risk perceptions, or because people believe that
money cannot replace lost health. 460 Compensation is socially inefficient when
resources are devoted to mitigation or risk reduction measures that are not the
most socially desirable. 461 For instance, compensation may be inefficient if it
eliminates the incentive for surrounding neighbors to take precautionary
measures that are cheaper than those that the developer is capable of
implementing. 462
Any attempt, however, to preempt local decisionmaking by limiting the
amount of compensation would likely engender indirect political forces that
would seek to block or delay a proposed project. 46 3 Preemptive statutes have
not worked well in overcoming determined local opposition. 464 Coercive
preemption statutes should be limited to situations in which there is a critical
national or regional need for a facility and there are no reasonable alternative
459 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1045-46.
460 See id. at 1043-44.
461 See id. at 1045 n.234; infra note 177 (discussing whether risk substitution is
socially efficient).
462 The facility could attempt to negotiate a level of compensation that would
encourage the neighbors to take the precautions, but that solution creates holdout problems
and other transaction costs. See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1045-46. Numerous
commentators have discussed the problem of developing socially efficient legal frameworks
that encourage the least cost avoider to take action. See WILLLAM J. BAUMOL,
SuPERFAumN 96-104 (1986); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
1, 31-34 (1960); Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A
Survey, 30 J. EcoN. Lrr. 675, 680-81 (1992); see also Lawrence Blume & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 592-
97 (1984) (discussing potential inefficiency of analogous compensation schemes for
governmental takings of private property).
43 See supra notes 95, 97, 101-03, 218, 221-22 and accompanying text.
46 4 See supra notes 95, 97, 101-03, 218, 221-22 and accompanying text.
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
sites.
Because mediation can facilitate communication between hostile parties, 465
voluntary mediation between the negotiating committee and the developer
should be encouraged. Coercive, mandatory arbitration should not be used
unless there is a critical need for a facility and there are no reasonable
alternative sites. 46 6 The presence of a mediator, however, is unlikely to
eliminate unequal bargaining power caused by financial or informational
disparities. 46 7 It may be necessary to provide financial and technical assistance
grants to local negotiating teams so they can bargain with developers with
relatively equal strength. 468
The Community Negotiation and Compensation Committee would retain
significant discretion in making choices among different types of compensation,
such as choosing among remedial, preventive, or incentive compensation. 469
The Committee would also choose among ex ante, ongoing, and ex post
compensation. 470 Part VI(B)(3) discusses some of the problems that may arise
in choosing among various types of compensation.
Critics of compensation argue that minority or poor residents should not be
placed in the position of giving up their health in a devil's bargain for cash. 471
It is paternalistic and patronizing to presume that minority groups or the poor
cannot make rational decisions even if they are fairly represented and have
access to technical experts to assist them in understanding and questioning the
developer's proposal. It should be assumed that poor or minority residents are
as capable as wealthy persons of bargaining with developers, as long as the
process for selecting the negotiating team adequately represents high-risk and
minority residents and the team has access to adequate technical support
selected by the team but paid for by the government or the developer. It is not
clear whether poor communities are more vulnerable to offers of compensation
or whether there are more complex cultural explanations, such as a long
tradition of hosting military-related projects, for why some communities accept
risky projects, while others do not.472 Because poverty and unemployment
carry significant health risks, local minority groups should be able to determine
whether the benefits in jobs and taxes outweigh the risks of a proposed facility,
465 See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
466 See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
467 See Mank, supra note 79, at 280.
468 See generally Mank, supra note 18, at 342-43; infra note 474 and accompanying
text.
46 9 See supra part lIM.B. 1.
4 70 See supra part 1lI.B.2.
471 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1040-42.
472 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1147-52, 1196-97.
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unless an expert agency finds that the risks are unacceptable. 473 The provision
of technical assistance grants to local communities or citizen groups could
provide a more equal bargaining environment and improve the ability of poor
communities to assess health risks. 474
While there is some danger that certain communities will be exploited by
accepting dangerous projects in exchange for inadequate compensation,
probably the greater problem with this proposal is that risk-based committees in
many cases will refuse to accept even remote risks or will demand
compensation far in excess of any scientifically credible estimate, if they
believe that money cannot replace lost health. This proposal could reduce
NIMBY opposition if a community, believing that the Community Negotiation
and Compensation Committee fairly represents its interests, accepts a facility it
would have rejected under a different siting process. More likely, at least some
individual residents will oppose a proposed facility even if neighborhood
representatives strongly favor its construction. 475
Justice Breyer probably would prefer that siting decisions be made by a
politically insulated, technocratic body rather than the general public or the
proposed risk-based siting committee. Yet even expert agencies make mistakes,
and at least in the American tradition of democratic society it is unrealistic to
expect agencies to operate without public approval, even if Breyer is correct
that public opinion is often il-informed. 476
A risk-based representation and rights statute should not guarantee
absolutely equal distribution of risks, but should force developers and
potentially responsible parties to give greater attention to high-risk residents.477
473 See supra notes 13-15, 406-07, 414-28 and accompanying text.
474 See generally Mank, supra note 18, at 338-43 (discussing ways to improve public
participation in permit-issuing process for sources of hazardous air pollutants, including
provision of technical assistance grants). Eleven states provide such grants. Gerrard, supra
note 75, at 1158. The provision of such grants may discourage litigation in some cases,
although there is the danger that such grants will be used as de facto settlements to get rid of
litigation. For example, environmental justice groups that had petitioned the EPA to address
pollution in the New River withdrew their petition on the final day of the 90-day appeal
period after the Agency promised to consider funding a "community empowerment grant"
to be used by the petitioners to follow all the regulatory activities associated with the New
River. See Environmental Justice Groups Withdraw Petition That Urged EPA to Address
Pollution in New River, [25 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 260 (June 10, 1994).
475 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1045.
476 See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
477 A policy that limits the number of hazardous facilities sited in any given area may
indirectly encourage developers to site facilities in pristine areas without any hazardous
facilities and as a result may run counter to the policy of preserving pristine areas contained,
for example, in the Clean Air Act's prevention of significant deterioration provisions. But
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The process of local decisionmaking and guaranteeing a minimum level of
safety to all persons are both important. Whether a risk-based committee
accepts or denies a proposed facility, it is most equitable that those who bear
the greatest risks have the greatest role in the decisionmaking process, subject
to a risk assessment process that places some limits on what risks or
compensation is reasonable.
From the standpoint of environmental justice, if minorities are in fact more
often exposed to high-risk projects and pollution, a risk-based committee
system ought to empower them and all persons at greatest risk. Additional
reforms may be necessary to improve the effectiveness of risk-based
committees, including the provision of technical assistance grants, better
notification of residents through individual notice, and Spanish or other foreign
language translations.478
In Dolan v. City of ligard,479 the Supreme Court held that a government
body may not put conditions on the granting of a discretionary benefit to an
individual unless the government meets its burden in demonstrating that the
conditions are in rough proportion to the impact of the proposed development.
While a siting board's granting of a permit to a proposed hazardous waste
facility will not ordinarily effect an unconstitutional taking of an adjacent
property owner's land despite the potential for negative impacts, there ought to
be some rough proportion between the burdens imposed by a facility and the
benefits received by individual owners. The best way to achieve this
proportionality is to allocate representation on a siting board according to the
risks posed to respective groups of residents.
3. Neighbors in the "Danger Zone"
Professor Been argues "that compensation programs may underprotect the
immediate neighbors of [a locally undesirable land use] because acceptance of
the compensation is often based upon consent of the majority of the political
jurisdiction, rather than the majority of those most seriously burdened by the
[land use]." 480 A similar issue can arise when communities approve cleanup or
future use plans for an abandoned waste site.
The people who are most threatened by a site should be most heavily
provisions preserving pristine areas are seen by some as hurting minorities and low-income
persons living in urban areas. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
478 See generally Saleem, supra note 280, at 246-47 (arguing that current notice
requirements are inadequate and proposing individual notice and translations for foreign
language speakers).
479 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994).
480 Been, supra note 77, at 788 n.2; id. at 826.
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represented on the committee that advises or decides siting or cleanup issues.
There should be a lesser or no role for residents in a municipality or state who
bear little or no risk. Even these simple principles, however, are very difficult
to apply. One must consider the relative rights of future and present
residents481 or whether residents in the area most at risk who may benefit from
the site as a result of obtaining employment should have the same right to
representation as others who do not receive any employment benefits.
Moreover, it is difficult to assess risk in light of the pervasive scientific
uncertainties and to quantify all of the benefits and risks posed by a proposed
facility.482 Nevertheless, a risk-based approach is the fairest one possible.
There are at least three major ways to define the affected neighborhood-
that is, who is most vulnerable. First, Congress or a state legislature could
choose an arbitrary geographical boundary, such as a two-mile radius around
the facility, a census tract, or a zip code.483 But the magnitude of potential risk
generated by hazardous waste sites has not been established nor has the
relationship between such risks and distance from a site been determined. 484
Accordingly, a fixed distance approach is not the best way to measure risk.
Second, Congress or a state legislature could require the developer, owner,
or operator to conduct a site-specific risk assessment to determine which
residents are most vulnerable.485 The EPA conducts extensive studies of the
exposure pathways by which a population may be exposed to chemicals at, or
originating from, each Superfund site.486 Site-specific risk assessments often
involve a combination of physical exposure assessments and models based upon
extrapolations of data from that source.487 The public should have an
opportunity to challenge that assessment before a siting committee is elected.
People living in an area with an excess cancer risk of one-in-fifty-thousand
ought to have roughly ten times the representation of those who bear a risk of
only one-in-five-hundred-thousand. Undoubtedly, there will be people at the
periphery of areas that could be classified as living in either a high-risk or low-
risk area, but the proposed scheme would correspond to actual risk better than
481 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1044.
4 82 Id. at 1042-43.
483 See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
4 84 Anderton et al., supra note 59, at 124-25. A forthcoming study, Evaluating
Enironmental Equity: The Impacts of Indusrial Hazards on Selected Social Groups in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, by Theodore Glickman at Resources for the Future,
examines the distribution of locally undesirable land uses by risk and proximity. This study
became available too late in the publishing process to include its results. I wish to thank
Professor Vicki Been for alerting me to this study.
485 See infra notes 486-89 and accompanying text.
4 86 See Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 424, at 576-77 &passim.
487 See Mank, supra note 18, at 334-37.
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do arbitrary geographical tests.
One objection to using a risk assessment process to select representatives is
cost. Courts have frequently upheld the EPA's rejection of site-specific
variance procedures proposed by industry on the ground that they are too
costly or bureaucratically cumbersome.488 Using actual exposure assessments
or even models would be more expensive than relying upon arbitrary
geographical tests,489 and there would be more possibilities for litigation
regarding the amount of risk and representation. Nevertheless, Congress or a
state legislature might establish criteria for when exposure assessments are
required. One possibility would be to limit costs to one-half of one percent of
the total cost of building a new facility or cleaning up an abandoned site, then
using geographical tests as a default mechanism for selecting a committee.
A third method of defining the affected neighborhood involves statistical
averages or models. The EPA or states could predict the risk of a facility
having particular characteristics, such as volume and toxicity of waste, based
on studies of similar facilities or on computer models of the proposed site.490
While models are often used in environmental law, 49 1 using statistical averages
or profiles to predict a facility's risk and basing representation on a siting or
compensation committee on that prediction is a new approach.
For both individualized risk assessments and estimates based upon
statistical averages, there will be difficulties in measuring carcinogenic risks
and even greater difficulties in assessing the risks of noncarcinogens, especially
for subpopulation groups whose dietary patterns differ considerably from the
national average. 492 An agency is more likely to estimate a range of risk from a
site than to provide a single number. 493 The EPA or state authorities will have
to exercise their technocratic judgment as to conflicting risk assessments and in
defining the geographic boundaries of the various levels of risk.
In addition, Congress or a state legislature could provide a list of desiderata
to help define the relevant groups most at risk. One possibility would be to
require that racial minorities living in high-risk areas have representation
proportionate to their numbers in that high-risk area. Another possibility would
488 See, e.g., Leather Indus. of Am. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
489 See Mank, supra note 18, at 334-35.
4 90 See ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 23-24 (3d ed. Supp. 1993); see also Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth
S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REv. 1481, 1490-96 (1992)
(proposing use of statistical claim profiles in tort cases).
491 See Mank, supra note 18, at 335.
4 92 See supra notes 54, 449 and accompanying text.
493 See Mank, supra note 18, at 332-34 (discussing risk range concept and use of
"fuzzy bright line" statutes and regulations acknowledging scientific uncertainties).
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be to require that at least one committee member be a racial minority if there is
a certain percentage of minorities in the high-risk area. Better ways to protect
the interests of all minority groups and ways more consistent with democratic
theory are a cumulative voting system, in which any self-identified minority
can cumulate all of its votes for one candidate,494 and a Hare Single
Transferable Vote proportional voting system.495 This Article's proposal
differs from traditional cumulative or proportional voting systems in that votes
would be weighted to give more influence to high-risk residents. Congress or a
state legislature might also direct the EPA or state authorities to take into
account geographical boundaries such as census tracts or political subdivisions
if such boundaries coincide in large part with the high-risk area and if only a
494 See GUINIER, supra note 72, at 14-16 & passim. Guinier discusses the use of
supermajority rules or a minority veto as voting remedies in extreme cases of majority
domination. Id. at 16-17, 116-17, 260 n.119. Such drastic remedies should not be
considered until cumulative voting has been shown to be ineffective at representing minority
interests.
495 In a Hare Single Transferable Vote proportional voting system, voters rank the
candidates in order of preference. If a candidate has more than the minimum number of
votes to win under the Droop formula, her "surplus" votes are transferred to her voter's
second choice. If this transfer does not result in a winner, the candidate with the fewest
votes is eliminated and her votes transferred to the next available preference, excluding
winning candidates. See Inman, supra note 351, at 1999-2001; Still, supra note 351, at
258-59. Proponents of a Single Transferable Vote proportional voting system argue that it
is less open to manipulation than cumulative voting as a result of either strategic voting or
the encouragement of "straw men" to waste opponents' votes. See Still, supra note 351, at
260. A party-list proportional voting system, in which each voter votes for one party or list,
has certain advantages compared to a Hare Single Transferable Vote system, but has
significant drawbacks in nonpartisan elections in which the minority is a racial or ethnic
minority rather than a political party. See id. at 262. While the formation of racial parties
can reduce the problems that party-list systems can cause for minorities, this Article
assumes that elections for a siting committee should be nonpartisan and that the Hare Single
Transferable Vote system is probably a better approach for such elections.
The Michigan Supreme Court in two old cases held that cumulative voting and single
transferable voting violated the Michigan Constitution's right of each citizen to vote for all
elective officers. See Wattles v. Upjohn, 179 N.W. 335, 335-42 (Mich. 1920) (single
transferable voting); Maynard v. Board of Dist. Canvassers, 47 N.W. 756, 756-61 (Mich.
1890) (cumulative voting). Many scholars have criticized Maynard's poor reasoning, and
Wattles is probably no longer good law. See Bernard Grofinan, Criteria for Districting: A
Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REv. 77, 165-66 (1985). Many courts have
upheld the validity of cumulative or single transferable voting. See, e.g., Campbell v. Board
of Educ., 310 F. Supp. 94, 95-106 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Moore v. Election Comm'rs, 35
N.E.2d 222, 229-41 (Mass. 1941); Johnson v. City of New York, 9 N.E.2d 30, 31-38
(N.Y. 1937); Reutener v. City of Cleveland, 141 N.E. 27, 32-34 (Ohio 1923).
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few persons would be excluded from electing representatives to, or serving as
members of, a siting or remedy selection committee by taking into account
such boundaries.
There are a number of problems in apportioning representation among
those who live or own property in a high-risk area. One problem involves
apportioning representation among renters, resident property owners, and
nonresident property owners. 496 Professor Been states that "[riesidents would
claim that they bear the most immediate risk and injury. Landlords, however,
would assert that they absorb at least some, if not all, of the tenants' damages
through lower rents." 497
For equitable reasons, health risks should take precedence over risks to
property. Renters who are at high risk of developing cancer ought to have more
representation than nonresidential property owners. Nonresidential property
owners should have to demonstrate that they are likely to live in their homes in
the future or to articulate what property damages they expect as a result of the
facility. 498 If the market for rent is efficient, landlords will benefit from higher
rents if more people are willing to rent in an area that hosts a facility but
compensates renters. Long-term residents should receive more representation
than transient residents. For example, there could be a requirement that at least
one representative on the siting committee have lived in the high-risk area for
at least five years. 499
An even more difficult problem is representing future residents.500 A
compensation committee must decide what percentage of compensation will be
496 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1044 (discussing allocation of compensation
among residents, property owners, and the neighborhood itself).
49 7 Id.
498 There is mixed evidence regarding the impact of locally undesirable land uses on
neighboring property values. See id. at 1020-23.
499 Proposed Superfund legislation included precatory language suggesting that it is
"appropriate" for the President to include representation from "long-term residents who are
members of the medical community." H.R. 3800, supra note 259, § 103.
500 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1044. See generally Farber &
Hemmersbaugh, supra note 254 (discussing problems of discount rates and intergenerational
effects); Roger E. Kasperson, Social Issues in Radioactive Waste Management: The
National Experience, in EQurrY IssuEs IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMEW 24, 50-52
(Roger E. Kasperson ed., 1983); Guy Kirsch, Solidarity Between Generations:
Intergenerational Distributional Problems in Environmental and Resource Policy, in
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTS IN ENmOtNMEmAL RESOURCE POLICY 381 (Allan Schnaigberg
et al. eds., 1986); Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Responsibilities to Future
Generations for the Environment, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 198 (1990); E. Joshua Rosenkranz,
Note, A Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come: Standing to Sue for Future Generations, 1 J.L. &
TECH. 67 (1986).
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ex ante, ongoing, or ex post.501 In a recent study of Superfund sites, Professors
Hamilton and Viscusi found that "future risks account[ed] for over 90% of all
the risk-weighted pathways for the Superfund sites in our sample. Chief among
these future risks is the projection that future residents will reside on sites that
are not currently residential." 50 2 They argue that many of these risks could be
eliminated by land use restrictions preventing residential use of highly polluted
sites and by containment, including fences, but that these strategies would
require a change in the EPA's legislative mandate preferring long-term
effectiveness and permanence in remedy selection.503 Legislation proposed in
1994 would have allowed the EPA to take into account the likely future use of
a site, whether residential or industrial, and would have established Community
Working Groups of up to twenty representatives to advise the EPA on land use
recommendations affecting future use.504
Siting boards and negotiating committees face conflicts in representing
present and future interests, and typically there are no statutory or regulatory
guidelines that address conflicting or multiple interests. 505 Because present
residents have an incentive to seek ex ante compensation, the government
should appoint trustees to represent future residents. In traditional estates and
trusts law, trustees often must make difficult choices between income- and
principal-producing investments in fulfilling their duty to represent the
conflicting interests of both present life beneficiaries and holders of future
interests.5°6 Trustees should represent only future generations, and those
residents currently most at risk should have the greatest weight in electing
representatives to act on behalf of present interests. 507
501 e supra part Il.B.2.
502 Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 424, at 608.
503 See id. at 608-09.
504 See H.R. 3800, supra note 259, § 102 (community working groups), § 502(2)
(reasonably anticipated future uses of land); Douglas A. McWilliams, Comment,
Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment: Economics and Equality in Urban
Revitalization, 21 EcoLoGY L.Q. 705, 774-75 (1994) (discussing community work group
proposal).
505 See ENGLISH, supra note 270, at 73-76 (discussing fiduciary responsibility of siting
boards).
5 06 See JESSE DUKEMINmR & STANLEY M. JOHANSoN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
876 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing fiduciary duty of impartiality in allocating income and
principal). Professor Richard Epstein argues that genetic connection usually leads parents to
protect the interests of their children if the parent as a life beneficiary of a trust has the right
to invade principal at the expense of the remainderpersons, her children. See Richard A.
Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1465, 1472-74 (1989).
507 This proposal does not address discount rates or the trustee's time horizon. Another
difficult issue is the extent of the current generation's obligations to future generations.
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Several environmental statutes require the EPA or other government
agencies to consider future threats to human health. 508 Most notably, the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) declares that "it is the
continuing responsibility of the federal government to use all practicable
means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to
[ensure]... that the Nation may... fulfill the responsibilities of each
generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations." 509 In
both the Oil Pollution Act of 1990510 and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),511 the
Mhe current generation is not truly a trustee with a moral obligation to preserve the
entire corpus for future generations.... [We think that members of the current
generation are felt to have a more compelling obligation toward the next generation
(and perhaps at least to young grandchildren) than to later generations.
Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 254, at 295.
508 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act mentions the minimization of
"present and future threat[s] to human health and the environment" in a number of
provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (stating national policy), § 6922(b) (requiring
generators to certify that technology in furtherance of this policy is being employed),
§ 6925(h)(2) (likewise conditioning permit issuance on use of compatible technologies)
(1988); Spear, supra note 425, at 118-19 n.5 (1993). In defining the terms "remedy" and
"remedial action," the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act requires that the chosen course of action "prevent or minimize the release of
hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or
future public health or welfare or the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988); Spear,
supra note 425, at 119 n.9 & passim. Title IV of the Clean Air Act, which addresses acid
deposition, states that "current and future generations of Americans will be adversely
affected by delaying measures to remedy the problem." 42 U.S.C. § 7651(a)(5) (Supp. V
1993). The Nuclear Waste Act states that "high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear
fuel have become major subjects of public concern, and appropriate precautions must be
taken to ensure that such waste and spent fuel do not adversely affect the public health and
safety and the environment for this or future generations." Id. § 10131(a)(7).
509 Id. § 4331(b); see Gerald M. Levine, The Rhetoric of Public Expectation: An
Enquiry into the Concepts of Responsiveness and Responsibility Under the Environmental
Laws, 8 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 389, 414-16 (1991) (discussing trustee provision in NEPA);
Timothy P. Brady, Comment, "But Most of It Belongs to Those Yet to Be Born:" The Public
Trust Doctrine, NEPA, and the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 621, 644-
45 (1990) (arguing NEPA has failed to incorporate public trust doctrine and is inadequate to
protect future generations).
510 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b) (Supp. V 1993). See generally Symposium, Oil Pollution Act
Rulemaking, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 215 (1993).
511 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988). See generally Anthony R. Chase, Remedying
CERCLA 's Natural Resource Damages Provision: Incorporation of the Public Trust Doctrine
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President, or the authorized representative of any state, Indian tribe, or foreign
government, may designate trustees to present a claim and recover damages to
compensate for harm to natural resources. In theory, trustees should protect
environmental resources for future generations, 512 but both the Oil Pollution
Act and CERCLA fail to specify how trustees should spend recovered damages
in the future or where the money should be kept in the interim.513 NEPA's
provisions regarding the rights of future generations are purely procedural and
lack any substantive power.514
A percentage of the seats on a Community Negotiation Compensation
Committee should be assigned to government trustees whose sole purpose is to
represent future generations. 515 Trustees should distinguish between those who
will live near a facility while it is operating and those who will reside there
only after the facility closes. Instead of making a lump sum payment to
residents present when a facility is opened, an ongoing compensation plan
could require annual payments to those residents present on a certain date,
perhaps including a pro rata system for those present only part of a year. 516 To
protect residents after a facility is closed, a developer could create an ex post
trust fund or put up a bond to address future issues resulting from eventual
closure of the site, such as post-closure monitoring or implementation of
institutional controls including signs, a fence, or local land use regulations. 517
into Natural Resources Damage Actions, 11 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 353 (1992); Andrew J.
Simons & James M. Wicks, Natural Resources Damages Under CERCLA: Here They
Come, Ready or Not, 63 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 801 (1989).
512 See Levine, supra note 509, at 414-16.
513 Chase, supra note 511, at 380 (discussing CERCLA).
5 14 See Brady, supra note 509, at 643-46.
515 The number or percentage of seats that ought to be assigned raises a number of
complex questions related to the discounting of future harms or benefits. See generally
Farber & Heimmersbaugh, supra note 254. Congress or a state legislature could mandate a
fixed percentage or number of seats, or delegate this task to an administrative agency
empowered to consider the question of discount rates.
5 16 Tooele County, Utah receives $2,000,000 in annual "mitigation fees," which have
allowed the county to freeze its property taxes. Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1161. Efforts in
several states to use ongoing compensation to convince residents to accept low-level
radioactive waste facilities have failed. See Been, supra note 77, at 803-08.
517 Owners of hazardous waste facilities must set aside enough resources to assure site
safety for 30 years after closure. 40 C.F.R. § 264.117(a)(1) (1994). See generally Bailey,
supra note 75, at B3. The recent decline in demand for hazardous waste disposal has led to
declining profits in the industry and raised questions about whether firms will be able to
survive to fulfill postclosure requirements. Some states are requiring operators to put cash
into trust funds to pay for postclosure monitoring. Bailey, supra note 75, at B3; see also
Black, supra note 186, at 584 (criticizing current financial guarantee requirements for
hazardous waste operators).
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There is evidence that current financial responsibility requirements for
hazardous waste operators are inadequate.518 Efforts to create long-term
repositories for high-level radioactive waste raise issues about our society's
ability to establish institutional controls for centuries or millennia.519
Ultimately, there is no perfect way to allocate seats or votes among renters and
property owners, long-term and short-term residents, and especially among
present and future residents, but a more representative siting system should at
least take such factors into account.
There are important distributional issues concerning which citizens and
governmental bodies in a community should benefit from compensation.
Negotiation committees should have the authority to negotiate compensation
from developers that is paid either directly by the developer or indirectly
through a governmental body to mitigate the harms caused to individual
residents. There would have to be some guidelines to prevent members of the
committee from simply rewarding themselves or their friends, and to protect
future residents. Compensation should be subject to public disclosure and
debate, and to review by an administrative agency and the courts.
Remedial and preventive compensation should take precedence over simply
providing incentives to accept a facility. It is more important to provide
remedial compensation to persons who suffer actual health or property damage
from a facility than to give every person in a host community $100 per year as
an incentive to vote in favor of accepting the facility. The choice between
providing remedial compensation to those who have suffered harm and using
compensation to prevent future harms raises more complex issues. Ideally, a
developer should compensate every person actually harmed, but the long
latency periods of many diseases and the fact that there are many possible
causes of cancer and other diseases make it difficult to determine whether the
facility is a significant causal factor. Accordingly, it may make sense to
concentrate on preventive measures that reduce the harmfulness of the facility.
Another issue is whether a compensation scheme should consider the
employment or other in-kind benefits that a resident receives from a facility in
reducing the amount of compensation. 520 In principle, a resident should not
receive double benefits from a facility, such as both employment and
compensation for living near her employer. On the other hand, an employee
might argue that the benefits of working for the facility should be discounted
by the possibility that the employee could obtain alternative employment and
518 See supra notes 186, 517 and accompanying text.
519 A number of critics have questioned whether the Department of Energy's attempt
to design a 10,000-year "keep out" sign at radioactive depositories is practical when no
human institution has lasted that long. See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1133.
520 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1044.
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then also receive compensation. For instance, if an employee makes $25,000
per year working at a hazardous waste facility but could make $24,500 per year
at an alternate job, then the actual benefit of the facility to the employee is only
$500 per year and not $25,000. Because the complexities of assessing an
employee's substitute employment opportunities may outweigh the advantages
of considering the benefits of employment, it may be better not to consider
employment benefits in determining how much compensation a resident should
receive from a facility owner or operator.
4. Local Politicians and Political Residents
The biggest potential losers from a scheme of risk-based compensation
committees would be state and local politicians, who today normally have the
greatest say in negotiating compensation from developers of risky projects, and
residents of host communities who would benefit from compensation even if
they were at low or no risk from the facility.521 Because it is elected officials
who bear much of the responsibility for the decisions that have created siting
disparities, reducing their authority is a plausible strategy for reducing such
disparities. 522 Even if elected officials are currently the best suited to make
siting and compensation decisions, it may be better to allow others to negotiate
with developers because many people associate elected officials with past
discriminatory practices. 523 Furthermore, elected officials may not be
representative of the public on the issues raised by the compensation
proposal. 524
To the extent that it is politically feasible, the Community Negotiation and
Compensation Committees should supplant these politicians. Of course, there
will always be some type of politics involved in any system of representation,
but this proposal would at least reduce the role of elected politicians and
increase the influence of those at greatest risk. Many politicians would be more
than happy to dump divisive siting issues like a hot potato. Some politicians
have lost re-election as a result of taking a stand on controversial siting
issues.525
Residents of a state or municipality who elected local or state politicians or
521 See id. at 1045 (noting that state or local officials generally conduct siting
compensation negotiations).
522 See id.
523 See id.
52 4 See id.; ENGLisH, supra note 270, at 76, 138.
525 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1052 n.9 (citing sources describing incumbents in
Nebraska and Nevada who were defeated largely as a result of their positions on siting
issues).
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who have the right to vote in a referendum approving a site should lose power
to the extent that the project does not pose a risk to them. Arguably, low-risk
residents who receive compensation in excess of their harm from the facility
are engaging in rent seeking, in the language of public choice theory, 526 at the
expense of higher-risk residents or possibly the facility owner. Legislatures
should reduce the political power of low-risk residents to give more power to
endangered neighbors, but it may be difficult to accomplish this equitable goal
if low-risk residents are well represented in the legislature. Low-risk residents
should not have veto power over needed facilities if high-risk residents are
willing to accept a facility. For example, the residents in Nevada who bear little
or no risk should not decide whether a particular locality such as Nye County,
the home of Yucca Mountain, ought to accept a high-level radioactive waste
facility that is needed by the nation if local residents are willing to accept the
risk, unless the state as a whole will bear substantial costs or risks.527
There are important equitable reasons for giving less money and authority
to states, local governments, or individuals that do not bear significant risks
from building a proposed facility or cleaning up an abandoned one.
Compensation may be used by a state or municipality for such beneficial
purposes as "tax relief, new schools and hospitals, and more police and
teachers."5 28 To the extent that this Article's proposal redirects more money to
those neighbors at greatest risk, there will be less money for general municipal
or state improvement projects. It is fairest, however, to compensate those who
are actually at risk. Comprehensive property or income tax measures are a
better way to raise revenues than is giving compensation to an entire state or
municipality for a project that may place risks on only a few people within that
political division. It is even more unfair when states or communities gain
compensation for projects that cause significant externalities for residents of
neighboring communities, states, or even foreign nations.5 29 A risk-based
representation system is fairer than relying upon existing political subdivisions
that do not reflect the actual distribution of risks from a site.
5. Regional Concerns
Commentators have often argued in favor of regional political solutions to
526 See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
527 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1161-62 ("Many residents of Nye County, Nevada,
the home of Yucca Mountain, support the construction of [such a facility], but the state has
vigorously fought the proposal.").
528 Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1199.
529 See supra note 150 and accompanying text; infra notes 530-34, 543-44 and
accompanying text.
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social or environmental problems because states and municipalities tend to site
polluting facilities on their boundaries, passing external costs on to other
communities.5 30 In an earlier article, this author noted the regional nature of
pollution from waste disposal facilities and argued that "surrounding
communities should have a greater role in negotiating compensation." 531
Subsequently, Michael Wheeler discussed the need for regional siting
negotiations.5 32 This Article's proposed risk-based siting committee differs
from previous proposals by ignoring political subdivisions to the extent
possible and allocating representation based on the risk that a facility presents
to a group of persons rather than on where they live. Regional residents who
do not live in the political subdivision hosting the facility would gain or lose
power depending upon the actual risk posed by the site to them.
Pollution problems often create externalities or spillover effects that do not
respect political boundaries.5 33 Previous efforts to deal with interstate air
pollution have not been effective because the EPA has been too reluctant to
override political subdivisions for the sake of less pollution. 534 Thus, it is
important to give more representation to regional residents who are affected by
significant spillover effects. Regional residents who are at little risk from a
project are often the most vociferous and best organized, and such residents
would lose influence under the proposal. 535
530 See supra note 150 and accompanying text; infra notes 531-34, 543-44 and
accompanying text.
531 Manic, supra note 79, at 284. The Massachusetts negotiated compensation statute
permits a community that "hosts" a new facility to grant surrounding communities a role in
negotiations and possibly in compensation. Under the Massachusetts administrative code,
the chief executive officer of a host community of a hazardous waste facility can invite up to
four people from abutting communities to be members of a local assessment committee. See
MAss. REGS. CODE, tit. 990, § 8.02(l)(g) (1987 & Supp. 1993); Mank, supra, note 79, at
279 n.231, 284.
532 See Wheeler, supra note 214, at 284-88.
533 See Mank, supra note 172, at 784-86.
534 See FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 490, at 372-75 (3d ed. 1991) (discussing the
failure of 1970 Clean Air Act §§ 110(a)(2)(E) and 126 to address interstate air pollution and
judicial deference to the EPA, which approved state implementation plans unlikely to
resolve interstate pollution problems).
535 Much of the opposition to the siting of a high-level radioactive waste facility at
Yucca Mountain comes from outside Nye County, the location of the proposed facility. See
Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1150, 1161-62. The Department of Energy has had as much
trouble regarding the cleanup of the Hanford nuclear facility from Seattle and Portland
groups as from local residents. Interview with John S. Applegate, chairperson of the
Citizens Task Force for cleaning up the Fernald, Ohio Department of Energy nuclear
facility, in Cincinnati, Ohio (Aug. 10, 1994).
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Local sovereignty in America has often resulted in an exodus of middle
class people and businesses from the problems of the city into suburbs and
thereby "segregated many of America's metropolitan areas into 'two nations':
rich and poor, white and black, expanding and contracting." 536 Professor Jerry
Frug has argued that new forms of regional organization should be created to
address this problem and proposed that, a regional legislature, with
representatives elected from neighborhoods rather than from existing political
subdivisions, should decide whether a locality may exclude a waste dump that
the region needs. 537 Even a regional government's interests, however, would
need some broader check.538
While Frug's proposal for regional legislatures remains a dream, three
models of regional collaboration have been used with some degree of success:
(1) special fora that allow municipalities to coordinate regional policies; (2)
systems that allow communities to shift regional mandates; and (3) pooling
arrangements that enable communities to share the costs and benefits of
development more equitably.539 Connecticut has adopted voluntary policy fora
in which central cities and their suburban neighbors can negotiate "fair share
housing compacts" regarding low-income housing.5 40 New Jersey has created
an administrative agency to determine each municipality's low-income housing
obligations but allows authorized communities to lower their affordable housing
burden by up to one-half if they could voluntarily negotiate with other
municipalities to absorb more than their quota.5 41 Since 1971, St. Paul and
Minneapolis, Minnesota have participated in a seven-county regional tax-base-
sharing area, which is essentially a pooling arrangement designed to reduce
fiscal disparities between the two cities and the surrounding suburbs. Despite
extensive discussion of the subject by academics and planners, no other major
metropolitan area has adopted such an approach or genuine regional power
sharing. 542
536 Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHi. L. REv. 253, 256 (1993).
537 See id. at 295-97.
538 "As Foucault suggests, fear of sovereign power is so common that it is routinely
converted into a subjected sovereignty, a sovereignty limited by some other sovereignty."
Id. at 255 (discussing Michel Foucault, LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE 221
(1977)).
539 Wheeler, supra note 214, at 284.
540 See id. at 284-85.
541 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-305(a), -312(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1994);
Wheeler, supra note 216, at 285-86.
542 See Mank, supra note 80, at 284-85 n.259 (citing sources discussing regional tax-
based sharing); Wheeler, supra note 214, at 286.
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Wheeler proposes that all communities in a region be assessed a NIMBY
tax, the proceeds of which would compensate communities that agreed to take
responsibility for treatment plants, prisons, or other needed facilities.5 43 His
proposal is interesting, but does not address who should serve on the
compensation negotiation committee or direct compensation to those individuals
at greatest risk.
A radical transformation to regional government is not necessary. Siting
committee representation should be based on risk even if affected individuals
live outside the host community's political boundaries. This approach could be
implemented by using either geographical boundaries such as a two-mile radius
or site-specific exposure assessments or models. Either way, nearby regional
residents would have a greater say. Those who would suffer direct economic
injury from a physical environmental effect of a proposed site should have a
say in selecting the community negotiating committee, but indirect and
tangential economic injuries should be ignored. 544
543 See Wheeler, supra note 214, at 286-87.
544 See Been, supra note 77, at 826. To answer a question posed by Professor Been, in
selecting a siting committee, not much weight should be given to a ski resort 20 miles away
that fears a facility might stigmatize the area and discourage tourism. Similarly, the Army
Corps of Engineers may not deny a wetlands permit under § 404 of the Clean Water Act
because of indirect socioeconomic impacts on a neighboring city unrelated to the direct
physical impacts of a proposed suburban mall on wetlands. See Mall Properties, Inc. v.
Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561, 566-67 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that Army Corps of Engineers
may not deny wetlands permit based upon indirect socioeconomic impacts of suburban mall
on merchants in nearby city), appeal dismissed, 841 F.2d 440 (ist Cir.), cen. denied sub
nom. City of Newhaven v. Marsh, 488 U.S. 848 (1988). The National Environmental
Policy Act distinguishes between direct socioeconomic impacts proximately caused by
physical effects, which warrant discussion in an Environmental Impact Statement, and
tangential social impacts, which may be omitted. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a;
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 773-77 (1983)
(holding that psychological fears of nuclear accident at Three Mile Island are not a
significant impact warranting an Environmental Impact Statement because there is not a
reasonably close causal connection between a change in the physical environment and effect
at issue); Glass Packaging Inst. v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that
potential for increased tampering if agency adopts regulations allowing plastic liquor bottles
is not an environmental consequence under National Environmental Policy Act), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984).
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State and local governments should have a say based upon the actual risks
or costs posed by a siting or remedy selection issue. This proposal would
reduce the stateline problem discussed above and more accurately internalize
the externalities caused by a project. Most likely, states or municipalities would
fight any attempt to weaken their siting or remedy selection authority. The
environmental justice movement, however, may force Congress to rethink the
existing environmental decisionmaking framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because the central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to provide an
adequate opportunity for political participation and representation to minority
groups rather than to guarantee substantive fairness, 545 Congress and state
legislatures should adopt this Article's proposal for enhancing the ability of
those residents most at risk, including racial minorities, to select a community's
siting negotiation and compensation committee rather than expand the ability of
minority groups to bring disparate impact suits alleging substantive unfairness.
Siting discrimination suits at best can address only inequities in the initial siting
decision. A compensation process allows a community to negotiate with a
developer to provide ex ante compensation to redress harms resulting from the
initial siting decision, and also to provide ongoing or ex post compensation to
compensate future residents. In the absence of intentional discrimination, a
compensation process that adequately protects the ability of minorities to
participate can address a broader range of harms than can siting discrimination
suits and can do so without unfairly stigmatizing government officials or
developers. 546
This Article proposes a risk-based representation and compensation system
in which the EPA or state agency would use its technocratic expertise to set
upper limits on risk, establish minimum compensation, and determine
representation on a risk-based negotiation committee. A weighted cumulative or
proportional voting system might be used to enhance the ability of racial and
other minorities to gain representation on the siting committee. The local risk-
545 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
546 While developers and government officials can reasonably expect to receive
criticism for their siting decisions from various members of the public or the media, courts
should not conclude that officials or developers have harmed minority groups unless one
can reasonably infer conscious bias or that the siting process unreasonably excludes
minorities from the decisionmaking process. If minorities are adequately represented and
have reasonable access to information about a project, a siting committee ought to be able to
place a project in a minority community unless there is an unreasonable overall risk to that
community as determined by the EPA or a state agency.
[Vol. 56:329
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
based committees would determine whether to accept a proposed facility and
would negotiate the amount and distribution of compensation. There are a
number of complex issues in allocating representation among future and present
residents, renters and property owners, transient and long-term residents, and
in selecting among remedial, preventive, and incentive remedies. These issues
should be confronted rather than ignored because of a misplaced focus on
discrimination suits and judicial scrutiny of substantive results. 547
5 47 It is important that the committee determine a fair amount of compensation because
its settlement with the developer should normally foreclose future litigation unless the
developer withheld important information or significantly changes the scope of its
operations. Cf Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871-75 (N.Y. 1970)
(granting injunction against defendant but allowing defendant to pay permanent damages to
private plaintiffs that will foreclose future litigation by those plaintiffs); see also Daniel A.
Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, Efficiency, and Nuisance Law, in PROPERTY LAW AND
LEGAL EDUCATION 7, 14-19 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988) (criticizing
Boomer court's damages approach and arguing for injunctive remedies).
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